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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This report documents research undertaken over the past year through the Winnipeg Inner-city Research 
Alliance to examine the rise of fringe financial services in Winnipeg's North End. Fringe financial 
services include a variety of financial services such as loans and cheque-cashing that are offered by fringe 
banks. Although fringe banks are becoming more common today they generally operate on the margin of 
the mainstream banking and credit union system in Canada.  
 
Fringe banks include pawnshops, cheque-cashing firms, payday lenders, rent-to-own firms, tax refund 
advancers, finance companies and 'white-label' automatic teller machine providers. This report explores 
client experiences with fringe banks, it examines the issue of fringe bank legitimacy and it develops a 
model and provides a preliminary feasibility assessment of an alternative model to fringe banks for low-
income people. The research project has involved a series of methods including interviews with 41 North 
End fringe bank clients; interviews with 27 key-informants with special knowledge about fringe banks 
and North End resident’s financial needs; outlet follow-up and sample transaction and two focus group 
discussions and a feasibility assessment. 
 
The rise of fringe banks and their use is a complex phenomenon that is driven by broad changes in 
Canadian society and economy. Although many of the drivers of the fringe bank growth are broad 
processes, fringe banks have a particular impact on their clients, owners, employees and neighbourhoods. 
The research project, rooted in a community-identified issue, has generated a significant understanding of 
the social and economic impacts of fringe banking in the North End.  
 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Section one of the report summarises available academic and policy literature on fringe banking and 
describes the research objectives and methods of this research project. The research objectives were 
threefold:  
• to understand the motives and experiences of North End fringe bank clients;  
• to determine if fringe bankers overcharge their clients; and  
• to develop a model, and complete a pre-feasibility assessment of a consumer financial services outlet 
that could offer an alternative to existing fringe banks.  
 
 
NORTH END WINNIPEG 
 
Section two reports on key social and economic indicators for households within the North End and in 
comparison with the rest of Winnipeg. This section demonstrates the relatively disadvantaged situation 
faced by households in the North End in general and within certain North End communities in particular. 
Indicators ranging from income, employment to dependence on social assistance demonstrate that North 
End residents experience greater deprivation than in Winnipeg overall. Considering that mainstream 
banks have shut down branches in the North End and that North End residents are more reliant on public 
transportation serves to compound the challenge for residents of the North End in meeting their financial 
service needs.  
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CLIENT EXPERIENCES AND MOTIVATIONS 
 
The survey of fringe bank clients is reported in section three. This section documents client experiences 
and motivations in using various fringe banks, the reasons for using fringe financial services, different 
household strategies for obtaining informal credit and the social consequences of relying on fringe banks. 
This research found that the motivations for using fringe banks are quite complex, varying among clients 
and across types of fringe banks.  
 
On the one hand, the clients we spoke with thought that fringe banks provided a service they needed. 
These financial service outlets, such as cheque-cashing firms and rent-to-owns, are easy to access for a 
variety of reasons: clients generally do not need a bank account or the personal identification required for 
a bank account. Moreover, fringe bank outlets are nearby and have convenient hours of operation. 
Pawnshops provide clients with quick access to cash to meet emergency needs when other sources (e.g., 
bank, family or friends) are not available. In general, clients of these services had low incomes. Payday 
lenders and finance firms were used by a smaller number of our surveyed clients. Clients of these services 
reported similar accessibility motives as did other fringe bank clients, but they had higher incomes. Firms 
that provide tax refund advances and local stores and bars that provide credit and cheque-cashing services 
were also described by some clients who were interviewed. 
 
On the other hand, several of the fringe bank clients who were interviewed recognised that the services 
come at a high cost, in some cases deepening their debt load and aggravating a cycle of poverty. Some 
clients of cheque-cashing firms noted the high price they paid for this service. Some interviewed 
pawnshop clients were particularly aware of the relationship between pawning, debt and poverty. Several 
rent-to-own clients we interviewed noted the large difference between the retail price of the good as 
compared to the total payments they made for the good. While in many cases clients do not know exactly 
how the fringe bank fee compares to mainstream bank services, they do understand that fringe financial 
services are more expensive. 
 
Among interviewed clients factors correlated with the use of fringe banks include, low income, low levels 
of formal education, single parenthood, limited access to a mainstream banks and bank services. Some 
clients have difficulty physically getting to the bank while others lack the personal identification required 
to open a basic account. Fringe bank clients we interviewed commented that they felt more respectfully 
treated and that they had a greater sense of control over their money at fringe banks as compared to 
mainstream banks. 
 
These motives and experiences help to explain the rise of fringe banks in the North End. The client 
research also revealed a variety of informal credit strategies undertaken by fringe bank clients. These 
strategies involve informal credit through family and friends that complement or substitute for fringe bank 
credit. Section three concludes with a discussion of the social effects of fringe banking. It argues that 
fringe banking can trap low-income clients into a cycle of debt and poverty. This is aggravated by public 
policy that does not effectively address the causes of poverty and community-based supports that are 
inadequate to deal with the scope of the challenge. 
 
 
THE NATURE OF FRINGE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
Section four documents the number of fringe financial service providers, their services and the costs of 
their services in Winnipeg and the North End. The data demonstrate a rise in the number of providers in 
both Winnipeg and the North End in the last twenty years, but particularly in the last five years. Cheque-
cashers, payday lenders, rent-to-owns and pawnshops are a growing sector. Over the last 10 to 15 years, 
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the North End has experienced a transformation whereby the number of mainstream bank branches have 
declined precipitously while the number of fringe banks has grown rapidly.  
 
This section also documents the types of services offered by fringe banks and examines the associated 
costs in terms of a lump-sum fee and annualised interest rates. The costs associated with these services are 
high in terms of annualised interest rates as follows: 450 percent for a $50–$100 pawn; 210 percent to 
cash a cheque (assuming it is equivalent to a five-day loan); 675 percent for a $100 payday loan; 305 
percent for a rent-to-own agreement; and 286 percent for a tax refund advance (assuming it is equivalent 
to a two-week loan). Fringe bank service costs are far in excess of comparable services offered by 
mainstream banks through deposit accounts, credit cards and lines-of-credit. Moreover, fringe financial 
services meet only the immediate financial need; these services do not address longer-term financial 
needs of their clients such as savings and building a positive credit rating.  
 
This section also reports on fringe banker perceptions of their clients' background. Many interviewed 
fringe bankers believe their clients have low-incomes. Pawnbrokers and rent-to-own respondents felt that 
the majority of their respondents are Aboriginal and rent-to-own respondents indicated 85 percent of their 
clients were recipients of Employment and Income Assistance. Because of data limitations, we were not 
able to determine whether fringe banks generated profits beyond what is considered to be a fair or 
competitive rate of profit.  
 
 
FRINGE BANK LEGITIMACY ISSUES 
 
Section five addresses and summarises the central issues raised in the key informant survey pertaining to 
fringe bank legitimacy, government policy and the relationship between fringe banks and the illegal 
economy. In terms of fringe bank legitimacy, views expressed by key informants varied. Fringe bankers 
made the case for legitimacy in a variety of ways, most importantly that they follow fair business 
practices and that other 'legitimate' businesses (e.g., corporations) also regularly charge high fees for 
services. Fringe bankers report that they are responding to a growing demand for their services and 
described their business practices as fair. (Note that we were only able to interview one cheque-
cashing/payday lending firm.) The fees charged, according to the fringe bank respondents, were high 
because of the risky and time-consuming nature of their business. A business-client tension was identified 
when fringe bank respondents were asked why their clients used fringe financial services instead of 
mainstream financial services: several commented that their clients made poor decisions. 
 
Section five included views expressed by other key informants about fringe banking policy and 
community impact. Government views of fringe banks were somewhat mixed. Views of provincial 
government respondents were particularly complicated, involving support in principle for fringe banks, 
but a willingness to address particular cases of fringe bank overcharging and when necessary, adjusting 
the fees paid by an individual to below the criminal rate of interest. The federal government respondent 
indicated that fringe banking is not in its jurisdiction in terms of policy, making the provincial perspective 
all the more important. Views expressed by community organisations were mixed regarding fringe bank 
legitimacy but a common concern was expressed that the relationship with fringe banks does not help 
clients move out of poverty. 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 
Section six considers a variety of alternatives to fringe banks from around North America, examining 
them from a community economic development perspective. This section highlights the models, services 
and costs associated with a variety of firms around the continent including the Toronto's Cash and Save, 
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Vancouver's Four Corners Savings Association, the Desjardins Caisse Populaire micro-consumer loan 
fund in Quebec and the Florida Central Credit Union inner-city projects. These models demonstrate the 
variety of approaches that credit unions, banks, governments and communities have developed to address 
financial service needs of low-income people.  
 
This section concludes by arguing that successful financial service models for low-income communities 
must achieve a certain level of self-reliance. This means that they must face the need to partly pay for 
services through fees. To be successful, these models require good relations with the community, 
something community organisations can contribute. They also require institutional support, most likely 
from a credit union or possibly government. Finally, financial services to low-income communities 
should address short-term needs such as cheque-cashing and small loans, and long-term needs such as 
saving and developing a solid credit rating. 
 
 
A COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICE CENTRE 
 
These models, along with the other research findings, helped to shape the idea of a community financial 
service centre that is described in appendix F. This centre would involve a physical outlet that would 
provide some core services including micro-consumer loans. In addition, the centre would be a part of a 
network that would include a mainstream bank or credit union in addition to other community 
organisations. The relationship with the mainstream bank would allow clients to borrow and save their 
way into a regular relationship with a bank or credit union. The other partners would provide other 
services such as character referencing, cheque-cashing and credit counselling. The feasibility assessment 
of this model is found in appendix G. The assessment demonstrates that various financial services can be 
self-supporting if core outlet costs are covered by other means. 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendations from the research fall into three categories: recommendations about services needed 
for North End residents; recommendations about government policy related to fringe and mainstream 
banking; and, recommendations about further research. The recommendations must be understood in light 
of the limitations of the research size and scope, discussed in the research methods section. 
 
1.     FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE NORTH END 
 
The research has documented that access to mainstream financial services in the North End has been 
declining as availability of fringe financial services has been growing. Fringe financial services can 
address the very short-term financial needs of some North End residents. However, these services are 
expensive and do not provide a direct way for clients to participate in financial services that address long- 
term need, e.g., savings and longer-term credit. For this reason, the team believes that access to 
mainstream bank services must be improved. We recognise that simply establishing new mainstream bank 
branches is both unlikely, given the large-scale closures in recent years, and does not address the entire 
issue. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
1.1     Community organisations might seek to raise awareness among North End residents about 
the costs, benefits and limitations of fringe bank services and the need to consider longer-term 
financial strategies. This process could cast more light on client motives and generate social and 
political support for the development of alternative services that are more beneficial to clients in the 
long-term. 
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1.2     That mainstream banks and credit unions remaining in the North End be encouraged and  
supported to establish outreach services for residents of the North End who do not use their 
services because of a lack of awareness of the benefits. These mainstream banks could work with 
community agencies to better understand the needs of the North End clients and raise awareness 
among these potential clients about the benefits of mainstream banking. To be successful, the 
mainstream banks would need to address concerns expressed by North End clients about 
convenience, disrespect and control over their funds. 
 
1.3     As discussed in section four, the costs and practices of fringe financial services vary considerably. 
It might be sensible for community agencies to work with the fringe banks that offer the best 
rates and practices. These collaborative fringe bankers might be approached to explore the 
possibility of building ways in which their clients can make a transition to mainstream financial 
institutions. 
 
1.4     That a community banking centre be established in the North End, somewhere close to 
Selkirk Avenue and Salter Street. The model for this centre is described in appendix F that also 
includes a feasibility assessment. 
 
1.5     That fringe bank clients who are dependent on Employment and Income Assistance be made 
aware of the existing opportunities they have to save money. Savings by these people might be 
facilitated by addressing point number 2 above, so that Employment and Income Assistance clients 
can establish savings accounts at mainstream banks. 
 
 
2.      GOVERNMENT POLICY 
 
The research team has identified two general areas of government policy requiring reform. Poverty and 
stagnating incomes at the low end of the income scale has facilitated the demand for fringe financial 
services. Thus, the growing dependence on fringe banks suggests a need to re-examine broad social 
policy. Second, the rapid rise of fringe banking has meant that government policy needs to ‘catch-up’ 
with the economic reality. In Manitoba, regulation of fringe banking is limited and ad-hoc.  
 
2.1     The research team believes that growing dependence on fringe banks is partly the result of poverty 
and stagnating or declining incomes. Thus, policies and regulations effecting the incomes of low-
income people must be addressed. For instance, the provincial government could move to a 
guaranteed minimum income program. Alternatively, the government could raise the rates of 
Employment and Income Assistance. Additionally, the government could address the needs of low-
income people through greater subsidies in housing, health-care and child-care.  
 
2.2     Considering the use of fringe banks has been associated, through the client and key-informant 
survey, with a need for loans to finance gambling and substance abuse, the research team suggests 
the provincial government discontinue operating gambling casinos, and more effectively 
address the issue of substance abuse. In addition the government must work more pro-actively at 
reducing racism. 
 
2.3     The Manitoba government should seek to find ways to help people move from Employment 
and Income Assistance to employment. This transition can be facilitated if Employment and 
Income Assistance recipients can save in order to invest in education and employment. The 
government should clarify with clients, and reform the rules for savings, to facilitate a transition out 
of dependence on Employment and Income Assistance. 
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2.4     The Manitoba government should consider introducing a photo-identification card that could 
be used for mainstream bank identification. Moreover, the province could require, as is done in 
British Colombia, that mainstream banks cash provincial cheques, e.g., Employment and Income 
Assistance cheques for free.  
 
2.5     The federal government must address the issue of declining availability of mainstream banks 
in inner-city neighbourhoods. This can be achieved by developing legislation that requires 
mainstream banks to contribute to these communities. The Community Reinvestment Act (see 
Caskey 1994, p. 133) in the US is an example of this type of legislation. Of course, to attract people 
to a mainstream bank from a neighbourhood like the North End requires the physical establishment of 
the bank and outreach operations. Federal policy could require that all mainstream banks contribute to 
inner-city and rural communities across the country. 
 
2.6     The federal agency, the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, should take a pro-active 
stance regarding the fringe bank phenomenon. The agency’s mandate includes the education of 
consumers about financial services. Given the fringe bank rise, and the decline of mainstream 
banks in inner-city neighbourhoods, the agency must address the educational needs of inner-
city residents. This can be achieved through research and education programs offered, e.g., through 
community agencies and schools. It is unlikely that this education can be achieved through the 
agency’s web page. 
 
2.7     The provincial government should introduce new legislation regulating all fringe banks, 
including pawnshops, cheque-cashers, payday lenders, rent-to-owns, income-tax refund 
advancers, finance companies, etc. This legislation should establish a system of fair disclosure 
requiring firms to use a consistent system of pricing and advertising so that consumers can easily and 
understandably compare prices between firms. Regulations should also limit loan rollovers or 
extensions and restrict firm collection practices due to defaulted loans. The government might also 
introduce a recommended annualised interest rate for small-sum, short-term loans.1 This could be 
based on further research, described below. 
 
2.8     At present pawnshops in Winnipeg are more regulated than the other fringe banks. This regulation 
is undertaken by the city and deals with zoning and monitoring of transactions of stolen goods. 
Besides the issue of stolen goods, it is not clear why pawnshops face more regulation than other 
fringe bankers. Our research demonstrates that clients benefit from pawnshop services. The research 
team recommends that fair disclosure legislation, described above for fringe banks in general, 
should apply also to pawnshops. If the proposed Internet-based monitoring system increases the 
cost of pawning faced by consumers then the rationale for the program needs to be very clear. At 
present, even the best monitoring system is limited by people’s propensity to keep records of their 
serial numbers. 
 
 
3.     FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
With any research project, several questions are answered and many new questions arise. This is the case 
with the present research project. The research team has tried to address the three research objectives 
dealing with fringe bank overcharging, fringe bank client motivations and the feasibility of a community-
                                                     
1 In France the government posts usury interest rates at banks and financial institutions. Lenders cannot charge 
interest rates above this usury interest rate. 
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oriented alternative to a fringe bank. However, the team recognises that not all the questions on these 
issues have been addressed and that new questions have arisen.  
 
3.1     Because the client research was conducted using a chain-referral method in the North End with 
only 41 respondents, the research project cannot make universal statements about the results. There is 
a need for a broader survey of fringe bank clients across Winnipeg and possibly across the 
country.  
 
3.2     The research team could not find studies examining the fringe bank phenomenon generally in 
Canada. There is a need for studies to examine the growth, services and costs of fringe banking 
across the country. This study might include an examination of the connection with mainstream 
branch closures, argued by Caskey (1994) in the US case.  
 
3.3     While this research project did not address fringe bank policy directly, it became clear that there is 
a need for more research in this area. The team recommends that further independent research be 
conducted related to provincial and federal government policy regarding this sector with an eye 
to considering the impact on the low-income fringe bank consumer. 
 
3.4     Another policy issue indirectly addressed in this study relates to general social policy for low-
income people. There is a need for further research into the relationship between social policy 
and the demand for financial services. What is the relationship between social policy and 
dependence on fringe financial services? How can social policy be reformed to encourage a transition 
towards mainstream financial services? 
 
3.5     Fringe banks are increasingly operating in middle-income neighbourhoods in Winnipeg. 
Research might examine this phenomenon and compare it with the rise of fringe banks in low-
income neighbourhoods. More generally, fringe banks are becoming more common and therefore 
more mainstream. A research study could examine the consequences for clients in this process of 
‘normalisation’ of a new sector. A related question would be to examine the social perceptions in 
Canada towards fringe bankers.  
 
3.6     Research might be conducted into the costs of providing small-sum, short-term loans. These 
data could be used to help consumers evaluate the options they face in terms of fringe financial 
services. 
 
3.7     Research might examine the impact of fringe bank establishments on a neighbourhood. For 
instance a study might look at the consequences of the establishment of a pawnshop on a 
neighbourhood’s businesses, sense of community, housing quality and prices, etc.  
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1.0    INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT 
 
 
1.1     CONTEXT OF RESEARCH TOPIC 
 
I use [a Cheque-Cashing Firm] to cash cheques and get money orders. My bank 
places a hold on my cheque for five days. At the cheque-cashing facility I get my 
money right away. There is no extra paper work there either. It’s just more 
convenient. 
        (client of a cheque-cashing firm) 
 
We [pawnbrokers] provide a service…People won't pay [for the service] if the 
price is too high. Compare our profit with, for example, Robin's Donuts. We 
expect a [fair return] on investment.  
        (pawnbroker) 
 
The two quotes2 above come from research conducted from September 2002 through August 
2003 with clients and owners/managers of fringe banks and other key informants. The quotes 
point to the mixture of motives involved with the rise of fringe banking in Winnipeg's North 
End. The research study explored why fringe banks are growing in numbers and types when they 
charge fees for services higher than mainstream banks. The research was particularly focused on 
understanding why clients use these services and whether fringe banks earn excessive profits. 
This section of the report introduces contrasting views on the legitimacy of fringe financial 
services, outlines results from recent studies on fringe banking in Canada and the US and 
describes the research objectives and research methods of this study.  
 
Fringe financial service firms, or simply fringe banks,3 are a growing phenomenon in Winnipeg 
and to varying degrees throughout Canada, the US and the UK. This industry includes 
pawnshops, cheque-cashing firms, payday loan firms and rent-to-owns, and more broadly can 
also include finance and loan companies. These fringe banks provide fringe financial services 
which include cheque-cashing, loans, money orders, and rent-to-own agreements. While 
pawnbroking is an historic institution, other fringe banks are newer entrants into the market for 
financial services. That is not to say that the services these newer fringe banks provide are new. 
Retailers have done cheque-cashing for many years and rent-to-own agreements have been 
offered by some retailers' in the past. What is new is the establishment of firms exclusively 
                                                     
2 Quotes are based on information recorded during interviews. They may be written verbatim or they may be 
paraphrased. 
3 The name for this industry is of recent origin because of its rapid and recent rise. The term 'fringe banks' seems to 
be quite well accepted in the US where most of these firms, excepting pawnshops, have their longest history (see 
Caskey, 1994). In Canada 'fringe' (see Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2002) and 'alternative' (see Ramsey, 2000) 
are adjectives that are used to describe this financial sector. Fringe financial service firm or fringe bank is used in 
this study because US and some Canadian research have established this as an effective name. The term is intended 
to describe a variety of firms that operate on the margin of the financial system - it is not intended to judge the firms 
or clients. Caskey (1994, p. 106) notes that another set of fringe banks, in this case associated with the high-income 
margin of the financial system, has also experienced recent growth in the US. 
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concerned with a certain type of financial service: cheque-cashing, payday loans, and rent-to-
own agreements. These financial services generally involve some sort of loan that in comparison 
to mainstream credit –from banks, credit unions and credit card companies– is small in size and 
very costly. Fringe financial service users tend to be low-income people.  
 
The dependence of low-income people on fringe banks has generated a major concern regarding 
the rise of fringe financial services. From an anti-poverty perspective, voiced by community 
development practitioners, these services further impoverish low-income people. Pawnshop 
loans and expensive cheque-cashing are the only option for a low-income person particularly as 
mainstream banks close their branches in the inner-cities. The service charges for the loan or 
cashed cheque eat into a low-income person’s limited budget. These charges compound the debt-
poverty cycle often faced by a low-income person. A pawn loan allows a person to meet a daily 
need or want today but repaying the loan and interest in one month reduces their income at that 
time or requires an additional loan. This places further economic and psychological strain on the 
low-income persons. This strain can lead to a further deterioration of the person’s economic and 
social wellbeing. 
 
On the other hand, from a market perspective, the rise of fringe banking represents the growth of 
innovative new financial services that were previously unavailable to people. Financial sector 
liberalisation, i.e., reduced regulations and national protection, and the development of new 
technologies, i.e., communications and information processing, have generated new services and 
firms. These processes are associated with the recent deepening of economic globalisation 
reflected in international and regional trade agreements. The result, according to industry 
proponents, is that these services and firms can meet the needs of a particular set of consumers in 
a way that, for instance, mainstream banks have previously been unable to. The case for 
pawnshop loans is somewhat different given its long history. That said, industry proponents 
argue that pawn loans are an efficient way to provide credit to people with little or no collateral.  
 
The idea for the study that informs this report originated with several community-oriented 
organisations primarily based in the North End,4 an inner-city neighbourhood in Winnipeg. 
These community organisations are involved in anti-poverty work in general and particularly 
address the difficult economic situation faced by inner-city and North End Winnipeg residents. 
These organisations are involved in a number of programmes from micro-enterprise 
development through ‘asset-building’ (individual savings) programmes to general 
neighbourhood revitalisation. They are also actively engaged in dialogue with policymakers and 
politicians and connected through various research projects, this one included, to the academic 
community. These agencies reflect both pragmatic and radical perspectives on poverty and 
community development. These perspectives have in common a concern for the local area and 
addressing poverty, but they differ in terms of understanding about the fundamental causes of, 
and solutions to, poverty. The pragmatic approach accents economic and social causes of poverty 
                                                     
4 The North End refers to what used to be the northern quadrant of the city of Winnipeg. The title “North End” 
continues to be used for this area even thought it is now situated in the core area of Winnipeg – the inner-city. The 
geographic boundaries of the North End, as determined by the North End Community Renewal Corporation, is north 
of the CPR tracks, south of Caruthers Avenue, east of McPhillips Street, and west of the Red River. The city 
neighbourhoods included in this definition of the North End include: Burrows Central, Dufferin, Dufferin Industrial, 
Inkster Faraday, Lord Selkirk Park, Luxton, North Point Douglas, Robertson, St. John’s, St. John’s Park, and 
William Whyte.  
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and sees solutions in bridging the social and economic barriers. Radical analysis accents the 
political causes of poverty and searches for political solutions. Both of these views are found 
within the organisations that identified the fringe bank as an important issue in the North End. 
The idea for this research study is one outcome of these groups' efforts. 
 
 
1.2 STUDIES OF FRINGE BANKING 
 
The literature on fringe financial services is thin, particularly in Canada. Scholarly examination 
of fringe financial service firms in the US grew in the 1990s (Caskey 1991, p. 85). The following 
data point to the recent growth and current significance of pawnshops, cheque-cashers and 
payday loan firms. 
 
The number of pawnshops in the US is up, having increasing to between 9,000 to 13,000 
(Caskey 1994, p.47; Johnson and Johnson, p. 7). It is estimated that in 1988, US pawnshop credit 
reached $689 million, less than one percent of total US consumer credit. At that time there were 
roughly one-half as many pawnshops as today suggesting that pawn loans may have reached 
closer to two percent of total consumer credit in the US.  
 
The number of cheque-cashing outlets in the US grew from approximately 2,000 in 1986 to 
5,500 in 1997 reaching 11,000 in 2002 (Squires and O’Connor 2001, p. 142; Lynch 2002, p. 3). 
The number of payday loan firms in the US in 2001 is estimated at 8,000-10,000 (Elliehausen 
and Lawrence 2001, p. iv; Lott and Grant 2002, p. 12). Note that there is some overlap between 
payday loan and cheque-cashing firm, so that the total number of cheque-cashing firms and 
payday loan outlets in the US would be less than 19,000. 
 
Based on a small-scale household survey undertaken by the Public Interest Advocacy Centre 
(PIAC) in 2002 (p.34-35), it was estimated that almost 200,000 Canadians had used a pawnshop 
service and between 1-1.4 million Canadians used some type of fringe banking service in the last 
three years. Ramsey (p.11) found the largest number of pawnbrokers across Canada in Quebec, 
followed by British Colombia, Alberta and Ontario. Money Mart, the largest payday loan and 
cheque-cashing firm in Canada, claimed to have established 254 outlets by 2002. The PIAC 
study estimated that approximately 550,000 Canadians had used a cheque-cashing or payday 
loan service in the last three years. However, Ramsey reported that the 1998 research study for 
the Financial Services Task Force found that 8 percent of the Canadian population 
(approximately 2.4 million) had used a cheque-cashing firm’s service. Ramsey (p. 5) notes the 
highest number of cheque-cashing firms per capita in Canada is in British Colombia, followed by 
Alberta and Ontario. Quebec had a low per-capita number of cheque-cashing firms. Caskey 
(1994, p. 64) estimated that in 1990, US cheque-cashing firms cashed 128 million cheques with a 
combined value of $38 billion, earning the industry $700 million in fees.  
 
Fringe bank clients come from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. That said, there is 
evidence that clients of some fringe banks, particularly pawnshops and cheque-cashing firms are 
generally characterised by low income and limited access to mainstream banks. Caskey (1994, p. 
68-73) found evidence for this in his interviews of firm operators in the US. The PIAC survey 
supported this view regarding pawnshop clients.  
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Payday loans are another matter. Evidence from the US suggests that payday loan consumers 
come from a socio-economic group with a lower middle-income level (Elliehausen and 
Lawrence 2001, p. iv). The PIAC (p. 36) study commented that broadly defined fringe financial 
services, including previously mentioned firms plus finance companies, loan brokers and tax 
rebate discounters, are not used predominantly by low-income people. PIAC estimated that only 
15 percent of the consumers within this broadly defined fringe banking market would fall below 
Statistics Canada's low-income cut off. 
 
Studies confirm that fringe financial services are relatively expensive. Annualised interest rates 
of 100-500 percent are common while one estimate found that payday loans’ annualised interest 
rates amounted to 3000 percent (Lewison 1999, p. 3). At the same time, many studies have found 
that clients use fringe banks because of convenience related to hours of operation, proximity and 
quick service (Squires and O’Connor 2001, p. 154). This report provides further evidence in 
relationship to both of these issues. 
 
In terms of explaining the growth of fringe banking, various factors have been identified in US 
and Canadian studies. Broadly speaking, these factors fall into two categories. On the supply-
side of the fringe bank equation, various factors influencing the supply of mainstream and fringe 
bank services. Several factors relate to changing financial sector regulations, which is itself 
related to broad processes such as financial sector liberalisation and technological change. On the 
demand-side as well, several factors influence peoples' demand for mainstream and fringe bank 
services including stagnant incomes at low-income levels, growing debt ratios, declining state 
interventions and racial discrimination. 
 
In his examination of fringe banking in the US, Caskey (1994, p. 84) argues that a chief reason 
for their rise is the increase in the number of households without bank accounts, rising from 9.5 
percent of the US population in 1977 to 13.5 percent in 1989. He finds this is the result of 
processes effecting banks (supply-side) and bank clients (demand-side). On the supply-side of 
the equation, Caskey argues that changing bank regulations have led to the introduction of bank 
fees and the closure of bank branches in low-income neighbourhoods that have reduced 
accessibility of bank accounts. On the demand-side of the equation, bank clients and potential 
clients have faced pressures making holding a bank account less advantageous. Caskey points to 
several factors here including the stagnant or declining real incomes of low-income people; an 
increase in the number of people falling below the poverty line; and, reduced savings rates. Other 
factors associated with the rise of fringe banking include, the rise in consumer credit risk related 
to high levels of debt-servicing and personal bankruptcy; contraction in the bank and finance 
company supply of non-revolving, unsecured loans; growing numbers of people with higher 
credit risk due to increased legal and illegal immigration to the US; the increase in gold prices; 
the growing awareness among entrepreneurs of the profits in fringe banking and the growing 
demand for instant credit on the part of consumers. 
 
Ramsey points to a similar set of factors for the rise of fringe banking in Canada. Ramsey (2000, 
p. 2) points out that between 650,000 and 900,000 adults do not have a bank account and that 8 
percent of households with incomes less than $25,000 do not have bank accounts. This varies 
considerably across the country as households in Quebec, with its extensive caisse populaire 
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system, have better access to mainstream banks. Ramsey points out that the decline in supply of 
small unsecured loans, due to the development of credit cards and lines-of-credit is a factor in the 
rise of fringe banking. He points to rising debt-to-income ratios among Canadians in general, and 
low-income people in particular; lower rates of savings; racial discrimination; and rising income 
inequality in Canada as explanatory factors on the demand-side of the fringe bank equation. The 
debt-to-disposable income ratio for Canadians rose on average from 78 percent in 1992 to 100 
percent in 1998. The PIAC (2002, p. 38) study, drawing on fringe bank clients' perceptions of 
their economic circumstances found that only pawnshop clients perceived their debt levels to be 
higher than the average. Considering average debt load has been rising this is not surprising.  
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES FOR THIS STUDY 
 
The objective of this research is to study the fringe banking firms, the consumers, and the 
relationship between them to better understand the rise of these services. Among other processes, 
poverty, the feminisation of poverty and unemployment affect low-income consumers while 
fringe financial service providers are affected by financial sector deregulation. The study will 
examine the interaction in the fringe financial services sector in light of these broader processes. 
Examining the social motivations, as well as market features behind fringe financial services will 
inform the process of designing solutions that meet consumer needs and are more compatible 
with community economic development approaches. The data will be used to understand 
whether a community-based agency could offer these services in a way that benefits low-income 
consumers. As well, we will seek to understand how public policy could support such an 
approach. The research project has three principal goals: 
 
A. To explain the economic reasons for the changing market dynamics in the fringe financial 
sector. Do fringe financial services overcharge low-income customers? Or do their high costs 
reflect high risk and high transaction costs? 
 
B. To explain the sociological and political reasons for the growth of the fringe financial sector. 
What motivates low-income users of these services? Are these consumers behaving in an 
economically rational way? 
 
C. To examine whether a community-owned non-profit service that could offer lower fees and 
interest rates has prima facie feasibility and to examine whether alternative models to provide 
these financial services show any basic evidence of market feasibility while striving to meet 
the social and economic needs of users.  
 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Besides the literature and database reviews, the research project involved several field methods 
including, key informant interviews, sample transactions and outlet follow-up, client 
questionnaire, focus-group discussions and feasibility assessment. The literature review was 
undertaken of existing secondary materials related to the size, profitability and client motivations 
of fringe financial services in Canada, the US and beyond. For the field research tools, an initial 
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test was conducted in the fall of 2002 with a small group of respondents to ensure the questions 
were practical and understandable. Revisions were made to the instruments as necessary. 
 
The first objective of the research was to explore the economics of the fringe financial sector and 
to determine whether the sector overcharges low-income customers. Besides the secondary 
research review, this research involved a series of key informant interviews, sample transactions 
and some outlet follow-up. Key informants were purposely selected based on their special 
understanding of fringe banks and fringe bank customers. This included key informants from the 
fringe financial sector, community agencies, banks and credit unions, and government. A total of 
27 key informant interviews were undertaken during the fall and winter 2002-2003. The key 
informants were asked a sub-set of the questions contained in the key informant schedule 
(Appendix B). These questions asked about the size, profitability and motivations of the fringe 
financial sector as well as the scope for community-based alternatives. Not all key informants 
were asked all the questions in the schedule. For instance, the police pawnshop patrol was asked 
specifically about city regulations and perceived adherence to these regulations. Dr. Jerry 
Buckland undertook the majority of these interviews with Brendan Reimer and Nancy Barbour.  
 
For some fringe financial services there was insufficient secondary and key informant data. In 
these cases it was necessary to run sample transactions and do some outlet follow-up to 
determine the procedures, costs and benefits. One sample transaction was undertaken with a 
fringe financial service firm in the North End. Once the sample transaction was completed we 
informed the firm in writing about it and our results. Particularly in the case of cheque-cashing 
and payday loan firms, who refused to participate in the key informant study, some additional 
data were collected through outlet follow-up. This included telephone calls or in-person visits to 
determine services, cost and procedures. Dr. Jerry Buckland carried out this additional work with 
assistance from Nancy Barbour and Brendan Reimer. 
 
The second goal of this research was to explore the sociological and political reasons behind the 
fringe bank boom. In particular this research component sought to understand fringe bank client 
experiences and motivations. This research was guided by Dr. Jerry Buckland and Dr. Thibault 
Martin and undertaken by three student research assistants, Rana McDonald, Amelia Curran and 
Brendan Reimer, and both of the community research assistants, Nancy Barbour and Kathleen 
Bremner. This field research involved a survey of 41 North End adult (at least 18 years of age) 
clients of fringe financial services in the fall of 2002. We used the ‘chain referral’ sampling 
method ensuring that one-half of the respondents were female (to ensure fair gender 
representation).  
 
Kathleen Bremner took the lead in contacting the initial respondents through personal contacts or 
by talking with clients outside of the fringe financial firm’s outlet. These contacts were 
interviewed and asked to refer other clients for the interview, and so on. Flyers were also posted 
in strategic locations to attract additional responses. Arrangements were made to interview the 
majority of the clients over a four week period at the offices of the North End Community 
Renewal Corporation and North End Community Ministry. The clients were asked a series of 
questions outlined in the client questionnaire (Appendix B). These questions relate to the client’s 
use and motivations behind the use of fringe financial services. Clients were asked to discuss 
their interest and ideas about community-based alternatives to fringe financial services. 
 17
Respondents were compensated for childcare, travel and incidental costs at a rate of $20 per 
interview.  
 
The research was supplemented with two focus group discussions (Appendix C). One focus 
group involved fringe bank clients and further explored their experiences with fringe banks and 
their ideas about alternatives to fringe banks. The second focus group involved community 
organisation key informants who helped to develop a model that formed the basis of the 
feasibility assessment.  
 
The firm and client research results were brought together to develop a community-based model 
that formed the basis of a feasibility assessment. The feasibility assessment (Appendix F) relates 
to the third objective of the study. The feasibility assessment developed preliminary financial 
analyses of a community financial services firm that would provide North End residents with an 
alternative to dependence on fringe financial services.   
  
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE REPORT 
 
This report is composed of six sections. The first section, written by Rana McDonald establishes 
some basic characteristics of Winnipeg's North End. This is done by summarizing available 
socio-economic indicators for the North End and comparing these data with data for Winnipeg as 
a whole.  
 
The second section co-authored by Dr. Thibault Martin, Rana McDonald and Amelia Curran 
reports on the survey of fringe bank clients in Winnipeg's North End. This section documents 
fringe bank clients' experiences with fringe and mainstream banks and explores their savings 
strategies and reasons for using fringe financial services.  
 
The third section, written by Dr. Jerry Buckland, Brendan Reimer and Nancy Barbour reports on 
a survey of fringe bank outlets, services and costs in Winnipeg and the North End. The next 
section co-authored by Dr. Jerry Buckland, Nancy Barbour and Brendan Reimer reports on the 
key informant survey that addresses, among other points, the question of fringe bank legitimacy.  
 
The fifth section, written by Brendan Reimer summarises a series of models the research team 
identified that strive to provide a community-oriented alternative to fringe financial services. The 
report ends with a summary and presentation of a series of recommendations developed by the 
research team. This includes reference to a community banking outlet that seeks to address fringe 
and longer-term financial service needs of North End residents, found in appendix F. The 
preliminary feasibility assessment of this community banking outlet was done by Blair Hamilton 
of Dungannon Consulting Services. This report was edited by Brendan Reimer and Jerry 
Buckland. 
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2.0     SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF WINNIPEG’S 
NORTH END 
 
 
2.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
To gain a better understanding of the nature of Winnipeg's North End, this section describes 
statistics on the community's social and economic make-up. By providing data on income and 
employment levels, ethnicity, family structure, education level and access to transportation this 
section seeks to provide an understanding of the North End, on its own and in comparison to 
other Winnipeg communities. 
 
The Pawnshops and Community Development study examines fringe banking in the area in 
Winnipeg referred to as the North End which is bounded by the CPR tracks to the south, 
Carruthers Avenue to the north, McPhillips Street to the west, and the Red River in the east and 
includes the neighbourhoods of Burrows Central, Dufferin, Dufferin Industrial, Lord Selkirk 
Park, Luxton, North Point Douglas, St. John’s, St. John’s Park, Robertson, and William Whyte. 
The definition of the North End provided by the North End Community Renewal Corporation. 
This area is a unique community within Winnipeg that encompasses a high density of fringe 
banking facilities in comparison to other areas of Winnipeg. 
 
The composition of the population in the North End can be examined through the area’s social 
and economic indicators. This section of the report will specifically focus on the following 
indicators: population size, age, race/ethnicity, education, employment, income, marital status 
and transportation. For the purposes of this demographic study, six of the 11 neighbourhoods 
will be analysed: Burrows Central, Dufferin, Dufferin Industrial, Lord Selkirk Park, North Point 
Douglas, and William Whyte. These six neighbourhoods, which make up the southern half of the 
North End, are considered to be the more socio-economically challenged neighbourhoods in the 
North End. The social and economic indicators will provide an overall view of the population of 
these North End communities. These North End demographics5 will be compared to those of 
Winnipeg6 in each respective characteristic using statistical information from the 1996 census. 
This will enable the comparison of indicators that reflect between the two area’s populations. 
These individual North End neighbourhoods will also be examined in relation to each other and 
                                                     
5 This demographic information of Winnipeg’s North End is composed of statistical information found on 
the City of Winnipeg web site at www.city.winnipeg.mb.ca/interhom/about_winnipeg/profile/census.stm.  This 
information is based on the 1996 Census Data.  The “Winnipeg’s Neighbourhood Profiles” are based on Non-
Institutional Population and 20% sampling as provided by Statistics Canada. This means the data does not include 
people living in hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, etc. As well, one in five dwellings were surveyed; the results 
were then multiplied by five to arrive at representative data for the whole community.  Only the “Total Population” 
data is based on the results of surveying all of the dwellings and including all of the population, both non-
institutional and institutional.” (City of Winnipeg, 2003) 
6 The statistics for Winnipeg include all of the individual areas/communities and include the areas to which 
they are being compared. 
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to Winnipeg. This will facilitate an enhanced understanding of the processes underlying the 
unique socio-economic structures that exist in the North End. 
 
 
2.2    POPULATION 
 
The North End has a total population of 17,295. This represents approximately 2.8 percent of the 
total population of Winnipeg. Within the North End, the William Whyte neighbourhood has the 
highest population containing 6,230 people. The city of Winnipeg has a total population of 
618,475 that has increased by 0.5 percent from the previous census in 1991. However, between 
1991 and 1996, the population of the North End has decreased by 6.4 percent from a total of 
18,485. The population in the North End has been steadily decreasing as the population in 
Winnipeg has, for the most part, been constantly rising.   
 
 
Table 2.1   Population 
 
TOTAL 
POPULATION 
WILLIAM 
WHYTE 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END 
to WINNIPEG 
 Number % 
Change 
from 
Previous 
Census 
Number % 
Change 
from 
Previous 
Census 
Number % 
Change 
from 
Previous 
Census 
% 
Difference 
1996 Census 6,230 -5.9% 17,295 -6.4% 618,457 0.5% -6.9% 
1991 Census 6,620 -4.0% 18,485 -2.9% 615,215 3.5% -6.4% 
1986 Census (2) 6,895 1.7% 19,045 1.7% 594,555 5.3% -3.6% 
1981 Census (2) 6,780 -20.1% 18,720 -15.8% 564,745 0.6% -16.4% 
1976 Census (2) 8,490 -15.1% 22,245 -20.3% 560,875 4.8% -25.1% 
1971 Census (2) 10,005 N/A 26,750 N/A 535,100 N/A  
*Source City of Winnipeg website “Community Profiles” 
 
 
2.3    INCOME 
 
Income of individuals in a community is also a key demographic factor used to determine the 
community’s socio-economic status. The North End has a household7 income that is lower in 
comparison to Winnipeg’s overall household income. In Winnipeg the average household 
income is $44,937, in comparison to the North End in which the average household income is 
$22,320. The difference of $22,617 indicates an income disparity in Winnipeg. These disparities 
are notable in the North End where the majority, 33.1percent of households in the area, are found 
                                                     
7 Household - “Refers to a person or a group of persons (other than foreign residents) who occupy the same dwelling 
and do not have a usual place of residence elsewhere in Canada. It may consist of a family group (census family) 
with or without other non-family persons; of two or more families sharing a dwelling; of a group of unrelated 
persons; or of one person living alone.” (Statistics Canada, 1996) “The dwelling unit may be a house, a suite in a 
townhouse or apartment, or a mobile home etc.” (City of Winnipeg, 2003) 
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in the $10,000-$19,999 category in comparison to Winnipeg, in which only 17 percent of its 
households are found in the $10,000-$19,999 category.  
 
In the North End, 28.2 percent of its households are in the $30,000-$100,000 income category 
compared to Winnipeg in which 60 percent of the households fall into this income category. The 
North End has 16.1 percent more households in the $10,000-$19,999 income category and 31.6 
percent less households in the $30,000-$100,000 in comparison to Winnipeg. Within the North 
End, the lowest income households are found in Lord Selkirk Park in which the average income 
is $16,513 which is 63 percent lower than Winnipeg’s average. Even the highest income area of 
the North End, Burrows Central, is 29 percent lower than the Winnipeg average further 
signifying the financial disparity between the North End and Winnipeg.  
 
 
Table 2.2    Household Income 
 
HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME 
LORD SELKIRK 
PARK 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END to 
WINNIPEG 
 Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
% 
Difference 
Under $10,000 115 22.8% 1,520 22.2% 21,055 8.6% 13.7% 
$10,000-$19,000 295 58.4% 2,265 33.1% 41,795 17.0% 16.1% 
$20,000-$29,000 40 7.9% 1,125 16.4% 35,210 14.3% 2.1% 
$30,000-$39,000 10 2.0% 745 10.9% 32,605 13.2% -2.4% 
$40,000-$49,000 15 3.0% 430 6.3% 28,425 11.5% -5.3% 
$50,000-$59,000 10 2.0% 360 5.3% 25,200 10.2% -5.0% 
$60,000-$69,000 10 2.0% 180 2.6% 18,550 7.5% -4.9% 
$70,000-$79,000 0 0.0% 70 1.0% 13,315 5.4% -4.4% 
$80,000-$89,000 10 2.0% 90 1.3% 9,165 3.7% -2.4% 
$90,000-$99,000 0 0.0% 40 0.6% 6,380 2.6% -2.0% 
$100,000 and over 0 0.0% 15 0.2% 14,475 5.9% -5.7% 
Total 505 100.0% 6,840 100.0% 246,175 100.0% 0.0% 
Average Income $16,513  $22,320  $44,937   
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
Incidence of low-income is measured as a separate variable.  Incidence of low-income, “Refers 
to the position of an economic family or an unattached individual 15 years of age and over in 
relation to Statistics Canada’s low-income cut-offs (LICOs)” (Statistics Canada, 1996).  
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For Winnipeg the 1995 LICO table is: 
    
Table 2.3   LICO 
 
FAMILY SIZE LICO 
1  $16,874 
2  $21,092  
3  $26, 232  
4 $31,753 
5 $35, 494 
   *Source Statistics Canada 1996 
 
The incidence of low-income in private households in the North End is 64 percent, for Winnipeg 
it’s 24 percent. This indicates that the incidence of low-income is 39.7 percent higher in the 
North End than in Winnipeg. The lowest incidence of low-income in the North End is 40 
percent, which is found in Burrows Central and is 16 percent higher than Winnipeg. The highest 
incidence of low-income is 39.1 percent higher than Winnipeg. It is found in Lord Selkirk Park, 
whose incidence of low-income is 78.8 percent. These lower income levels are correlated with 
the levels of employment in the area as well as other social factors such as formal education. 
 
 
Table 2.4    Incidence of Low-Income 
 
INCIDENCE OF 
LOW-INCOME 
 
BURROWS 
CENTRAL 
LORD 
SELKIRK 
PARK 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END to 
WINNIPEG 
 Number Number Number Number % Difference 
Total Population in 
Private 
Households 
4,865 990 16,340 606,770 
Low-Income 1,945 780 9,8.5 147,425 
 
Incidence of Low-
Income -% 
 
40.0% 
 
78.8% 
 
64.0% 
 
24.3% 
 
39.7% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
 
2.4    EMPLOYMENT 
 
The North End’s lower overall income suggests that the rate of unemployment is a more relevant 
demographic factor to be examined in this area. The lowest unemployment rate is found in 
Burrows Central at 13.8 percent. The highest unemployment rate of 33.3 percent is in Lord 
Selkirk Park. In total, the North End’s unemployment rate is 23 percent, in comparison 
Winnipeg’s 8.2 percent unemployment rate. This indicates that the North End has a 14.8 percent 
higher concentration of unemployment than Winnipeg. In Burrows Central the unemployment 
rate is 5.6 percent higher than in Winnipeg and in Lord Selkirk Park the rate is 25.1 percent 
higher. There is no one area in the North End that has an equal or lower unemployment rate than 
the Winnipeg average, suggesting an overall higher percentage of unemployment in all of the 
North End. In relation to income, 43.1 percent of the North End population receives government 
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transfer payments8 compared to 13.9 percent of Winnipeg. This reveals that 29.3 percent more 
people in the North End receive some form of government transfer payment. The North End’s 
higher unemployment rate and higher recipient rate of government transfer payments contribute 
to the North End’s overall lower income and to a lower overall position of the North End in the 
socio-economic structure of Winnipeg.   
 
Table 2.5    Employment 
 
LABOUR 
FORCE 
 
BURROWS 
CENTRAL 
LORD 
SELKIRK 
PARK 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END 
to WINNIPEG 
15 Years and 
Older 
     
In Labor Force 2,170 230 6,295 325,045 318,750 
Employed 1,875 150 4,920 298,390 293,470 
Unemployed 300 75 1,370 26,655 25,285 
Not in the Labor 
Force 
 
1,650 
 
530 
 
6,295 
 
163,420 
 
157,125 
Unemployment 
Rate % 
 
13.8% 
 
33.3% 
 
23.0% 
 
8.2% 
 
-14.8% 
Employment to 
Population Ratio 
% 
 
 
49.7% 
 
 
19.7% 
 
 
36.5% 
 
 
61.1% 
 
24.6% 
Participation 
rate % 
 
57.5% 
 
29.6% 
 
46.8% 
 
66.5% 
 
19.8% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
 
2.5    AGE 
 
The North End contains more economically dependent youth than the rest of Winnipeg. 24.9 
percent of the population of the North End are 14 years or younger. The highest concentration of 
this population is in Lord Selkirk Park, where 28 percent of the population is in this age group. 
The lowest number of youth are found in Dufferin Industrial, where 12.5 percent of the 
population is 14 years or younger. In Winnipeg, only 20.2 percent of the population fall into the 
14 years and younger category, which is 4.9 percent less than in the North End. Despite the large 
variation in age groups within the North End, it contains more residents under the age of fourteen 
than Winnipeg does on average.  Youth who fall into this age category are economically 
dependent on others.   
 
Over the age of eighteen, the majority of the North End population falls into the 30-34 category 
as does the overall population of Winnipeg. The population at the age of retirement, 65 and over, 
often receive a reduced income, therefore the percentage of the population in this age category is 
an important factor when examining the income levels in a community. The largest segment of 
the retired population of the North End, 25.6 percent, resides in Lord Selkirk Park. 14.6 percent 
of the total population in the North End has reached the age of retirement. This figure is 1.6 
                                                     
8 Government transfer payment- Refers to: Old Age Security, Guaranteed Income Supplement, Canadian Pension 
Plan, Unemployment Insurance, Federal Child Tax Benefit, and other income from government sources (Federal, 
Provincial, and Municipal). (Statistics Canada, 1996) 
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percent higher than the Winnipeg average, indicating that the North End contains a larger 
percentage of retired population. Lord Selkirk contains a population of the age of retirement that 
is 15.2 percent higher than the Winnipeg average. The higher number of persons at the age of 
retirement and a large number of youth results in a large group of dependants residing in the 
North End.  
 
 
   Table 2.6    Age 
 
POPULATION BY 
AGE 
(Non-Institutional) 
DUFFERIN NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END 
to WINNIPEG 
 
Age Group 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
% 
Difference 
Less then 5 190 9.4% 1,640 9.8% 41,965 6.9% 3.0 
5-9 190 9.4% 1,430 8.6% 41,455 6.8% 1.8 
10-14 102 5.9% 1,090 6.5% 39,745 6.5% 0.0 
15-19 170 8.4% 1,075 6.4% 39,310 6.4% 0.0 
20-24 120 5.9% 1,070 6.4% 44,925 7.3% -0.9 
25-29 140 6.9% 1,265 7.6% 46,035 7.5% 0.1 
30-34 110 5.4% 1,415 8.5% 52,640 8.6% -0.1 
35-39 120 5.9% 1,180 7.1% 52,335 8.6% -1.5 
40-44 115 5.7% 1,130 6.8% 48,215 7.9% -1.1 
45-49 125 6.2% 980 5.9% 43,695 7.1% -1.3 
50-54 95 4.7% 730 4.4% 32,280 5.3% -0.9 
55-59 60 3.0% 620 3.7% 25,475 4.2% -0.4 
60-64 105 5.2% 620 3.7% 24,210 4.0% -0.2 
65-69 80 3.9% 580 3.5% 23,005 3.8% -0.3 
70-74 85 5.3% 675 4.0% 22,285 3.6% 0.4 
75+ 205 5.8% 1,185 7.1% 34,050 5.6% 1.5 
Total 2,030 100.0% 16,685 100.0% 611,625 100.0
% 
0.0% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
 
2.6     RACE AND ETHNICITY 
 
Race and ethnic diversity, which contributes to the uniqueness of an area, is also a factor upon 
which income is dependent. The North End contains a large self-identified Aboriginal population 
in comparison to the Winnipeg average. The Aboriginal population comprises 31.1 percent of the 
total population in the North End. In comparison, the Aboriginal population represents 7.1 
percent of the total population in Winnipeg. The largest Aboriginal population is found in Lord 
Selkirk Park in which the Aboriginal population is 47.9 percent. The lowest Aboriginal 
population in the North End is 12.2 percent in Burrows Central. However, this is still 5 percent 
higher than the Winnipeg average.   
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Table 2.7 Aboriginal Population 
 
ABORIGINAL 
POPULATION 
 
BURROWS 
CENTRAL 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END 
to WINNIPEG 
 Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
% 
Difference 
Aboriginal 
Population 
 
590 
 
12.1% 
 
5,235 
 
31.1% 
 
43,460 
 
7.1% 
 
24.0% 
Non-Aboriginal 
Population 
 
4,285 
 
87.9% 
 
11,585 
 
68.9% 
 
568,170 
 
92.9% 
 
-24.0% 
 
Total 
 
4,875 
 
100% 
 
16,820 
 
100% 
 
611,630 
 
100% 
 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
Other visible minority groups are also represented in this area, but are less prevalent than the 
Aboriginal population. Other visible minority groups include “person other than Aboriginal 
peoples who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.  This includes the following 
categories: Black, South Asian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, South Asian, Filipino, Arab/West 
Asian, Latin American, Visible Minority (not previously stated), and Multiple Visible Minority” 
(Statistics Canada, 1996). Visible minorities, which make up 16.5 percent of the total population 
of the North End, comprise a smaller percentage, 11.9 percent, of the total population of 
Winnipeg. There are fewer minorities found in the Lord Selkirk Park area than in Winnipeg by 
2.8 percent. However, Dufferin Industrial has a minority population of 41.1 percent that is 29.5 
percent higher than Winnipeg. Overall, the North End has a 4.6 percent higher minority 
percentage. The North End represents a racially and ethnically diverse segment of Winnipeg.   
 
 
Table 2.8    Visible Minority Population 
 
VISIBLE 
MINORITIES 
 
LORD 
SELKIRK 
PARK 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END to 
WINNIPEG 
 Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
% 
Difference 
Visible Minority 
Population 
 
95 
 
9.1% 
 
2,760 
 
16.5% 
 
72,690 
 
11.9% 
 
4.6% 
Non-Visible 
Minority 
Population 
 
950 
 
90.9% 
 
14,010 
 
83.5% 
 
538,945 
 
88.1% 
 
-4.6% 
Total 1,045 100% 16,770 100% 611,635 100% 0.0% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
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2.7    FAMILY STRUCTURE 
 
Socio-economic status is also indirectly related to family structure. Income is directly related to 
the number of income earners contributing to the family. Typically, the higher the number of 
incomes contributing to a household, the greater likelihood of a higher household income. 
Overall, 66.4 percent of the North End’s population is in a common-law or married relationship, 
in contrast to 83.4 percent of Winnipeg’s population. Within the North End, the highest 
percentage of couples reside in the Dufferin Industrial area (80 percent). The lowest percentage 
of couples are found in William Whyte (62.4 percent). Both of these areas contain a lower 
percentage of couples when compared to Winnipeg. Based on the fact that there are more couple 
relationships in Winnipeg, Winnipeg has a higher possibility of housing families with dual 
incomes. The North End is less likely to have as many dual income households.   
 
 
Table 2.9   Family Structure 
 
CENSUS 
FAMILIES 
 
WILLIAM 
WHYTE 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END to 
WINNIPEG 
Family 
Structure 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
% 
Difference 
Married 
Couples 
625 44.8% 2,005 51.5% 121,850 74.6% -23.1% 
Common-law 
Couples 
245 17.6% 580 14.9% 14,325 8.8% 6.1% 
One Parent-
Female 
425 30.5% 1,090 28.0% 23,155 14.2% 13.6% 
One Parent-
Male 
100 7.2% 215 5.5% 3,985 2.4% 3.1% 
Total 
Families 
1,395 100% 3,890 100% 163,315 100% 0.0% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
Single parenthood is also a factor that reduces the likelihood of a dual income household. In the 
North End, 47.4 percent of families are single parents with children. In Winnipeg the percentage 
of single parent families is 25.4 percent. Therefore, the North End contains 22 percent more 
single parents than Winnipeg. Within the North End, Dufferin has the largest percentage, 66.4 
percent single parents, while Dufferin Industrial has the lowest percentage of single parent 
families at 33 percent. Females typically head these single parent families. Single parents, 
specifically women, are more likely to experience poverty. They often have fewer financial 
supports than women in dual parent homes. In the North End, 39.6 percent of families with 
children are headed by single females compared to 7.8 percent headed by single males. In 
Winnipeg, 21.7 percent of these families are one-parent-female compared to 3.7 percent single-
parent-male families. Both Winnipeg and the North End have more female single parents than 
male single parents.  However, the North end has 17.9 percent more female single parent 
families with children. Within the North End, the lowest percentage of female single parents is 
29.8 percent, found in Burrows Central. Even the lowest incidence of female single parents in the 
North End is 11.9 percent higher than the Winnipeg average. The highest occurrence of female 
single parents is found in Lord Selkirk Park, revealing a disparity of 40.2 percent between this 
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area and Winnipeg. The North End has a higher occurrence of female single parents, in 
comparison to Winnipeg, regardless of the individual community examined.   
 
 
Table 2.10    Single Parents 
 
CENSUS 
FAMILIES 
 
LORD 
SELKIRK 
PARK 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END to 
WINNIPEG 
Family With 
Children 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
% 
Difference 
Married 
Couples 
50 32.3
% 
1,160 42.1
% 
73,225 68.6% -26.5% 
Common-law 
Couples 
15 9.7% 290 10.5
% 
6,355 6.0% 4.6% 
One Parent-
Female 
90 58.1
% 
1,090 39.6
% 
23,155 21.7% 17.9% 
One Parent-
Male 
0 0.0% 215 7.8% 3,985 3.7% 4.1% 
Total Families 
with Children 
 
155 
 
100.0
% 
 
2,755 
 
100.0
% 
 
106,720 
 
100.0% 
 
0.0% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
The number of economic dependants a family supports is correlated to the financial requirements 
of families. Families supporting a large number of children typically have greater financial 
responsibilities and less disposable income. Families in the North End are 7.1 percent more 
likely to have three or more children, whereas families in Winnipeg typically have two or less 
children. The area with the fewest number of children per family in the North End is Dufferin. 
On average, 50 percent of the families in Dufferin have one child. On the other end of the 
spectrum, Lord Selkirk Park has the highest number of children per family with 35.5 percent of 
families having three or more children, which is 17.5 percent higher than the Winnipeg average. 
The North End’s lower income and larger number of dependent children indicates a greater 
financial strain for these families. 
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Table 2.11     Number of Dependants 
 
CENSUS 
FAMILIES 
 
LORD 
SELKIRK 
PARK 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END to 
WINNIPEG 
Number of 
Children 
Per Family 
Number % Of 
Total 
Number % Of 
Total 
Number % Of 
Total 
% 
Difference 
One 40 25.8% 1,140 41.8% 45,485 42.6% -0.9% 
Two 60 38.7% 905 33.2% 42,035 39.4% -6.2% 
Three or 
More 
55 35.5% 685 25.1% 19,205 18.0% 7.1% 
Total 155 100.0
% 
2,730 100.0% 106,725 100.0% 0.0% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
 
2.8    EDUCATION 
 
The attainment of formal education is an important factor when looking at the demographics of 
an area. Formal education is also correlated with socio-economic status.  Education is a form of 
socialisation that teaches a wide range of knowledge and skills that prepares people for potential 
occupation. A higher level of education is directly linked to higher socio-economic status.  
 
The majority of the population in the North End has obtained an education between the levels of 
grade 9 and grade 12 with no certificate obtained. However, the North End did have a lower 
overall level of education compared to Winnipeg in regards to education beyond grade 12 with 
no certificate.9 64.8 percent of the population of Winnipeg has obtained an education beyond this 
level compared to only 38.9 percent of the population of the North End.  
 
The community containing the highest levels of education within the North End is North Point 
Douglas. 4.8 percent of the population of North Point Douglas has obtained a university degree.  
However, this community has 10.3 percent fewer people with a university degree than Winnipeg. 
In regards to lower levels of education within the North End, the highest percentage of people 
with less than a grade nine education is found in Dufferin Industrial. In comparison to Winnipeg, 
Dufferin Industrial has 29.4 percent more people with less than a grade nine education. These 
lower levels of education in the North End correlates with lower levels of employment, lower 
incomes, and an overall lower socio-economic status.   
 
 
                                                     
9 This includes Grade 9- 12 with secondary certificate, non-university (without certificate or diploma), non-
university (with certificate or diploma), and university without degree, university with degree. 
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Table 2.12    Formal Education 
 
FORMAL 
EDUCATON 
ATTAINMENT 
 
NORTH POINT 
DOUGLAS 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF  
WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END 
to WINNIPEG 
(15 Years and 
Older) 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
% 
Difference 
Less then Grade 9 385 21.8% 2,785 22.1% 44,420 9.1% 13.0% 
Grade 9-Grade 12 
without secondary 
certificate 
 
 
655 
 
 
37.1% 
 
 
4,915 
 
 
39.1% 
 
 
127,140 
 
 
26.0% 
 
 
13.0% 
Grade 9-Grade 12 
with secondary 
certificate 
 
 
130 
 
 
7.4% 
 
 
1,265 
 
 
10.1% 
 
 
56,680 
 
 
11.6% 
 
 
-1.5% 
Non-University-
without Certificate 
or Diploma 
 
160 
 
 
9.1% 
 
 
750 
 
 
5.6% 
 
 
27,065 
 
 
5.5% 
 
 
0.1% 
Non-University-
with Certificate or 
Diploma 
 
 
220 
 
12.5% 
 
 
1,630 
 
 
13.0% 
 
 
96,450 
 
 
19.1% 
 
 
-6.2% 
University without 
Degree 
 
130 
 
7.4% 
 
915 
 
7.3% 
 
66,130 
 
13.5% 
 
-6.3% 
University with 
Degree 
 
85 
 
4.8% 
 
365 
 
2.9% 
 
73,590 
 
15.1% 
 
-12.2% 
Total 1,765 100% 12,580 100% 488,475 100% 0.0% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
 
2.9    TRANSPORTATION 
 
While, the socio-economic status is not likely determined by the mode of transportation used by 
a household, it often is reflective of the socio-economic status of a community. Mode of 
transportation is also of specific interest in this study in relation to bank locations. With banks 
moving out of the North End, modes of transportation to and from banking locations is a key 
concern.  
 
In the North End, the mode of transportation most utilised by the population is a car, truck or van 
(as a driver). This mode of transportation is, however, utilised 15.7 percent more frequently in 
Winnipeg on average.  Public transit is also more widely used in the North End, 23.2 percent of 
the population use this form of transportation, in Winnipeg only 15.5 percent of the population 
use public transportation. The population of the North End that either walks or uses a bike as a 
primary mode of transportation is 4 percent higher than the Winnipeg average.  
 
In the community of Lord Selkirk Park, 40.7 percent of the population walk as a primary mode 
of transportation, indicating that 33.6 percent more people in Lord Selkirk Park utilise walking as 
a primary mode of transportation in comparison to Winnipeg. The population of the North End is 
also more likely to be a passenger in a vehicle, as opposed to the driver, than is the overall 
population of Winnipeg.  
 
These statistics indicate that the population of the North End is limited in terms of vehicle 
mobility, as a driver, but more diverse in their usage of other forms of transportation. This 
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indicates a lower level of socio-economic status. The limited form of transportation in the North 
End would make accessing remote banking locations more difficult for residents of the North 
End in comparison to other residents of Winnipeg. 
 
 
Table 2.13    Mode of Transportation 
 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORTATION 
 
LORD 
SELKIRK 
PARK 
NORTH 
END 
CITY OF 
 WINNIPEG 
DIFFERENCE 
NORTH END to 
WINNIPEG 
(15 Years and Older) Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
Number % Of  
Total 
% 
Difference 
Car, Truck, Van-as Driver 35 25.9% 2,410 50.9% 188,630 66.6% -15.7% 
Car, Truck, Van-as 
Passenger 
 
20 
 
14.8% 
 
605 
 
12.8% 
 
25,950 
 
9.2% 
 
3.6% 
Public Transit 25 18.5% 1,100 23.2% 44,015 15.5% 7.7% 
Walk to Work 55 40.7% 420 8.9% 18,220 6.4% 2.4% 
Bicycle 0 0.0% 130 2.7% 4,125 1.5% 1.3% 
Motorcycle 0 0.0% 10 0.2% 145 0.1% 0.2% 
Taxicab 0 0.0% 10 0.2% 605 0.2% 0.0% 
Other Methods 0 0.0% 50 1.1% 1,375 0.6% 0.5% 
Total 135 100.0
% 
4,735 100.0
% 
283,365 100.0
% 
0.0% 
*Source City of Winnipeg Web site “Community Profiles” 
 
 
2.10    SUMMARY 
 
The North End is found to have a lower socio-economic status in comparison to Winnipeg. The 
steady decline in the population of the North End demonstrates this. This low socio-economic 
status is in part correlated with the income disparity that exists between the North End and the 
rest of Winnipeg. The North End has a considerably lower average income than Winnipeg. 
Incidence of low-income is also higher in the North End than in Winnipeg partly due to higher 
levels of unemployment and high levels of government transfer payments.  
 
A high percentage of the population in the North End also falls into an unemployable age 
category, indicating less overall income potential for the area. Income is also correlated with 
ethnicity. Aboriginal people and visible minorities often have lower incomes. The North End’s 
large representation of Aboriginal and visible minority people is, therefore, correlated with low 
incomes and lower socio-economic status in the area. The higher percentage of single people, 
single females with children and a higher number of children per family in the North End, is also 
correlated with low socio-economic status, which is due to the reduced potential for dual 
incomes and the heightened financial requirement of the providers. Socio-economic status is also 
directly correlated with level of education. The North End’s low levels of education correlates 
with lower employment levels, lower income and, therefore, lower socio-economic status. The 
overall lower socio-economic status of the North End is reflected in the modes of transportation 
utilised by the population. The usage of a car, truck or van is lower in the North End than in 
Winnipeg. 
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Overall the North End has lower socio-economic status compared to Winnipeg as a whole. In 
sum, lower socio-economic status of the North End is correlated with its declining population, 
low income, high rates of unemployment, high levels of government transfer payments, high 
percentage of children and seniors, large number of minorities residents, prevalence of single 
income families, a high number of children per family and minimum levels of formal education. 
The heightened usage of public transportation in the North End is reflective of the lower socio-
economic status of the area.  
 
To summarise, the North End is an impoverished neighbourhood with a declining population. 
Declining state services and market deregulation are likely contributing factors to this 
neighbourhood’s poverty.  
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3.0 FRINGE BANKING IN WINNIPEG’S NORTH END: THE  
CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE 
 
3.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to determine the relationship between fringe banks —include local stores and bars that 
provide credit or cash cheques, pawnshops, rent-to-own firms, cheque-cashing businesses, tax 
preparation services with refund advances and independent financing companies— and the 
community, a number of questions are asked in the client questionnaire regarding the usage of 
each of these banking facilities. The following analysis intends to describe the specificity of each 
of these types of institutions and the type of relationship that the residents have with them.  
 
The responses provided by respondents are here categorised into each separate fringe banking 
facility to see if there are any patterns that appear with the categories and/or between the 
categories. This section will mainly focus on the type of credit provided, the conditions 
associated with these services and the frequency of usage in relation to each type of credit 
provided. As identified by the informants, the problems or limits of these fringe services, as well 
as the reasons for choosing to have recourse to these institutions, will also be discussed. 
However, the main discussion concerning the socio-economic factors influencing the use of 
fringe banking facilities will be covered in section 3.3 entitled “Criteria Contributing to the use 
of Fringe Banking.” 
 
 
3.2    Fringe Banking 
 
3.2.1    Cheque-cashing Outlets 
 
Although, there are a small number of respondents who did not use any of the services provided 
by cheque-cashing facilities overall, it was common to find that respondents in the survey used 
cheque-cashing outlets for cashing cheques. The respondents who indicated using cheque-
cashing outlets to cash cheques can be divided into two groups; frequent users and infrequent 
users.10   
 
The first group is comprised of respondents who frequently used the cheque-cashing services 
provided by the cheque-cashing outlets. Respondents indicated that they used these facilities 
approximately 2-4 times a month. This was dependent on how frequently they received cheques. 
This group was also representative of those respondents who don’t have access to bank accounts.   
                                                     
10 Some respondents in both groups were also found to have access to check cashing at local stores and/or 
bars.  These respondents indicated that they required the services of check cashing outlets when their local store/bar 
was unable to provide the service.  This was typically due to the lack of funds available at the local store and/or bar 
at the time the respondent required the check cashed. Therefore, frequency in both groups is also dependent upon 
access to local store and bar for check cashing for those who utilise this service.   
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There are a number of reasons expressed by respondents as to why they used cheque-cashing 
facilities. The two main reasons were the lack of access to bank accounts and the lack of 
identification required to cash cheques at banks. One respondent expressed this: 
 
I have to use a local cheque-cashing facility.  I have no ID and no 
bank account.  I need to cash my cheques somewhere.11  
 
As noted earlier, this is a common theme among the respondents in this category. The next most 
common reason given for using cheque-cashing outlets was their convenient locations and close 
proximity. 
 
A larger number of respondents fell into the second group, which were less frequent/occasional 
users, typically using cheque-cashing facilities one to three times a year. This group had access 
to bank accounts and/or access to cheque-cashing services at the banks. This limited the 
respondent’s dependency on cheque-cashing outlets for their cheque-cashing services. Their 
foremost reason for having used the cheque-cashing outlets, which is similar to the previous 
group, was also convenience as noted by the following respondent: 
 
I use [X Cheque-Cashing Firm] to cash cheques and get money 
orders. My bank places a hold on my cheque for five days. At the 
cheque-cashing facility I get my money right away.  There is no 
extra paper work there either. It’s just more convenient. 
 
This respondent expressed a commonly noted incentive for using cheque-cashing outlets: fast 
cash. Another reason noted by respondents was the hours of the cheque-cashing facility. 
Respondents indicated they primarily used the cheque-cashing outlets after normal banking 
hours to cash cheques. Other reasons noted included their convenient location and their lack of 
personal identification requirements. 
 
Respondents in both groups were found to have an average income of approximately $10,00012, 
although less frequent users have higher incomes. The respondent’s low income limited their 
ability to live from cheque to cheque, resulting in the immediate need for finances from time to 
time. This made convenience, specifically fast cash, hours and location, a benefit for using 
cheque-cashing outlets. However, respondents often felt that the charges of the cheque-cashing 
outlets were high. One respondent indicated this: 
 
I don’t want to have to pay that much to cash a cheque but I had 
too. I needed the money right away. 
 
                                                     
11 Quotes are based on information recorded during client interviews. They may be written verbatim or they may be 
paraphrased.  
12 Income is the income reported by the respondent in the process of the interview and may not reflect actual 
income. Rental expenses paid directly to landlords may not be included. As well, totals may reflect net income 
rather than gross income for those who are employed and have deductions taken from their paycheques.   
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Respondents indicated dissatisfaction with having to pay these high costs. However, respondents 
understood that the manner in which these services are provided creates a greater expense to the 
cheque-cashing outlets (due to diminished ID requirements, longer hours of operation, and the 
provision of immediate cash without a five-day hold) and that these expenses are in turn passed 
on to the customer through higher costs for services.   
 
Respondents less frequently used other services such as payday loans (see section 3.2.5 “Payday 
Loans”) provided by cheque-cashing facilities. The respondents who used these services also 
typically used the cheque-cashing services provided by the facility. Other services more typically 
used included money orders and money transfers. The reasons given for acquiring money orders 
through cheque-cashing outlets varied. A common reason noted was convenience, either due to 
the extended hours of service, close proximity, or the speed of service provided. Respondents 
also indicated that the reason they used cheque-cashing outlets for money orders was that they 
believe the service to be cheaper at the outlet than at a bank. For those respondents who did not 
have an account at a bank, their options for obtaining a money order were limited, and therefore 
utilised the services of cheque-cashing outlets based primarily on their lack of alternatives. 
   
3.2.2    Cheque-cashing at Stores/Bars 
 
Respondents were also able to cash cheques at local stores, bars and pharmacies. These 
respondents indicated that they had no personal relation to the pharmacy or its owners. ID was 
typically required to cash cheques if the staff was not familiar with the respondent. According to 
the respondents, the pharmacy charged a flat rate of $2.00 to cash a cheque. This minimal fee 
suggests that the drug store is not receiving a large profit by providing this service. The drug 
store is providing the cheque-cashing service to draw customers into the store in the hopes of 
facilitating purchases and increasing overall profit, signifying that the drug store’s motives for 
providing this service may be rooted more in a market strategy as opposed to community 
reciprocity. 
 
Another commonplace to cash cheques was at the respondent’s local store. The stores usually did 
not charge a fee. It was, however, expected that the respondents would buy items such as 
groceries at the store in order to get the cheque cashed. In this instance, cheque cashing was used 
as an incentive to persuade consumers to purchase products from their establishment. There were 
other locations in which respondents indicated cashing cheques. These locations were less 
common and included businesses such as bars and pawnshops. In these cases, respondents 
usually frequented these establishments. Establishments can be assumed to cash these cheques 
for the respondents to maintain good customer relationships and to facilitate future business with 
the customers. These establishments also base cheque-cashing services on a market strategy. 
However, these establishments provide cheque-cashing services to a minimal number of 
customers with whom the owners have developed a relationship, indicating the establishment’s 
cheque-cashing service also contains an element of community reciprocity.   
 
3.2.3    Pawnshops 
 
Respondents commonly indicated that they have used a pawnshop at some period in their lives. It 
is typical of these respondents to have used a pawnshop in the last year. Respondents usually 
have one to two regular pawnshops that they visit. Respondents frequented the same 
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pawnshop(s) based on the fact that they were familiar with the prices and the people there. The 
following was an explanation given by one respondent as to why she uses a specific pawnshop: 
 
I pawn things at [X Pawnshop] because they are close, have 
convenient hours, and I know what they will give me for my 
stereo. 
 
Items typically pawned consist of electronics such as televisions, DVDs, VCRs, CD players, 
video game units, video games and movies. There were a few instances in which jewellery was 
pawned. These items were taken into the pawnshops and exchanged for cash. Haggling over 
prices was a rare occurrence: 
 
When you bring something in to pawn, you are pawning it for a 
reason: you need money for groceries or for a bill so you know 
how much money you need and that is what you ask for. Usually 
you’ll get close to that amount. You want the least amount of 
money for the item you brought in so that when you get it out of 
pawn it doesn’t cost as much.   
 
This extract of testimony illustrates that respondents used pawnshops in a rational way and 
anticipated the consequences of their decision to pawn items. Respondents know that borrowing 
money from a pawnshop is very expensive. They do not try to get the highest dollar value for 
their items, because the interest on larger amounts of money results in a higher cost to them 
when reclaiming the item. Respondents typically asked for a monetary amount equal to the 
amount needed to overcome the crisis they were going through. However, the amount of money 
received for the item was also dependent on the size and market value of the item being pawned. 
The typical amount of money received by the respondents from the pawnshop ranged from 
$25.00 for less expensive items to $80.00 for more expensive items.  
 
Once an item was pawned, there was usually a hold placed on the item for fifteen days. The item 
could be reclaimed up to one month after it was pawned. When the item was reclaimed, the 
respondents were required to pay back the money lent plus interest. Interest rates varied from one 
location to another. Ordinarily, respondents were unaware of exactly what the interest rates were 
but knew what it would cost to get their items out of pawn. The following is an example of a 
respondent’s assessment of the cost of a transaction: 
 
I took my stereo in for $40.00 and I had to pay $54.00 to get it out. 
I get $20.00 for my movies and pay $29.00 to get them out. 
 
The interest rate on the items varied. But according to the amounts given by respondents on the 
money lent and the amount they have to pay back, the average interest rate on pawned items was 
around 34 percent for the first month. However, in the respondent’s mind, what mattered was not 
the interest rate, but the extra dollar amount they would have to add to the amount borrowed 
($9.00 for a $20.00 loan, and $14.00 for a $40.00 loan etc.). Respondents were typically 
accepting of the fees charged by the pawnshops: 
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The fees that I’m charged at the pawnshop are expected for the 
type of service that they provide. They charged a lot of interest, but 
I got the cash fast, and I couldn’t wait to get the money. 
 
Respondents commonly mentioned a preference for lower fees for these services. However, 
respondents typically allocated the high fees and interest rates presently charged at pawnshops to 
the cost of the services they provided; small loans based on collateral and the extension of these 
loans. 
 
If respondents were unable to claim the items after the first month, they got an extension on the 
pawn. The extension was to ensure that the pawnshop would continue to hold the item. An 
extension could be for a week or for a month. There was a charge of approximately $7.00 per 
week on the item or $25.00 a month for a $100.00 pawn loan. This extension charge was in 
addition to the fees charged in the first month. The respondents said that they typically reclaimed 
their items and did not get extensions. Not claiming back the item was an irregular practice in 
these cases. The following respondent explained how they preferred to get their belongings back 
as soon as possible and only obtained an extension when they could not avoid it: 
 
 I always reclaim my items. I won’t ever leave anything there. I 
usually get an extension once or twice per item. (That is one or two 
week extension on each item). In the last six months I got an 
extension about four to five times. 
  
Respondents indicated a wide range of reasons for using pawnshops. The most frequently 
mentioned reason was lack of finances. Indeed, pawnshop users are typically of lower income as 
reflected by the respondents in this study. Pawnshops are conventionally used when respondents 
do not have money for necessities such as food, childcare, and emergencies and for everyday 
conveniences such as bingo. The following is an example of an emergency, explained by a 
respondent, which required her to utilise a pawnshop: 
 
I don’t like to use pawnshops, but it was an emergency. I needed 
money for a funeral. I needed the money fast and couldn’t wait to 
get it anywhere else. None of my family or friends had that much 
money. I couldn’t wait for a loan. 
 
In this case, the respondent also noted that pawnshops provided quick funds in emergencies 
when finances from friends and family were unavailable. It was common for respondents to first 
turn to friends and family for money. However, getting support from family was not easy as 
frequently noted by respondents, since their relatives and/or friends were also typically facing 
financial shortages.  
 
In other cases, respondents preferred to go to pawnshops as opposed to asking family or friends 
for money. This was due to a variety of reasons such as the shame associated with asking for 
money, the need for privacy, or the prolonged lack of resources of friends and family. It was 
interesting to note that pawnshops were used first in all instances where respondents indicated 
requiring the finances for the purchase of drugs and/or alcohol. 
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There was a smaller group of respondents who indicated having used pawnshops in the past, but 
who were not currently using them. It is important to study this group of respondents, 
specifically in terms of what changed their financial lifestyle. This provides clues as to the 
reasons why other respondents continue to use pawnshops. Greater financial knowledge and 
financial stability were noted as important reasons for no longer requiring or using pawnshops. 
Respondents often indicated that they no longer used pawnshops due to their expanded 
knowledge in money management. Indeed, the respondents who had in the past used pawnshops, 
but did so no longer, were of higher income then those currently using pawnshops. The 
following illustrates that an improvement in overall financial situation was the main reason for 
no longer using pawnshops: 
 
I had to pawn things when I was on welfare. Welfare doesn’t give 
you much money. You have to pawn things. Then you don’t have 
enough money to get them out. I lost my stuff. I found a job now 
and I don’t have to pawn stuff any more. 
 
This respondent indicated income as a significant determinant of pawnshop usage and 
demonstrated that respondents found it difficult to function financially on EIA totals. 
Respondents’ profiles indicated that they were maintaining bank accounts but were limited in 
their participation in mainstream banking due to accessibility, and turned to pawnshops as an 
alternative way to obtain small loans. 
 
Past pawnshop users also indicated having financial support from friends and family. 
Respondents specifically indicated that, to some degree, a greater reliance on friends and family 
resulted in their lack of need for pawning.  
 
Another influential factor for no longer requiring pawnshop services was the recovery from 
substance abuse. As noted earlier, pawnshops were, in some cases, the primary source of funding 
for drugs and alcohol. Once a respondent was no longer abusing the substance, there was no 
longer a need for the loan provided by pawnshops. The following is an example: 
 
I used to pawn things about two years ago. I used to be an 
alcoholic. I’d try to keep the prices down just enough so I could 
buy beer. I needed the money so I did what I had to, I pawned my 
television, my stereo, anything I could. Once I quit drinking, I 
didn’t need to pawn stuff to buy alcohol. 
  
Some respondents indicated that they had never used a pawnshop. The group of non-pawnshop 
users contained a wide range of incomes from approximately $10,000 to $40,000 per year. The 
respondents indicated a variety of reasons for not using pawnshops. Some of the respondents 
stated that they had sufficient incomes and did not require the services of a pawnshop. 
Respondents also noted that access to mainstream banking systems such as an account and credit 
cards prevented them from requiring the financial services provided by a pawnshop. Other 
respondents indicated that support provided by family and friends was enough to avoid 
pawnshop use, as illustrated by the following respondent:  
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I don’t use pawnshops. I have a friend to borrow money from if I 
need to. Pawning is a vicious circle that always makes you short on 
cash. I have to try hard enough as it is to get by. I don’t need to 
spend more to pawn stuff.   
 
This respondent alluded to the cycle of financial dependency that can be created by pawning. 
This was the most popular response given by respondents for not using pawnshops. There was 
also a small group of respondents who stated that they had nothing worth pawning and, 
therefore, pawnshops were not an option.   
 
On the other hand, respondents from all categories indicated purchasing items from pawnshops. 
Items routinely purchased from pawnshops included movies, CD’s and video games. Other items 
purchased included televisions, VCRs, stereos, and video game units. Respondents rarely 
expressed the concern that goods sold at pawnshops were stolen. Respondents were typically 
aware of a fifteen-day hold placed on items and indicated that this hold period was so that police 
could run a check on the serial numbers of the items. This seemed to have reassured the 
respondents, as they indicated confidence that the goods that they purchased were in fact 
legitimate for resale. The main reason given for purchasing items at pawnshops was the lower 
prices, as noted below: 
 
I buy second hand stuff there for my kids. I buy them movies and 
video games. It’s way cheaper than buying new. 
 
The reduced price of the used item, compared to prices for new items, combined with the 
respondents low income were the primary motives given by the respondents for buying items at 
the pawnshop. For those respondents who used pawnshops to gain small loans through pawning, 
the additional items purchased became a type of savings or investment. Items were generally 
bought at a pawnshop when respondents had a surplus of money. The surplus of money was 
invested in an item and/or collateral, which could then be pawned at a later date, if necessary, to 
obtain finances when funds were scarce. The respondents used pawnshops as a facilitator for 
both loans and investments through the acquisition of additional collateral. These investments 
are unconventional compared to the higher-value market investments available through 
mainstream financial institutions. However, the principal of these investments is the same; to 
have extra money saved for a rainy day. What differs is the object of the investment, as well as 
the amount required for the investment. This indicates that pawnshop users participate in 
financial investing, but are limited in terms of the types of investment available to them and the 
type of firm that facilitate these investments. 
 
3.2.4    Rent-to-Own Facilities 
 
Rent-to-own facilities make it possible to purchase large household items such as furniture, 
appliances and electronics through rent-to-own agreements. The respondents’ experiences with 
the rent-to-own process varied, but with basic similarities. All of the respondents indicated that 
they signed a contract in order to rent-to-own, although none of the respondents were able to 
recall the contract’s specific information. Respondents did state that, generally, the contract 
contained the basic monthly payments to be made by the respondent and the time period in 
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which the contract was valid. The payment varied in relation to the item rented as well as the 
time frame in which the contract was valid for. The time period of the respondents’ contracts 
were typically 18 or 24 months.  
 
Until the respondent had completed the payments or bought out the contract, the items were 
rented to the respondent. The buy-out portion of the contract enabled respondents to exit the 
contract at an earlier date. There was no reference, by the respondent, as to the monetary cost or 
benefits of the buy-out. Respondents also mentioned a late fee of approximately one dollar per 
day for every day the pre-arranged monthly payment was late. After a pre-determined time 
period, if the payment was not made, the rented items were repossessed with no refund, as 
explained by the following: 
 
I have paid the 22 months of my 24-month contract. My payment 
is only a few days late. The rent-to-own company came and took 
the items I rented back. They said if I paid for the items and the 
late fee I could get my things back. They also expected me to pay 
for the time when they held the items.   
 
Typically, respondents were able to complete the payments or buy out the contract and the items 
became their property. 
 
Respondents indicated a variety of items that they had obtained through rent-to-own contracts. 
The most popular items mentioned were washer and dryer combinations, furniture, and 
televisions. In one extreme case, a respondent obtained a total of seven items from a rent-to-own 
facility. Respondents typically obtained one to two items through rent-to-own facilities as shown 
by the following: 
 
I have bought a couch and a dishwasher through a rent-to-own 
plan. The dishwasher is $88.00 per month for six months. The 
couch is $120.00 per month for two years. I figure the couch is 
worth about $2200.00. I ended up paying over $2500.00 through 
the rent-to-own plan. If I would have known it is going to cost that 
much, I wouldn’t have used rent-to-own service. 
 
Respondents often made reference to how much more they paid for the items through rent-to-
own programs in comparison to directly purchasing the items. Although the respondents were 
unaware of the interest rate, they indicated paying close to double what they thought the actual 
price of the item was. This indicates that most of the respondents utilising the rent-to-own 
services were unaware of the total cost of the services when they first signed up, as illustrated by 
the following: 
 
The interest rates, for the rent-to-own programs, are way too high. 
They don’t advertise their program properly. Their ads are very 
misleading. They make you think you are getting a good deal when 
you really aren’t. 
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This respondent, and respondents with similar experiences, had chosen not to use the rent-to-own 
programs in the future due to the misleading presentation of the service and its resulting high 
cost. 
 
However, other respondents indicated they would continue to use rent-to-own programs because 
of the monthly payment plan and no-money-down. These options were typically seen as a benefit 
to respondents due to their limited access to banks for loans or credit, low income, and their 
inability to save large sums of money required for the deposit on, or purchase of, large items. 
This reasoning for using rent-to-own programs was expressed by the following: 
 
It’s hard to save that much money to buy new stuff. This looked 
like an easy way to get new stuff. I could get the stuff right away 
without having to wait till I saved the money. I have to try it out. 
 
It appears that, despite the high cost of the rent-to-own facilities, respondents did use them and 
will continue to use them, because it is the only way for them to acquire expensive, but necessary 
household items. Although, the respondents using rent-to-own services were typically able to 
obtain minimal finances through family and friends, these resources were not sufficient to 
provide funding for large, higher-priced items such as electronics and furniture. This indicates 
that low income, lack of access to other banking services (i.e., loans and/or credit cards) and 
minimal funds from friends and family contributed to respondents utilising rent-to-own facilities. 
In relation to the services provided by the rent-to–own facilities; low monthly payment plans, no 
money down, and lack of realisation of total cost were also factors that contributed to 
respondents’ utilisation of rent-to-own facilities. It is, however, unclear whether a more 
transparent disclosure of the cost would discourage people to rent in order to own, as no other 
options are available for respondents to acquire large, and typically expensive, household items. 
 
3.2.5   Payday Loans 
 
A payday loan is another service provided by cheque-cashing outlets and other firms. There are a 
small number of respondents who used this service. These respondents had typically dealt with 
cheque-cashing outlets for cheque-cashing services. The respondents who acquired payday loans 
used the service infrequently; approximately once within any given year. The typical amount of 
money respondents indicated receiving was between $150.00-$200.00 per transaction. Most of 
the respondents were unaware of the charges for this service. One respondent explained the rates 
and interest as follows: 
 
I got a $170.00 payday loan. I borrowed  $170.00 and I have to pay 
back $192.00. I know that for a $45.00 payday loan you have to 
pay with a $50.00 cheque. 
 
According to this respondent, the combined fees and interest rates totalled $22.00 for a $170.00 
loan (interest rate of 13 percent per week) and $5.00 for a $45.00 loan (interest rate of 11 percent 
per week). A respondent described the process of receiving a payday loan: 
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When you go to get a payday loan you have to write a cheque. You 
post-date the cheque for when you are expecting to get paid. Your 
cheque has to cover the money you want to borrow and the 
charges. Then you get your payday loan. 
 
Respondents indicated a variety of reasons for needing a payday loan. A reoccurring theme 
among respondents for requiring a payday loan was the development of an emergency: 
 
The first time I got a payday loan was because my car had broken 
down. I needed money to repair it. Once I needed it (a payday 
loan) for my daughter’s tuition. I also used the money for 
unforeseen medical expenses and prescriptions. 
 
Other respondents indicated that they required payday loans to cover everyday expenses such as 
groceries and medication. Respondents that used payday loans were employed, since that is one 
of the conditions for obtaining a payday loan. Most of the respondents were employed part-time 
and had an average income of  $20,000-25,000 per year. It is, however, interesting to note that 
medication prescriptions were routinely noted by the respondents as the reason for needing a 
payday loan. This indicates that low-income people experience financial difficulties when they 
have to pay for medical expenses. In this respect, the absence in Manitoba of a public insurance 
that covers medication (as the one existing in Quebec) can contribute to impoverishment of 
people, especially those with children and of low income.  
 
In order to receive a payday loan, respondents were required to write a cheque addressed to the 
payday loan firm for the amount of the loan plus the associated fees. Therefore, respondents had 
to have a bank account in order to receive a payday loan. A bad credit rating can also result in 
the inability to obtain a loan through a bank and was a reason why some respondents required a 
payday loan. Respondents frequently indicated having limited access to loans or credit cards 
through banks. These circumstances, therefore, necessitated that they obtain loans through fringe 
banking facilities such as payday loan establishments.  
 
Circumstances such as the lack of sufficient funds, access to services such as loans that are 
provided by banks, lack of credit available through credit cards, and lack of access to funding 
through friends and family made payday loans the only option to these respondents. These 
respondents also dealt with other fringe banking facilities such as pawnshops; however, 
respondents typically used payday loan services when the money needed at the time exceeded 
what respondents could obtain from a pawnshop. Based on larger dollar amounts required by 
respondents, payday loans were the only option available to these respondents.    
 
3.2.6    Advance on Income Tax Refunds 
 
Tax preparation, in this analysis, refers to tax preparation services provided to respondents 
through firms that offer cash-advances on income tax returns. The issue of concern is the tax 
refund advance, as this is a particular type of loan. The firm provides the individual with instant 
access to the refund that is due to them – minus the firm’s fees – and then collects the 
individual’s income tax return when it arrives. Essentially, the firm loans the individual the 
 41
money for the two-to-three week period it would take for the refund to arrive and the fees are the 
“interest” that they collect on the loan. But since these quick refund services can only be 
accessed by also using the basic tax preparation services, respondents were asked questions 
about both aspects of tax preparation firms.  
 
Respondents who indicated using tax preparation services could be divided into two groups 
based on the types of services they received. The quick refund service was a preferred service of 
respondents who had their tax returns filed by the tax preparation establishment. This response 
illustrates the quick refund process: 
 
I got the refund the next day. I’m not sure how much it cost or 
what the interest rate is. I remember that they (X Tax Preparation 
Establishment) took $100.00 off my $400.00 rebate (from income 
tax). I ended up with $300.00  
 
Typically, respondents were unsure of the fee, but all could give an approximation of how much 
money the tax preparation establishment retained from the respondent’s original return. 
According to the respondents, tax preparation establishments either charged a flat rate, or a 
percentage of the total return. Other respondents thought the charge was a combination of a flat 
rate and a percentage of the total return. This indicates that tax preparation establishments do not 
use a common system of charging for the services they provide. It is, therefore, difficult for 
respondents to compare prices between tax preparation companies and to make cost effective 
decisions.  
 
The quick refund service offered by the tax preparation establishments is more expensive than 
the regular tax preparation, but was popular among respondents. Respondents used this quick 
refund option because they required the money as quickly as possible. The following expresses 
this reasoning: 
 
It’s like a habit; I’ve always gotten a quick refund. I don’t know 
how to do them myself…where else can I go…I need the money 
back fast. One of my kids also needed a new bed and I have to pay 
for day-care.  
 
Respondents typically noted that the additional cash was often needed as soon as possible to 
cover unplanned expenses such as childcare and household items. Respondents that used quick 
refunds tended to be of low income. This limited income, combined with unforeseen expenses, 
resulted in the need for fast cash.   
 
Respondents specifically noted childcare/day-care as an unplanned expense that required the use 
of the quick refund service. For instance, many day-cares will accept and/or continue to accept 
children while waiting for payment. This is, however, not always the case. In cases where the 
day-care requires payment immediately, respondents were unable to wait for the regular tax 
refund and required the quick refund. Income tax does provide some tax credit to individuals 
who have children in day-care; however, respondents felt that this credit was insufficient in 
relation to the cost of day-care programs. 
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Respondents generally indicated being satisfied with the fee charged for the quick refund service. 
The respondents who were not satisfied with the fees of the quick refund services often found 
alternatives: 
 
I used to use it (the tax preparation quick refund service). I think 
they used to charge me 15 percent of my total refund. I thought 
that is way too much. Now my husband does my taxes. 
  
The second type of service that respondents received at tax preparation firms was basic tax 
preparation. The fee for the regular tax preparation service was relatively cheaper than the quick 
refund service. The respondents indicated that in most cases the charges for tax preparation were 
a flat rate, ranging from $25.00 to $35.00. These respondents often could not do their own taxes. 
This, combined with a lack of alternative places that provide regular tax preparation services, left 
tax preparation establishments as their only choice. This lack of alternatives often left 
respondents with a feeling of resentment. This resentment was related to the respondent’s 
perception of the unavoidable high fees charged by the tax preparation establishment, as 
expressed by the following: 
 
It’s way to high (the fee for regular tax preparation). I pay $35.00 
for fifteen minutes of work. And I usually don’t get a refund. 
 
Respondents commonly expressed annoyance at paying for tax preparation services when not 
receiving a refund. Respondents who did receive a refund, however, were not as unsatisfied with 
the fees charged as indicated by the following: 
 
It (the fee for regular tax preparation) didn’t matter when I got a 
refund. 
 
It should also be noted that the use of basic tax preparation services was not dependent on the 
respondent’s income, access to banks, or available funding from friends and family.  
 
The remaining respondents indicated that they did not use tax preparation services. These 
respondents, who did not use tax preparation services, had the lowest average income. These 
respondents had found alternatives to the tax preparation services. Typically, respondents noted 
asking a friend or a family member to complete their taxes. There was no mention of any charge 
for this service by the respondents. The next most popular form of alternative tax preparation 
services was accessed through community organisations. One community organisation provided 
a free tax preparation service for respondents, while another provided it for a small fee. The 
exact cost for this service was unknown, but respondents stated that it was cheaper than the 
services provided by the tax preparation establishments. In other cases, respondents opted to 
complete their own taxes. Other respondents had chosen not to have their income tax forms 
completed. These low-cost alternatives may have been more attractive due to the respondent’s 
limited income. 
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In relation to tax preparation quick-refund services, access to banks was not linked to the 
respondent’s usage in any category. Friends and family, knowledge and access to alternatives to 
tax preparation services, as well as income were factors that contributed to respondent’s use of 
tax preparation quick-refund services. 
 
3.2.7    Private Financing Companies 
 
Private financing companies were the fringe banking facilities that were reported by respondents 
as the least used. Finance companies typically provided small loans to respondents to purchase 
household items such as furniture, appliances and electronics. Respondents were also able to 
finance vehicles and obtain mortgages through private finance companies. The interest rate 
charged by these companies varied from 18 percent to 32.8 percent annually according to the 
respondents, who also commented that these rates were too high. None of the respondents were 
able to provide further details on the contracts of these loans or mortgages.   
 
The respondents provided a variety of reasons for using the services of a private finance 
company. The following is a common reason: 
 
The financing companies ask fewer questions than banks, it’s less 
invasive. They are also quicker than banks when it comes to 
approval. They tell you right then-and-there that you are either 
approved or not approved. 
 
Respondents who had access to bank accounts, loans and credit cards stated that they preferred 
the anonymity and straightforward approach of the financing firms. Other respondents indicated 
using financing firms when they were unable to receive a loan or mortgage from a bank or credit 
through credit cards. The income range for respondents who use private finance companies was 
between $10,000-$32,000 per year. A sudden or drastic change in income, such as loss of 
employment, was noted as a reason for seeking the services of a private financing company.   
 
3.2.8    Credit with Local Stores and Bars  
  
It was uncommon for respondents to have access to credit at local establishments. However, it 
was an important form of credit for those respondents who did have access to it. The 
establishments that provided credit to respondents usually did not charge interest rates or fees. 
Those respondents that indicated having credit at a local store or bar mentioned a personal 
connection to those who were lending the money. This relationship included being a former 
employee, a landlord/tenant, or a long-time customer of the establishment. In some cases interest 
charges do apply as in this example: 
 
I used to have credit at a local grocery store and at a local bar. My 
mom had a line of credit at the local grocery store and I used to 
work at the bar. I used the money at the local grocery store to buy 
groceries about three times a year. They charged about $42.00 for 
a credit of $35.00 and I paid the money back in three days. I only 
used the credit from the bar twice, once in the vendor and once in 
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the bar for one drink. There is no interest at the bar. I used credit 
when I was broke, family at that time was not an option, and the 
interest is all right. 
 
This example shows that store-based credit may be an option when finances can not be obtained 
through other alternatives, specifically family. The respondent in the above example also 
commented on their lack of finances in general. It is interesting to note that all of the respondents 
in this category had an income of approximately $10,000 per year. Respondents were also 
typically collecting Employment and Income Assistance (EIA), which is commonly known as 
“social assistance” or “SA”, and were without bank accounts. These specific criteria suggest that 
this type of credit was one of last recourse that only the most disadvantaged and marginalised 
members of the community use.  
 
Interestingly, this type of credit is often provided at no charge indicating that the people lending 
the money were probably doing so out of obligation or a mixture of obligation and market 
incentives. This obligation could be the result of personal relationships (such as in the previous 
example) or could be the result of a humanitarian reaction pushing storeowners to open a line of 
credit for people who are in great need and can not find any other way to obtain finances. Where 
credit is provided purely out of obligatory motives, it could be disassociated from the fringe 
banking industry (as the major motivation is not profit) and could be seen as a communal 
response to poverty.  
 
In the cases where interest is charged, the interest rate asked could be as a way to formalise the 
transaction and to create a distance between lender and borrower rather than to generate profit. 
This is done in order for the borrower to understand that this is an exceptional situation and that 
the true goal of the business (bar or store) is primarily to make profit and not to provide support 
to community members. In fact, this form of borrowing is somehow halfway between the “gift-
giving economy” and the market. Indeed, the transaction does not seem to be primarily 
motivated by the quest for profit, but rather by community provision or appeal to solidarity. But 
there is still an interest rate involved, which indicates that the lender does not want to establish a 
sustainable relation of reciprocity with the borrower. It is also possible that the borrowing can be 
justified by the desire to accommodate (on an informal basis) a regular customer, and facilitate 
the purchase of goods, which indicates that market and reciprocity are far from being opposed 
and antithetic spheres; they can overlap. 
 
3.2.9    Summary 
 
To summarise, each fringe banking facility offers its own unique service to the respondents. 
Respondents’ views of the services varied depending on the services provided by the fringe 
facility. Respondents indicated dissatisfaction to paying the high costs at cheque-cashing outlets. 
However, respondents also noted that the benefit of longer hours of operation and the increased 
risk associated with waiving the traditional five-day hold on cashing cheques require this higher 
charge. In relation to pawnshops, respondents typically justified the high fees and interest rates 
presently charged to the cost of the services they provided, which are small loans based on 
collateral and the extension of these loans.  
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Respondents also commonly mentioned a preference for lower fees than those currently charged 
at pawnshops. Rent-to-own programs had mixed reviews from respondents. Respondents 
commonly mentioned the misleading presentation of the service and its high cost as a deterrent 
to future use. Other respondents indicated they would continue to use rent-to-own programs 
because of the structure that involves a monthly payment plan and no-money-down. In regards to 
payday loans, respondents were typically unaware of the charges or interest for this service and 
utilised the service due to a lack of viable alternatives. Respondent’s generally indicated being 
satisfied with the fee charged for the quick refund tax preparation service. This was based on the 
fact that they received some money back. Those respondents who received a limited or no refund 
viewed the charges more negatively. The interest rates from private finance companies were 
perceived as unacceptably high by respondents. Credit from local stores and bars was typically 
utilised by the most marginalised of fringe finance users and were commonly provided at no 
charge. Credit at local stores and bars was looked upon positively in all situations.   
 
Overall, respondents expressed that fringe banking was beneficial in providing much needed 
services and, at the same time, was taking advantage of low-income people as expressed by the 
following: 
 
Poverty is a booming business. Someone is making a lot of money 
off of people who don’t have much to begin with. 
 
Given the respondents’ need for fringe banking services and the generally high cost of fringe 
banking, the causes underlying the need for fringe banking must be identified. There were a 
number of factors that were linked to the general usage of fringe banking which can be 
categorised under three general headings: income; access to mainstream financial services; and, 
access to finances through friends and family. These factors and their relationship to fringe 
banking, and each other, will be examined in the following section. 
 
 
3.3    Criteria Contributing to the Use of Fringe Banking 
 
3.3.1    Income: The Common Denominator 
 
The use of fringe financial institutions stemmed from a situation of economic need, either in 
terms of acquiring a loan or expediency in cashing a cheque. It is no surprise then, that among 
our 41 respondents, low income was a common characteristic of fringe financial service users. 
Within this low-income category, a variety of sources of income were cited, although receiving 
EIA was a substantial contributor to this income bracket. Of the respondents who were 
employed, part-time or casual employment was more frequently cited than stable full-time 
employment. The primary income level cited by those receiving EIA was under $10,000 per 
year, while for those who were employed, this increased to the $10-20,000 per year level. It was 
possible to identify a variety of situational factors that appeared to correspond with this low-
income reliance on fringe financial institutions. 
 
Respondents tended to have low levels of formal education. Some had not finished high school 
and very few had any post-secondary education; fewer had completed a degree or received a 
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diploma. The generally low level of education may have contributed to the high incidence of 
respondents receiving EIA or obtaining low-paying employment. For those who had a college or 
university education, the repayment of student loans was identified as contributing to their 
financial restrictions. Of the respondents who were employed, the primary type of employment 
was part-time in casual or seasonal work and for minimum or low wages. The reliance on low-
paying employment and EIA made it difficult for the respondents to accumulate money or to 
have assets or investments. A common experience of our respondents was that their income was 
too low to sustain a bank account or be approved for credit. The following expresses a 
respondent’s desire to have a bank account:  
 
I had an account at [X Bank] but I closed it because I didn’t have 
any money at the time. I was being charged $9 per month even 
when there was no money in the account. 
  
This respondent had to close their bank account due to the unaffordable service fees on the 
account. This lack of surplus funds and/or credit needed to cover the fees and maintain an 
account can contribute to a reliance on pawnshops when small loans are needed for general 
living or unforeseen expenses, and when financial support from friends and family is 
unavailable. The lack of surplus funds and savings also meant that very few people owned cars; a 
situation that restricted access to banks to cash cheques when money was needed. As one 
respondent expressed: 
 
I find it very difficult without an account. I can’t find a friend to 
cash my cheque or to give me a ride to [X Cheque-Cashing Firm]. 
I had a bank five minutes away from my house, a [X Bank], but it 
closed. With kids, and no vehicle, I can’t get to their branch 
downtown. 
  
Being without a car also decreased the potential of receiving loans from mainstream banking due 
to the lack of suitable collateral.   
 
Being a single parent was typical for the respondents. This was a more common experience for 
female respondents. Single mothers often quit their jobs after having children in order to focus 
on childcare. For these single mothers, EIA became a common source of income. It was not 
uncommon for a single mother to be supporting three or four children on less than $10,000 per 
year. Far from being an exception, one 32-year-old woman with a grade 11 education supported 
herself and four children on a EIA allowance of under $10,000 per year. This was a commonly 
cited annual income for single mothers, regardless of how many children they had.  
 
Respondents citing a relatively higher level of income tended to reflect a recent change in 
employment status that often corresponded with a reduced use of fringe financial institutions. 
This, however, varied across different types of fringe banking businesses. The increase in income 
allowed for a surplus of money to be saved for emergency expenses, or at the very least, helped 
respondents make it through to the next paycheque. This resulted in a decreased reliance on 
pawnshops for small loans. Income levels were typically related to the use of pawnshops, but the 
use of cheque-cashing outlets was less affected by higher income as expressed by the following: 
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I don’t use pawnshops anymore because now I’m employed. My $20,000 
annual income has reduced my need for money at the end of the week. I 
use cheque-cashing outlets now because my job hours are late and they’re 
the only ones open. 
 
Respondents commonly indicated the location and hours of banks as being a problem for 
employed people, as they worked during bank hours. Bank hours were also of concern for 
respondents who were part-time or casually employed as this type of employment could lend 
itself to a less regular and, therefore, more hectic lifestyle in which organisational functions were 
hard to manage. This, combined with the low wages received by respondents, resulted in a tight 
stretch of time and funds that made waiting for an opportunity to access a bank impractical, 
leaving cheque-cashing institutions, with their long hours and numerous locations, the only 
option, regardless of income. 
 
Typically the more financially secure respondents did not use cheque-cashing services as 
frequently as respondents with lower incomes, especially since their increased income provided 
respondents with the capacity to open a bank account and, therefore, the ability to cash cheques 
there. Location of the bank branch still remained an issue. For some, this increase in financial 
security was the result of attaining a higher level of education. However, respondents tended to 
still be in debt from student loans, a circumstance that may sustain their use of pawnshops for a 
while, but it was expressed as a financial option that would hopefully be phased out as illustrated 
by the following: 
 
I have just started out in my career. I have been on social 
assistance for many years.  I still need help financially; I have three 
kids and a student loan.  It is hard to find adequate childcare.  I 
went 6 months without using a pawnshop but I started again 
recently to get money between cheques.  I hope it’s my last time. 
 
In this case, as with other respondents, outstanding student loans restricted respondents from 
getting credit from the bank when they needed it. In addition, limited financial support from 
family often left pawnshops as the only perceived option for obtaining money when the 
respondent needed it. 
 
3.3.2   Availability of Mainstream Financial Services   
 
For respondents, access to a bank account tended to be considered a desirable asset, mainly due 
to the reduced costs in comparison to fringe banking. However, several respondents said that 
they found the service fees too high to be able to maintain an account, although the fees could be 
lower in the long-run than using fringe banking. As a result, cheque-cashing outlets, payday loan 
firms, pawnshops, and rent-to-owns are used. This was the case for respondents who had a bank 
account open, and especially for those who did not. The primary reason discussed in terms of 
being unable to access a bank was location. This was a common concern for respondents, 
although a variety of other factors, as we will see in the following paragraphs, contributed to 
making mainstream financial services difficult to access for Winnipeg’s North End citizens. 
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For respondents who had an active bank account, the services available and/or utilised tended to 
be limited. Bank accounts were mainly used for cashing cheques, direct deposit of cheques, cash 
withdrawal, and debit card use. Yet even these basic services were often difficult to take full 
advantage of. Respondents less frequently cited using an overdraft service and/or credit card, or 
having acquired a bank loan (such as a student loan). Although respondents may have 
appreciated many or all of these services if available, low income levels prevented their use. 
Below is a discussion of the most common services used through banks and the limitation to the 
respondents of the services.  
 
3.3.2.1   Remoteness as a Limitation to Accessing Banks 
 
Respondents who had been using banks regularly expressed that they were now unable to do so 
due to the incidence of banks moving out of the North End. This out-flux of banks from their 
neighbourhood was a concern for the residents interviewed, as it had a direct impact on banking 
habits. For example, a respondent mentioned that their branch had moved twice and that it now 
took 45 minutes on the bus each way to access their account in person. In particular, the 
remoteness of banks was a frequently expressed concern of single mothers in the sample. 
Respondents commonly experienced difficulty in getting to a bank that was not within walking 
distance. This was a concern specifically expressed by the following: 
 
 It is nearly impossible to bundle up my four small children in 
order to walk five or six blocks to the bank to cash a cheque, let 
alone travelling out of the North End altogether.   
 
For a sole caregiver, nearby locations were a practical necessity, even though the closer locations 
are often the more expensive fringe banks. Respondents without a bank account often admitted 
that they would seriously consider opening one if the bank was within a few blocks of their 
home. Respondents were often unable to access banks due to their increasingly distant locations. 
 
3.3.2.2    Limitation to Cashing Cheques at Mainstream Banks 
 
In terms of mainstream financial services, cheque-cashing was cited as a priority. Cashing 
cheques at a bank is beneficial because this service is offered free of charge, or included in the 
general service fees. Although the opinion was occasionally held that banks charged more to 
cash cheques than fringe facilities, the general consensus was that banks were preferred because 
of their lower service fees. When asked if they were satisfied with the cheque-cashing service 
provided in the neighbourhood, one respondent answered: 
 
 
Yeah, I guess so. Well, sometimes I am dissatisfied because [X 
Cheque-Cashing Firm] charges too much, especially when it is a 
smaller cheque. $167 goes down to $157. That $10 dollars is a lot. 
I guess I am only satisfied that there is a service available for me to 
use - I am not really satisfied with fringe banking. 
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This service, used twice a month at a cheque-cashing facility, tended to amount to a higher cost 
than the bank service fees would have been. Yet, regardless of the savings associated with 
cashing cheques at their banks, respondents still used cheque-cashing outlets fairly regularly. The 
primary reason for this was the convenience factor both in terms of location and in terms of 
expediency in receiving the cash. The expediency was related to the five day hold banks can 
place on a cheque before cashing it. This situation exists both for those respondents without a 
bank account and for those whose bank accounts did not contain enough money to cover the 
value of the cheque. Cheque-cashing outlets did not place a hold on cheques and was therefore 
more practical for respondents who needed the money quickly.   
 
In addition, the operating hours of cheque-cashing outlets were a significant draw to their 
business. Banks are typically closed during evenings and weekends, so for respondents who 
needed money quickly after normal banking hours, fringe banking was the only option as 
expressed in the following statement: 
 
When I cashed my damage deposit cheque it cost me $7.50 to cash 
a $135 cheque. I could have taken it to my branch the next day but 
I couldn’t wait- I needed the money to move. 
 
3.3.2.3    Debit Cards/Automated Tellers 
 
Respondents that had their cheques directly deposited into their bank account were relieved of 
the need for cheque cashing. They still, however, required the use of withdrawal services. As 
bank branch locations were often problematic for North End residents, bank machines were 
frequently used. The cost for this service, although generally lower than cheque-cashing outlets, 
was still relatively high especially if respondents used bank machines from another bank or a 
“white label”13 ATM.  Respondents noted dissatisfaction with the increased cost of using a white 
label ATM or alternate banking company’s instant teller. However, as bank branch locations 
migrated away from the North End, the use of automated tellers became an alternative for 
respondents. Respondents assumed that bank branches will not return to the North End and 
requested that, under these circumstances, an increased variety of bank-owned instant tellers 
should be installed. Nevertheless, this request for more automated tellers highlights the need for 
increased access to their bank accounts, especially for those who use direct deposit and are no 
longer able to easily access their branch in person. 
 
3.3.2.4    Overdraft/Credit Cards and Loans 
 
There are a variety of factors that restricted respondents’ access to overdraft services, credit 
cards and loans through mainstream banks. Banks refused to provide these services to 
respondents with low incomes because they were seen as a financial liability.  Respondents that 
have claimed bankruptcy in the past were also seen as a financial liability to banks and were 
denied overdraft, credit card and loan privileges. Some respondents that have held credit cards in 
the past often decided not to use them any longer knowing that they would be unable to make 
                                                     
13 A “white label” ATM refers to a non-bank automated teller machine. It does not take deposits as most ATMs do 
and it is owned by a private, non-bank company.  
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payments due to their low income. Some respondents also refused to get a credit card because 
they felt the fees were higher than they were through fringe banking.   
 
In cases where overdraft, credit cards and loans were not available to respondents, they first 
turned to friends and family for the required funds. If this option was unavailable, respondents 
then turned to fringe banking. The following respondent described their troubles regarding a lack 
of credit: 
 
I am borderline diabetic and sometimes need money for fresh fruit. 
I have also pawned things for emergencies. In 1993 I needed 
money for a funeral. When you are stranded and you only have one 
option, you take it. It was my last resort. I lost some things that 
time- there were too many items to redeem. 
 
Respondents often required finances for everyday living, unforeseen expenses or in emergencies. 
Examples provided included: school supplies for their children, birthdays, Christmas, childcare 
expenses, and trips to visit relatives who were ill. These, and other expenses, were especially 
difficult to cover for respondents with low wages or on EIA, and with restricted forms of credit 
through mainstream banks. For these respondents, fringe banking was often seen as a viable 
option to obtain finances for these expenses. 
 
 
3.3.3    Discrimination 
 
3.3.3.1    Employment and Income Assistance  
   
Typically, recipients of EIA did have a bank account, but it was generally used solely for direct 
deposit of EIA cheques. Respondents commonly believed that recipients of EIA are denied 
access to a savings account and other banking services as shown by the following respondents 
comments:  
 
I once bought a Canada Savings Bond for my grandson. If welfare 
found out they would cut me off. Welfare says you can’t have a 
savings account. I want to be able to save at a bank, but welfare 
wants total control of your life.  
 
This respondent felt that any saved amount would subsequently be deducted from the next EIA 
payment, and if EIA found out the respondent had saved money, he/she would be denied any 
further social assistance services. Because of this common belief, those on EIA used only 
controlled accounts restricted to the deposit and withdrawal of EIA cheques. Thus, although 
receiving EIA did not completely restrict access to a bank account, it led to respondents feeling 
discriminated against in regards to bank access. 
 
It should also be noted that respondents expressed concern that they could not let their children 
open a bank account because any savings their children incurred would be deducted from their 
parents’ next EIA cheque: 
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With social services, they don’t allow you to have a savings 
account - even for your children. I have an 18-year-old who has 
nothing saved. I would have put $45.00 away for her each month if 
I were allowed. If I drop dead, I leave nothing for my kids. 
 
The respondents commonly expressed the perception that they are not allowed to have any type 
of saving for themselves or for their children, reinforcing the feelings of discrimination from 
mainstream banking. There are, however, provisions in the EIA policies that allow for limited 
savings. These policies are, however, ineffectively communicated to recipients. The Employment 
and Income Assistance Act states that recipients of standard EIA can acquire liquid assets of 
$400. An additional $400 for each dependant, up to a family maximum of $2000, is also allowed. 
These savings, though, may only be acquired once the family is receiving EIA; to be initially 
eligible, the applicant must have first exhausted any liquid assets. The knowledge of this original 
rule likely influenced people’s perception on the rules pertaining to savings. In addition to this 
primary impression, the ability to save money once on EIA is greatly hindered by the difficulty 
in making ends meet on the EIA monthly allowances. This lack of savings can facilitate the need 
for high-interest loans that spiral EIA recipients into deeper debt. Allowing an initial savings to 
be available to individuals eligible for EIA may help alleviate some of this hardship.   
 
In addition to the financial benefits that children of EIA recipients miss due to their parent’s 
limited income, the negative perceptions surrounding savings and EIA policy prevents parents 
from teaching their children basic saving habits. Positive savings habits could help children 
whose parents are on EIA gain economic self-sufficiency. In fact, it can easily be argued that this 
disposition of the EIA law is contributing to discrimination against individuals on EIA and their 
children by making saving, and learning how to save, a privilege limited to self-sufficient 
families. 
 
3.3.3.2 Respect and Courtesy  
 
The issue of respect and courtesy with using mainstream banks was also discussed by 
respondents, although we did not have specific questions about this topic. Respondents raised 
several concerns regarding feeling unsafe emotionally with the service offered through banks. 
There was an underlying feeling of alienation and discrimination that existed regardless of the 
location accessibility. For example, one woman expressed: 
 
I tried to open a bank account but I got attitude - they wouldn’t 
open an account for me. I had to go to [X Cheque-Cashing Firm] to 
cash my cheque.  I tried at [X Bank] also, but they said they would 
do a credit check and then I was refused. 
 
It is interesting to note that this same respondent later stated that they used [X Cheque-Cashing 
Firm] because of its long hours and convenience; yet in fact, they ultimately used fringe services 
because they were discriminated against at mainstream institutions. Likely it was easier to focus 
on other reasons for using fringe banking services rather than think about the discrimination. 
Respondents often noted feeling mistreated and disregarded by the bank tellers because they 
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received social assistance. Respondents noted with distaste that they stopped using their bank 
because tellers would insist on personal identification even though they had a debit card. There 
are various reports of this kind of dissatisfaction with being treated rudely and with disrespect.   
 
Although feelings of mistreatment were commonly directed at banks, there were notable 
accounts of this feeling associated with credit unions. The importance of customer service was 
also demonstrated as a concern through the number of respondents who listed ‘friendliness’ as a 
trait they would like to see in new services offered in the North End, even though this was not an 
issue brought up by the interviewers. The following comments illustrated this mistreatment: 
 
I tried to open an account at the near by credit union. I left without 
opening an account because the teller was rude. Distance is not the 
only factor. Being treated with respect is the most important thing. 
 
It is important to state that conventionally, the convenience of a bank’s location was not enough 
to ensure patronage. Respondents also wanted to be treated kindly and with respect. On the 
contrary, respondents did not complain about any form of discrimination at fringe banking 
facilities. In fact, they indicated being well treated in these places. 
 
It is unclear if respondents felt discriminated against because they were poor, or because they 
were Aboriginal or a visible minority, or if the two prejudices worked hand-in-hand. That is to 
say that visible minorities and Aboriginal people living in the neighbourhood may be assumed to 
be of low-income and, therefore, were not seen to be valuable customers. Survey limitations 
made it difficult to specifically discuss the issue in detail. However, an open discussion initiated 
by individual respondents revealed the importance of discrimination by the mainstream 
institutions.  
 
3.3.4    Identification 
 
Associated with the limitation poverty placed on mainstream banking is the fact that a lack of 
personal identification prohibited a number of respondents from opening a bank account. Due to 
lost, stolen, or unavailable identification (a common situation facing people living in low-income 
neighbourhoods), banks would neither open a bank account nor cash a cheque. The following 
respondent noted the limited forms of identification that are accepted as valid: 
 
I tried to use my photo Metis card. [X Bank] told me they don’t consider it 
valid ID. I was upset, this is who I am, how can they tell me it’s not 
acceptable.  
 
The most recognised and widely accepted form of identification was a driver license, which can 
be costly to obtain and inappropriate for those who do not drive. Likewise, identification from 
the Manitoba Liquor Commission requires transportation to their facility and payment for the 
card. Although impermanent residence and/or lack of telephone may also contribute to the 
inability to replace identification, the cost incurred in doing so (transportation, cost of card) was 
communicated as the primary obstacle. Whatever the reason, respondents felt discriminated 
against by their inability to prove their identity sufficiently, accordingly to bank standards. This 
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situation was difficult for the respondents to accept as this inability to have identification was 
only a result of their general economic condition and not the consequence of being a non-
credible citizen. 
 
3.3.5    Safety  
 
Concern for their personal physical safety was a common theme among respondents. They 
routinely echoed concerns about using bank machines and accessing bank branches in the North 
End. The fear of crime was also apparent in respondents’ explanations for why mainstream 
banking facilities were scarce in the North End. A common assumption was that banks had left 
the North End because of the threat of robbery, as illustrated by the following: 
 
I want banks back. The area used to be beautiful. We need patrols 
here now; it is not safe to walk at night. If we had safety the banks 
might come back.  
 
In this regard, we can say that the individuals not only felt directly discriminated against because 
of who they are, but also because of their neighbourhood being deemed unsafe. 
 
3.3.6    Control and Anonymity 
 
A few respondents claim they felt the banks were stealing money from them. Although this 
belief incorporated the sense that the service fees were misleading or dishonest, frequently it was 
the fear of direct theft from their bank accounts as illustrated by the following:  
 
I used to have an account with [X Bank] but they started taking 
money from my account. Once I found $200 missing from my 
account, another time $60 was missing. I don’t think they were 
service fees. 
 
Compared to the impersonal and undemanding transactions of fringe banking that required 
minimum identification, personal information and commitment, banks were sometimes seen as a 
‘big brother’ institution, an extension of state control. As such, banks were sometimes viewed 
through a suspicious and distrustful lens. 
 
It is possible that some of the reasons for this perception of distrust towards mainstream banks 
were rooted directly in the bureaucratic operations that required particular identification, a 
mandatory holding period for cheques, and a mandatory minimum account balance. For 
example, the lack of privacy provided through opening a bank account deterred some 
respondents as they felt that the banks had no right asking so many questions. "No questions 
asked" was also a common reason for pawning rather than borrowing from a bank. In this regard, 
bank policies can result in the feeling of personal discrimination regardless of the particular 
actions of the teller. On the other hand, there was not one respondent who mentioned 
experiencing personal mistreatment at a cheque-cashing facility. In fact, the friendliness and 
inviting attitude of the tellers at these places was consistently emphasised.      
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Typically, the respondents’ concerns revolved around wanting to retain a sense of autonomy and 
personal control over financial activities that banks could not offer. Although alternative services 
tended to be more expensive, they allowed the patron to retain direct control over the transaction. 
For example, some of the fees were posted and applied to everyone the same way, regardless of 
income. Even if the actual percentages were unknown, respondents were familiar with the fees 
charged at fringe services, as they remained fairly consistent.  
 
Most fringe banks do not demand that patrons disclose personal information to do business at 
their establishment. There is an element of freedom involved in fringe banking that is absent 
through the bureaucracy of mainstream banking commitments and policies. This desire not to be 
questioned, as expressed by respondents, is again indirectly attesting to discrimination, as it 
indicates that these people are so often questioned about their identity, and not always for 
legitimate reasons, that they are ready to pay a higher price for a service that will treat them as 
regular and trusted citizens. 
 
 
3.4    INFORMAL LENDING NETWORKS 
 
To better understand the respondents’ relation to fringe banking facilities, money and its 
movement within the community must be addressed from both the formal and informal levels. At 
the informal level, the issue arising from the interviews was the movement of finances/money 
among friends and family within the community. In the client questionnaire, those interviewed 
were asked a number of questions relating to their borrowing and lending of money to and from 
friends and family. The responses fell into three categories in relation to the informal lending 
process. The first category is referred to as a system of rotating funds. The second category is 
referred to as a top-down model. The third category is a combination of both the rotating and 
top-down model funds category.  
 
3.4.1    The Informal Rotating System of Funds 
 
An informal system of rotating funds was one of the financing systems found among 
respondents. This system was most common among respondents whose income was between 
$10,000 and $20,000 per year. Respondents who relied on this system were often receiving 
government support in the form of EIA, while those respondents who were employed were in 
part-time or casual positions. Although these respondents typically had access to bank accounts, 
it was rare that they used other banking services such as loans, credit cards and investment 
options. Based on the interviews, both surplus cash and credit were limited for the respondents, 
thus the system of rotating funds attempted to meet these needs as a process of mutual lending 
and borrowing money between individuals. A small amount of money continuously travelled 
within a small group of individuals that was usually composed of anywhere from two to five 
people, both friends and family. The strength of the system was not dependent on the biological 
relationship of family, but was based on the more social relationship of friendship, trust, and 
mutual support. The larger the group of people, the more borrowing options the people in that 
group had, as well as a greater obligation to lend. Between these individuals, the money was 
generally borrowed and/or lent anywhere from one to four times a month.  
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In the rotating funds system, the average amount of money that was borrowed and/or lent was 
between $5.00-$20.00 per transaction. Occasionally, up to $80.00 was lent and borrowed but this 
was less frequent. There seemed to be no interest charged on this money and it was typically paid 
back in cash to the person who lent it. In some cases, the loan was paid back ‘in kind’ rather than 
in cash. This exchange may have involved babysitting, house-cleaning, repair jobs or car rides in 
lieu of the cash owed. There was usually no definite time limit set on these loans, yet if there was 
a time limit set, the arrangements were made at the time the money was borrowed and was set by 
the person who was borrowing the money, not by the person who was lending the money. This 
was because repayment was dependent on when the borrower would be receiving their next 
EIA/employment cheque or other income. The system was based on an understanding that when 
the lender needed money, the borrower would reciprocate.  
 
There are a number of reasons why people used this rotating system of funds. The main reason 
was that the money they had did not stretch far enough to cover the costs of living. The money 
that was borrowed was for relatively small things, usually necessities such as rent and groceries. 
In addition to covering the necessities, money was sometimes also borrowed for entertainment 
such as bingo. When there were children in the family, money was often borrowed for clothing, 
diapers, school supplies, and entertainment such as movies, pizza and school trips. They relied 
on this system of rotating funds to obtain finances that were not available through mainstream 
financial sources, as this comment indicated: 
 
I don’t have a credit card, the overdraft on my account is used up 
and I need money for diapers.  It’s easier to borrow money for 
small things, like diapers, from friends and family.   
 
3.4.2    Top-Down Model 
 
The interviews also revealed a less common type of informal lending between friends and family 
referred to as the top-down model. The interviews showed that respondents in this category had a 
slightly higher employment rate, higher income levels, and greater participation in banking than 
those respondents in the rotating funds category. The top-down model was based on a 
hierarchical structure of lending and borrowing practices between individuals that originated 
from the top and flowed towards the bottom. It is important to note that none of the members of 
our sample were directly at the top of the hierarchy, but were instead always in the position of 
borrower, at least in the original transaction. In its most basic form, the top was the lender and 
the bottom was the borrower. Occasionally the borrower became an intermediate lender by 
sharing this money with others, constructing a larger model. The amount of money borrowed and 
lent in this system was usually higher than that in the rotating system. The amount of money 
ranged from $50 – $15,000 in exceptional cases. The following is an example of such a case: 
 
I had to borrow $15,000 from my father-in-law to buy out my ex-
wife’s half of the pension. There was no time limit set on the loan, 
but I’m paying five percent interest on it. I didn’t have a choice. I 
had to claim bankruptcy a few years ago and the banks won’t lend 
me that kind of money. The other loan places charge way too much 
interest. 
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This example demonstrated a simple top down model. In this model, the lender sometimes sets 
certain conditions on the money. Conditions can include interest rates and a time frame in which 
the money is to be paid back. In this case, the money was returned to the primary lender. In other 
cases, the money was not expected to be returned or could be returned in-kind. In most cases, 
this type of lending was used when people needed money and did not have access to mainstream 
financial institutions or when individuals preferred this system due to its informal nature. When 
the system involved more people it became more complex, but its basic function remained the 
same as in the following example:  
 
I borrow money from my sister every couple of months. I borrow 
anywhere from $100.00 to $200.00. My sister expects the money 
back when I have it. I also drive her around when she comes into 
the city. If I can’t afford to pay her back, she understands and it’s 
forgiven. She’ll still [lend] me money if I need it. My brother also 
gives me meat. He works on a farm and gives us food. I have to 
pay him back for the meat in cash. It’s easier and less humiliating 
than borrowing from a bank. I lend cash to my son and daughter 
for everything from gas money to furniture. I don’t expect to get 
the money back from my kids, although it would be nice 
eventually. I’ve also [lent] money to a friend once in an 
emergency, but I usually don’t [lend] to friends.   
 
In this situation there were two lenders at the top of this structure who lent to the respondent, in 
turn the respondent lent to two people. In this example, only the first relationship between the 
primary lenders and the respondent involved a two-way flow of money. The secondary 
relationships in this example involved single downward flow of money. This was not necessarily 
the case in other situations. Generally, the money was not simply being circulated amongst 
individuals; it was being distributed among a variety of individuals. 
 
3.4.3    The Combined System 
 
Another system found in the interviews, which existed among friends and family within informal 
lending/borrowing, was a combined system. This system had elements of both the rotating 
system and the top-down model. The respondents in this system were generally part-time or 
casually employed, or receiving EIA. Although the income level of this group varied from 
$10,000 - $25,000, the respondents in this group had the lowest participation rate in mainstream 
banking. In most cases, respondents used a system of rotating funds in everyday life for smaller 
loans and accessed a top-down model in emergencies. For instance this respondent explains: 
 
I borrow once a month usually off one of three people. I borrow 
between $20.00-$30.00 for groceries off them. They usually 
borrow money from me too. I have to pay them back next check. I 
did recently have to borrow $150.00 from a friend for a wedding. I 
have to pay her back but she never has to borrow from me because 
she has savings. 
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This comment showed that some individuals had access to both types of informal 
funds from friends and family. These individuals participated in both a rotating 
fund system and a top-down model.   
 
3.4.4    Limited Informal Systems of Borrowing 
 
There are a limited number of respondents who said they had never pawned items because they 
could always obtain money through friends and family. Nevertheless, respondents frequently 
noted that, due to the limited resources of their friends and relatives, the amount of money they 
could borrow from them was sufficient to purchase goods such as milk or cigarettes, but not 
enough for major expenses such as medication. In cases where money could not be obtained 
through informal borrowing and lending, fringe financial institutions were often the next option. 
As explained by this respondent:  
 
I would rather ask my friends and family than have to pawn 
something. Pawning is my last option. I only pawn in emergencies 
when no one has any cash. 
 
The most popular fringe banking institution accessed, when communal networks were not 
available, was a pawnshop. Those respondents who used the rotating system of funds were found 
to utilise pawnshops more frequently than those in the top-down model. The combined system 
had the least frequent pawnshop users.   
 
Other respondents in the sample completely lacked access to any model of reciprocity. This was 
especially true for respondents, usually Aboriginal people, who had recently moved into 
Winnipeg. This was a rare occurrence and encompassed a number of unique situations. The 
following was an example of such a situation: 
 
I don’t have a bank here; I had one where I used to live. I used to 
borrow money from my friends. They’d lend me money and I’d fix 
things for them. The last time I borrowed money from a friend I 
helped him do renovations on his house for three weeks to pay him 
back and he ripped me off. I don’t get along with my family, so I 
don’t talk to them or borrow money from them. 
 
In this case, the respondent did not participate in the mainstream financial services, had a low 
income of approximately $10,000 per year, and was unable to obtain money through friends and 
family. This respondent relied heavily on the fringe services, specifically pawnshops, for 
financial assistance. This case is an illustration of the fate of many Aboriginal people or new 
settlers who, because they cannot have access to the mainstream bank and do not have any 
communal network, have to rely on fringe banking services. Although most of these individuals 
have had previous experience with conventional banking, their resettlement and the 
impoverishment that often goes with it, pushes them into the margins of society. Once involved 
with fringe banking, they enter a spiral. This spiral makes them more dependent and less likely to 
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be able to reintegrate into the conventional banking system, as the following discussion will 
illustrate. 
 
3.5    THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF FRINGE BANKING 
 
There exists a relationship between the social conditions that result in the use of fringe banking 
and the social conditions exacerbated through these services. For the respondents, the 
convenience and availability of fringe banking could quickly encourage a dependency on these 
services, but then they found they had become indebted to the high-interest demands. As 
expressed by the following respondent: 
 
At the time when I needed money, it was good that there was a way 
to get it. But I look at it now and (fringe banks) charge way too 
much. It is ridiculous to pay $24.00 out of a cheque. You never get 
out of the hole, especially if you are on social assistance, you just 
can’t get out of the hole. 
 
By catering to customers within a low-income bracket, the high-interest demands of fringe 
banking created a cycle of debt that ensured the continued use of pawnshops for small loans, 
cheque-cashing outlets for immediate cash, and rent-to-own services for any purchases. 
Respondents viewed fringe-banking facilities as providing services that no one else was ready to 
provide, and the attraction and necessity of fringe services manifested itself as a downward 
spiral. For individuals who had become caught in this system and had low-paying employment, 
received EIA, or struggled with addictions, it became very difficult to accumulate surplus cash or 
even a sufficient monthly income to pay off the interest on previously pawned items, pay for 
cheque-cashing and bill payment fees, and other high interest services, while still being able to 
cover the everyday costs of living. Yet the further into this spiral they were, the harder it was to 
get out of debt, save money, become eligible for legitimate loans, or take measures that may 
have helped encourage upward mobility such as training and education.        
 
This spiral, though, cannot be credited entirely to the fringe banking facilities, as these services 
fill a void previously established through mainstream banking practices. Excluded from the 
mainstream opportunities of savings accounts, credit, loans, cheque-cashing, and more, North 
End residents are marginalised as a result of their socio-economic status, geographic location, 
and in some cases, their ethnicity. In mainstream banking, service fees are generally lower for 
individuals whose bank accounts maintain a certain balance, often of one thousand dollars. 
Lower socio-economic individuals, who need the service fee reductions the most, are not 
qualified for this benefit. At credit unions, the five-dollar share deposit was sometimes 
mentioned as a constraint to opening an account.  
 
In looking to larger social systems that facilitate the conditions leading to the trap of high-
interest fringe banking, traditional institutions of solidarity are often limited in their scope by 
modern institutions. For instance, traditional informal supports between family members or 
community members have been hindered through restrictive EIA policies and the lack of a living 
wage offered through minimum wage jobs. Several respondents said that their relatives could not 
lend them much because they did not have enough savings themselves. One respondent said she 
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would like to lend more, but with no savings from her welfare cheque, she could not do any more 
for her family. EIA regulation limits the ability of people to lend money to their network, not 
only through the low payments, but also because saving money is restricted. Thus, within 
communities that are struggling financially, it is made very difficult to acquire the necessary sum 
of money that could facilitate changes in this cycle of poverty. 
In addition to the financial constraints of borrowing from family, there were also respondents 
who preferred to pawn rather than to borrow money from friends and family.  For example, 
immigrants or Aboriginal people settling in Winnipeg with the desire to embrace the ideal of 
modernity and become self-supporting individuals rather than traditional, meant they were forced 
into the marginal economic sector. There were a number of reasons for this preference, the most 
popular of which was the feeling of shame that accompanied asking friends and family for 
financial assistance. This situation is exemplified in the following statement: 
 
It is easier to pawn something than asking a friend to borrow 
money. It’s embarrassing having to ask people for money. I’m 
ashamed to ask them. At the pawnshops they don’t ask you any 
questions. 
 
As previously discussed, convenience and privacy were commonly stated assets of fringe 
banking. It was easier to access pawnshops at any given time and fewer questions were asked. 
The desire to be emancipated from family networks and from the reciprocity could usually be 
satisfied by having access to modern institutions of banking; however, for poor people who are 
denied access to banks, the only way to obtain that freedom will be to access the fringe banking. 
 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The interviews revealed that the use of fringe banks stems from a variety of influences. The first 
factor influencing the use of fringe banks is income. Respondents with low income did not have 
enough money to cover the cost of necessities or to accumulate savings and, therefore, required 
extra finances to cover these costs. These extra finances are often not available through the 
mainstream banking facilities, since low-income respondents are shown to have restricted access 
to mainstream banking. This results in the use of fringe banks for required funds. The correlation 
between income and fringe banking is further supported by the fact that respondents with higher 
incomes, but formerly with lower incomes, indicate a reduction in their use of fringe banks.   
 
The second factor correlated with fringe banking is access to mainstream banks. Respondents 
often saw mainstream banks locations, hours, and regulations as restrictive in comparison to 
fringe banking services. These respondents indicated using fringe banking for its extended 
conveniences. In other cases, mainstream banking services such as accounts, overdraft services, 
credit cards and loans are inaccessible to respondents due to their low income, as previously 
mentioned, or their poor credit history. These respondents, therefore, have no other option but to 
turn to fringe banking to acquire funds. 
 
Discrimination is also an issue restricting respondents’ use of mainstream banks. It is also the 
third factor correlated with the use of fringe banks. EIA policy, according to respondents, elicited 
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feelings of discrimination in regards to their ability to participation in mainstream banking. The 
issue of direct discrimination by mainstream banks towards respondents was felt in regards to the 
types of identification the banks accepted, the negative attitudes of mainstream banks, and the 
abandonment of the North End by banks due to its negative stereotype. All of these forms of 
discrimination from mainstream banks, described by respondents, were related to income and/or 
race. Many respondents subsequently turned to fringe banks to avoid the discrimination found in 
mainstream banks. 
 
The fourth factor correlated with the use of fringe banks is informal lending among friends and 
family. Frequently, respondents noted turning to friends and family for financial support before 
using fringe banking. There are three different systems of informal lending found among 
respondents. The first system is referred to as the informal system of rotating funds, the second is 
the top-down model, and the third is the combined system. These informal lending systems are 
structurally different, but provide the same basic function - financial support for respondents. 
These systems of informal lending are, however, limited in their ability to provide sufficient 
funds. In instances where friends and family do not have the extra finances to provide support, or 
if respondents did not have access to these systems, as in the case of recent migrants, respondents 
used fringe banking. 
 
Fringe banking becomes the only alternative for respondents to access banking services as a 
result of low income, an ability to access mainstream banks, discrimination, and a lack of 
financial resources from friends and family. Respondents using fringe banking quickly become 
indebted due to the high-interest demands of the fringe facilities. This debt, combined with a lack 
of alternatives, leads to the continued use of fringe facilities in an attempt to regain financial 
stability. However, this continued usage of fringe banking only ensures an increased debt, 
creating a downward spiral effect and leaving fringe bank users in an inescapable financial crisis. 
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4.0   FRINGE BANKS IN WINNIPEG AND THE NORTH END 
 
 
4.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
This section will describe the fringe financial service firms in Winnipeg and the North End. It 
presents data on the rise of fringe bankers over the last twenty years, focusing on pawnshops, 
cheque-cashing firms, payday loan firms, rent-to-own firms and tax refund advancers. The 
section provides some information on the fringe bankers’ perception of their customers’ 
characteristics. This section also explains the types of services these firms offer and the 
associated costs. Fringe financial service costs are presented as a lump sum and in an annualised 
interest rate format. In some cases these costs are compared with costs associated with equivalent 
services in mainstream banks. 
 
The data for this section come from key informant interviews, a sample transaction, outlet 
follow-up and various secondary sources (e.g., fringe and mainstream bank flyers, pamphlets, 
websites and the Winnipeg telephone directories). Primarily in the case of cheque cashing and 
payday loan firms, data were drawn from outlet follow-up questions that involved telephone or 
in-person visits to inquire about available services, requirements to obtain the service and the 
associated costs. This supplemental information was necessary for these firms because of their 
low participation in the key informant survey.14  
 
In all cases the costs for fringe financial services are expressed as a lump-sum fee and an 
annualised interest rate. Both of these methods combine various fees for the service into one 
figure.15 How the costs for fringe financial services are expressed is controversial. Proponents of 
fringe banks, most notably payday loan services, argue that since these loans are for only two 
weeks, it makes sense to consider the absolute cost of the service (Elliehausen and Lawrence, 
2001). Accordingly the fees represent the cost of providing risky and administratively heavy 
loans. However, some argue that fringe bank services should be compared with mainstream bank 
services. The principal cost of mainstream bank services such as loans, credit cards and lines of 
credit is the (annual) interest rate. The loans implicit in pawning, cheque-cashing, payday loans, 
rent-to-owning and tax refund16 advancing should be valued using the same measure. Since the 
                                                     
14 The research team documented the efforts we took to interview cheque-cashing and payday loan firms in 
Winnipeg (Appendix D). In addition we emailed and telephoned firms with headquarters outside of Winnipeg. 
Finally we took out an ad in a local newspaper advertising the research study and calling for participation from 
cheque-cashing and payday loan employees.  
15 The Consumer Measures Committee, a partnership of federal, provincial and territorial government departments, 
is seeking to develop common policies regarding the 'alternative consumer credit market,' i.e., fringe financial 
services. In 1998 they completed a paper, "Agreement for Harmonization of Cost of Credit Disclosure Laws in 
Canada: Drafting Template." The paper proposes that fringe banks provide consistent information about their 
services to consumers in part by combining all fees into a lump-sum total cost and then convert this into an 
annualised interest rate. The fees include “interest; administrative charges such as service, transaction, and activity 
charges; charges for the services of a notary or lawyer hired by the lender and payable by the borrower; charges for 
loan insurance… [and] brokerage fees…” (p. 8). 
16 Other fringe bankers such as finance companies, white-label automatic teller machines and money orders are not 
examined here.  
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duration for most of these services is a few days up to one month, fringe financial service fees 
need to be compiled together and transformed into an annualised interest rate.17 There are good 
reasons to follow the approach of annualised interest rates. For one, mainstream banks provide 
short duration credit through credit cards and lines of credit. They express the interest rates in an 
annualised form. Annualised interest rates allow for comparison of fringe and mainstream 
financial services.  
 
 
4.2    PAWNSHOPS: TRADITIONAL FRINGE BANKERS 
 
Unlike cheque cashing and payday loan firms, pawnshops have a long tradition in the West and 
around the world.18 Pawning is a unique system that provides a small, secured loan for a fee. In 
our interviews with pawnbrokers and clients we found that pawnshop clientele come primarily 
from a low-income category. Often these people will not have access to other forms of credit. 
 
In 1987 there were only 23 pawnbrokers in Winnipeg, jumping to 38 pawnshops in 1988 and 
dropping to 31 in 1989 (Figure 1). The number of licensed pawnshops in Winnipeg has held 
steady over the past 15 years at around 30. It has held at approximately that level from 1989 until 
2002. Today there are 32 pawnshops licensed by the city. These pawnshops are primarily 
scattered throughout Winnipeg’s inner city. According to one respondent the first pawnshop was 
established in the North End in 1980. The number of pawnshops in the North End grew to five in 
1987 reaching nine pawnshops today (Figure 4.1). We are aware of an application to establish a 
new pawnshop in the North End. If this was approved it would raise the number of pawnshops in 
the North End to 10 and for Winnipeg to 33.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 For this study the annualised interest rate is calculated in the following manner. First, all fees associated with the 
transaction are a combined into a lump-sum total cost for the service (see footnote #1). The period interest rate is the 
total lump-sum cost divided by the value of the loan. The annualised interest rate is the period percentage rate 
multiplied by the number of periods in one year. For instance, a pawnshop loan of $10 for a one-month involves 
various fees amounting to $4.5 in total. The one-month (period) interest rate = $4.5/$10 = 0.45 = 45%. The 
annualised interest rate = 45%/month x 12 months/year = 540%. 
18 For a brief historical review of pawnshops and other fringe banks in the US see, Caskey (1994). For a more in-
depth look at social perceptions of pawnbrokers over time in Europe and North America see, Lewison (1999). For 
an examination of pawnbroking in the South (or Developing World) see, Bouman and Houtman (1988) and Bouman 
and Bastiaanssen (1992). 
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Figure 4.1    Number of Pawnshops in Winnipeg and the North End, 1987-2002 
Source: City of Winnipeg Licensing Department and the Winnipeg Yellow Pages Directories. 
 
 
Pawning involves a simple relationship designed to facilitate a cash loan. It works as follows: the 
borrower deposits a re-saleable item such as electronics or jewellery with a pawn broker. The 
broker advances the depositor a loan, worth less than the resale value of the deposited item. In 
Winnipeg, the pawn is made for one month but may be redeemed after fifteen days at which time 
the depositor repays the loan plus pays other fees. If the loan is defaulted the broker sells the 
deposited item. Pawnshops can also operate as second-hand sellers, although our respondents 
indicated that the vast majority of their transactions were pawning. We are aware of three 
pawnshops that also offer limited cheque-cashing services.  
 
Key informants were asked about the financial nature of their business. While they were 
unwilling to share detailed information, we were able to develop a basic understanding of the 
business. We learned that these pawnshops are locally-owned, independent businesses. There 
appears to be some market concentration in the pawnbroking sector as one or two pawnbrokers 
control several pawnshops. According to the police respondent, there were a total of 8,750 pawn 
transactions per month in Winnipeg last year. Evenly spread over the 32 pawnshops this amounts 
to a monthly total of 273 per pawnshop. In fact, two pawnshop respondents indicated 
transactions of 500 and 700 per month suggesting a variation in the size among pawnshops. With 
a monthly average of 600 pawn transactions these two respondents claimed that they did on 
average 300 extensions. An extension is when the borrower requests an additional month to 
repay the loan. Just over three-quarters of all pawns are eventually redeemed, according to these 
respondents. Most pawnbroker respondents were unwilling to provide information on their 
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income and profits and therefore we cannot comment on the overall profitability of pawnshops. 
However one respondent provided data suggesting a very good return-on-equity at 
approximately 60 percent in one year. 
 
According to our pawnbroker respondents the vast majority of their clients are from their 
neighbourhood (Table 4.1). Two pawnbrokers reported that an average of 90 percent of their 
clients come from the neighbourhood. One pawnbroker reported that one-half of their clients had 
an ongoing relationship with the pawnshop. The three pawnbrokers reported that over one-half of 
the clients are from an aboriginal background. 43 percent of their clients are from a non-
Aboriginal background. On average the respondents indicated slightly more clients are male than 
female.  
 
 
Table 4.1    Pawnbroker Perception of Pawnshop Client Characteristics  
 
Clients Firm A Firm B Firm C Average 
Local Residents 85% 95%  90% 
Non-local Residents 15% 5%  10% 
Repeat Clients   50% 50% 
Aboriginal  50% 70% 50% 57% 
Non-Aboriginal  50% 30% 50% 43% 
Female  60% 50% 30% 47% 
Male  40% 50% 70% 53% 
Source: Key Informant Interviews 
 
According to our respondents, the value of the average pawn is just over $50. The pawn is for 
one month but it can be redeemed within 15 days. The cost to redeem the pawn depends on the 
value of the pawn with higher per dollar costs for lower pawns. The redemption cost generally 
includes an interest charge plus storage and insurance charge. The interest charge is generally 5 
percent per month, amounting to 60 percent per year. However, when the storage and insurance 
charges are rolled into the interest charges, the annualised interest rates are higher (Table 4.2). 
On average annualised interest charges for a larger pawn of between $50-100 are 300 percent. 
Annualised interest rates on smaller pawns of between $10-30 are 450 percent. 
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Table 4.2    Value of Pawns and Interest Rates 
 
 Firm A Firm B Firm C Average 
Large Pawn: $50-$100 Pawn     
Value of Pawn $100  $50  $100  $50-$100 
Redemption Cost (1 Month) $125  $65  $120   
Monthly Interest Rate 25% 30% 20% 25% 
Annualised Interest Rate 300% 360% 240% 300% 
 
Small Pawn: $10-$30 Pawn 
    
Value of Pawn $10  $30  $10  $10-$30 
Redemption Cost (1 Month) $14.50  $39  $12   
Monthly Interest Rate 45% 30% 20% 38% 
Annualised Interest Rate 540% 360% 240% 450% 
Source: Key Informant Interviews 
 
 
4.3 CHEQUE-CASHING AND PAYDAY LOAN FIRMS: THE NEW FRINGE 
BANKERS 
 
Cashing a cheque outside of a mainstream financial institution is an old practice, although not as 
old as pawning. Through our client survey we found that cheques are cashed at local stores, bars 
and pawnshops in the North End. However in the last twenty years a new type of fringe bank has 
arisen, one that deals centrally in cheque-cashing and/or payday loans. Whereas the corner store 
will cash a cheque in order to facilitate the purchase of its merchandise, the cheque-cashing 
firm’s business is cheque cashing. We found through our research that, with the exception of one 
firm, cheque-cashing firms are involved in other fringe financial services, e.g., payday loans, title 
loans, etc. As mentioned above, with one exception, this category of firm was unwilling to be 
interviewed for this research. The one cheque-cashing respondent claimed that the cheque-
cashing portion of the business is declining and the payday loan portion is increasing. The 
decline in cheque cashing was attributed by this respondent to the rise in directly deposited 
payments. 
 
While the number of pawnshops in Winnipeg and the North End grew through the 1980s, the 
number of cheque-cashing and payday loan firms has grown in the 1990s and 2000s (Figure 4.2). 
1985 was the first listing of cheque-cashing firms in the Winnipeg telephone directory, when 
there were two outlets (from one firm) listed. This increased to four outlets in 1988 and hovered 
there until 1999 when it jumped to six outlets climbing to ten outlets today. This includes only 
two firms that are cheque-cashing businesses and that have listed their outlets in the telephone 
directory. The first payday loan firm listing in the telephone directory was in 2000 (when there 
were 3 outlets listed). Growth spiked to 25 outlets in 2002 and 33 outlets today. Part of this 
increase is due to the fact that in 2001 the largest cheque-cashing firm began listing itself under 
the payday loan category as well.   
 
There is considerable market concentration in the cheque cashing and payday loan business in 
Winnipeg. In 2003, 11 firms controlled these 33 outlets. Two firms, Money Mart and Instaloans, 
control nine and eight outlets respectively, representing one-half of the total outlets. The 
remaining 16 outlets are held by nine firms, with some firms owning three or four outlets 
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including the Cash Store and Sorenson's Loans. According to a key informant, there are a total of 
eleven payday loan outlets in other parts on Manitoba. The two cheque-cashing firms in town, 
presently involving ten branches, are owned by larger corporate entities. In the case of Financial 
Stop, H & R Block is the owner. Dollar Financial Group, a US corporation with operations in the 
US and UK, owns Money Mart. Financial Stop has reduced their outlets from three to one in 
2003. 
 
 
Figure 4.2    The Number of Cheque-cashing Firms and Payday Lenders in 
Winnipeg, 1984-2003a 
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Sources: data for 1984-2002 from Winnipeg Yellow Pages Telephone Directories. Data for 2003 from Winnipeg 
Yellow Pages Telephone Directory [online]. Available: http://www.mywinnipeg.com [Accessed 18 June 2003]. 
a. Data on numbers of payday loan and cheque-cashing outlets are approximations. During the period of data 
collections the numbers varied considerably with new ones opening up and some older ones closing down. 
*Until 1990 Money Mart was the only firm in the cheque-cashing firm category in the telephone directory; for 2001 
and 2002 Money Mart was listed under cheque-cashing services and loan categories (number of Money Mart outlets 
in 2001 were 7; in 2002 were 9). For 2003 in the Winnipeg Yellow Pages Telephone Directory [Online], Money 
Mart is no longer listed. This is not reflected in the figure above. 
**The number of payday loan outlets is the sum of, number of firms offering payday loans in loan category in the 
telephone directory and, for 2003 the number of Money Mart outlets (as their outlets are not included in loan 
category in online directory). 
***Payday loan and cheque-cashing firms are the number payday loan outlets plus the number of Money Mart 
outlets. In 2003 there is only one cheque-cashing outlet that does not offer payday loans. 
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The situation in the North End mirrors, at a lower scale, the situation in Winnipeg. In the North 
End, one cheque-cashing firm has operated continuously since 1988. This increased to two 
outlets for a short period in the early 1990s and once again rose to two outlets in 2001. Payday 
loan firms first appeared in 2002 and today there are five outlets, two located in the heart of the 
North End near Selkirk Avenue and Salter Street. 
 
 
Figure 4.3    The Number of Cheque-cashing Firms and Payday Lenders in the 
North End, 1980 -2003a 
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Source: Winnipeg Telephone Directories and Outlet Follow-up 
a.Data on numbers of payday loan and cheque-cashing outlets are approximations. During the period of data 
collections the numbers varied considerably with new ones opening up and some older ones closing down. 
*Until 1990 Money Mart was the only firm in the cheque-cashing category in the telephone directory; for 2001 and 
2002 Money Mart was listed under cheque-cashing services and loan categories. For 2003 in the Winnipeg Yellow 
Pages Telephone Directory [Online], Money Mart is no longer listed. This is not reflected in the figure above. 
**The number of payday loan outlets is the sum of, number of firms offering payday loans in loan category in the 
telephone directory and, for 2003 the number of Money Mart outlets (as their outlets are not included in loan 
category in online directory). 
***Payday loan and cheque-cashing firms are the number payday loan outlets plus the number of Money Mart 
outlets. In 2003 there is only one cheque-cashing outlet that does not offer payday loans. 
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The name cheque-cashing is quite self-explanatory. Providing the cheque-cashing firm with a 
third party cheque with adequate personal identification and a fee, the client is able to obtain 
immediate cash. The immediate conversion to cash is attractive. It contrasts to the experience for 
many at mainstream banks that often place a five-day hold on the cheque before cash can be 
drawn on it. In addition, mainstream banks generally have tighter identification requirements as 
compared to the cheque-cashing firm. For instance in the North End the personal identification 
requirements range from two pieces of photo-identification to as a respondent reported, 
“whatever you have” (Table 4.3). Fees for cheque-cashing range significantly for this service, 
generally including a per-cheque fee and a percentage of the cheque's value. One cheque-cashing 
firm respondent clearly posts its cheque-cashing fees while our visits to other cheque-cashing 
firms found that others did not clearly post their fees. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the costs of fringe financial services can be 
generalised into a lump-sum fee or an annualised interest rate. To cash a $100 cheque, fees 
ranged from $2.00 to $4.89, with an average value of $4.04. Following Ramsey (2000) we can 
assume that if a cheque had been cashed at the bank, a hold would be placed on it. In general, the 
hold would last for five business-days. One respondent reported that US cheques were subject to 
a 21-day hold at their bank. Thus, by cashing a Canadian cheque immediately, the cheque-
cashing firm is providing a very short-term, five-day loan. Using this formulation, annualised 
interest rates range from 104 to 259 percent.  
 
 
Table 4.3    Cheque-cashing Requirements and Fees 
 
 
Cheque-
cashing 
Firm 
Personal 
Identification 
(ID) 
Required 
 
 
 
Fee 
 
 
Total Fee for 
$100 Cheque 
 
Annualised Interest Rate on 
a Five Business Day Loana 
A  $10 for $300  $3.33 173% 
B 2 photo ID $2 for $100; $1 per subs. $100 $2.00 104% 
C ID >$100 = $1.99 + 2.99%  $4.98 259% 
D "whatever 
you have" 
$1.99 + 2.99% cheque $4.98 259% 
E 1 photo + 
1 other ID 
$1.99 + 2.90% $4.89 254% 
Average $4.04 210% 
Sources: Key Informant Interviews and Outlet Follow-up 
 
The average cost to cash a $100 cheque at a Winnipeg cheque-cashing firm is just over $4. This 
is more than the average monthly cost for a basic account at a credit union or bank, averaging 
$3.67 per month (Table 4.4). With this basic account the client can engage in approximately 12 
transactions including cheques, automatic teller machine and teller transactions. Per item 
transaction costs range from $0.50 to $1.00, significantly lower than the $4 paid at the cheque-
cashing firm. The average cost to cash twelve $100 cheques at a cheque-cashing firm, based on 
our sample, is $48.48. This is $44.81 more than what a bank client would pay to complete the 
same number of transactions at the bank. Cashing even two cheques of $100 per month at a 
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cheque-cashing firm will cost over $8. This financial service charge represents a significant sum 
for a low-income person. In fact it represents 3.3 percent of the provincial Employment and 
Income Assistance (commonly called Social Assistance) support for a single person without a disability, 
amounting to $242.10 per month (excluding rental expenses).  
 
 
Table 4.4     Fees for Services at Mainstream Banks and Credit Unions 
 
Lowest Fee Account 
Fee Per Month 
 
Per Transaction Fee 
 
 
 
Credit Union/Bank 
 
Fee 
Number of 
Transactions 
Automatic 
teller machine 
 
Person 
Credit Unions     
Assiniboine Credit Union $4.00 15 $0.50 $0.75 
Desjardins Caisse Populaire $2.00 7   
Holy Spirit Credit Union $4.95 15 $0.50 $0.50 
     Average $3.65 12.3 $0.50 $0.63 
Banks     
Bank of Montreal $3.50 10 $0.50 $1.00 
CIBC $4.00 12 $0.60 $0.60 
Laurentian Bank $2.95 8   
National Bank $3.50 12   
Royal Bank $4.00 15 $0.50 $0.75 
Scotiabank $3.95 12 $0.50 $1.00 
TD Canada Trust $3.95 14   
     Average $3.69 11.9 $0.53 $0.84 
Sources: Key Informant Interviews, mainstream bank websites and pamphlets 
 
As mentioned above, the number of payday loan firms and outlets have experienced the most 
rapid growth in the city in the last three years. As with cheque cashing, personal identification is 
required to be eligible for a payday loan. In addition, several other documents are required 
sometimes including: evidence of employment (e.g., pay stubs), evidence of permanent residence 
(e.g., utility bills), and evidence of a bank account (e.g., bank statement) (Table 4.5). This 
demonstrates that payday loans, unlike pawnshop loans or rent-to-own loans, target employed 
persons. This has been documented by a study recently undertaken by the Public Interest 
Advocacy Committee (2002). They found through a nation-wide survey that, 
 
…the average income of the [payday loan] customers is roughly in line with the 
Canadian average household income. Specific vulnerable groups are also not 
heavily represented  
         (Public Interest Advocacy Centre 2002, p. 36). 
  
We found that payday loans were generally made for a two-week period in amounts of $100 to 
$300, the loan amount being limited to a proportion of the client's anticipated paycheque. Fees 
for payday loans generally include an interest charge plus various transaction charges such as a 
processing fee and cheque-cashing fee (Table 4.5). Fees and annualised interest rates vary across 
firms and loan amounts. Fees for a $100 two-week loan vary from $18 to $38, with an average 
fee of $26. Fees for a $300 loan vary more widely across firms, from $30 to $76, with an average fee 
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of $63. Annualised interest rates vary as well. For a $200 loan they range from 260 percent to 650 
percent, with an average rate of 551 percent.  
 
 
Table 4.5    Payday Loan Requirements, Fees and Annualised Interest Rates 
 
 
 
Firm 
 
 
Requirements for Eligibilitya 
 
 
Fee 
Annualised
Interest 
Rate 
A ID, 3 months same employer, 2 pay 
stubs, bank statement, utility bill and 
2 post-dated cheques 
For $100 return $138 in 2 weeks 988% 
B ID, 2 pay stubs, bank statement, 
utility bill, post-dated cheques 
For $100 return $135.12 in 2 weeks 
For $300 return $375.70 in 2 weeks 
913% 
656% 
C 3 months same employer, 
checking account and post-dated 
cheque 
25% for 2 weeks 650% 
D 3 months same employer, 
checking account and post-dated 
cheque 
For $200 return $247 in 2 weeks 611% 
E ID, pay stub, proof of address, bank 
statement and post-dated cheque 
For $100 return $118 in 2 weeks 
For $200 return $220 in 2 weeks 
For $300 return $330 in 2 weeks 
468% 
260% 
260% 
F ID, references, 2 pay stubs, bank 
statement and 2 utility bills 
For $100 return $124 in 2 weeks 
For $200 return $245 in 2 weeks 
624% 
585% 
G Not available For $100 return $120 in 2 weeks 520% 
H Not available For $100 return $127.95 in 14 days 
For $300 return $370.95 in 14 days 
727% 
615% 
I Not available For $100 return 125 in 2 weeks 
For $200 return 250 in 2 weeks 
650% 
650% 
J Not available For $100 return $126.50 in 2 weeks 
For $300 return $363.50 in 2 weeks 
689% 
550% 
K Not available For $100 return $120 in 2 weeks 520% 
Average 
     $100 $26 675% 
     $200 $33 551% 
     $300 $63 546% 
Source: Key Informant Interviews and Outlet Follow-up 
a. Eligibility requirements generally involve personal identification (ID) and proof of employment and residence. 
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Two points flow from these data. First, given the considerable variation in fees and associated 
annualised interest rates across firms, consumers would be wise to shop around. This would be 
facilitated by regulation that compel businesses to follow a common fee formulation, perhaps an 
annualised interest rate, and be required to clearly post this. In the businesses we visited in our 
outlet follow-up to the key informant interviews we found that fees were not clearly posted and 
they did not use an annualised interest rate formulation. In some cases employees were willing to 
write out for us the cost of various loan amounts. This is a more critical issue for payday loans 
than other fringe financial services because there are more fees and they are more complicated, 
often involving a daily/weekly interest charge plus two or more additional fees (e.g., broker fees, 
membership fees, cheque-cashing fee, item fee). Using a common formula to price these loans 
would help consumers judge between different products and particularly between different firms. 
 
A second point relates to the interest charges. As mentioned in the introduction, payday loan 
proponents claim that annualised interest rates are not a fair reflection of the cost of the service. 
They argue that because the loan is of short duration, costly to administer and relatively risky, a 
better indicator of the cost to the consumer is the lump-sum fee. That payday loan firms are 
growing in numbers suggests that consumers are satisfied with the fee. On the other hand, 
mainstream banks offer services that can involve short-term loans including credit cards and 
lines of credit. For these services, loans can be taken out for shorter periods than two weeks. In 
mainstream banks, comparable interest charges hover around 10 to 25 percent for these services. 
The annualised interest rate for a payday loan is 55 to 68 times higher than for a credit card loan.  
 
 
4.4    RENT-TO-OWN SERVICES AND FIRMS 
 
The rent-to-own service is a way for a customer to immediately obtain an item through a rental 
agreement. If the customer completes the contracted payments, they then own the item. Some 
businesses in Winnipeg have been offering a rent-to-own option for obtaining furniture and 
appliances for many years. The telephone directory lists businesses with this type of service and 
we collected data as far back as 1982. At that time there were four businesses in Winnipeg that 
offered that service (Figure 4.4). The numbers increased to between eight and nine through the 
1980s and early 1990s, dropping back down to five in the mid 1990s, rising to between six and 
eight in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The firms that offered rent-to-own services in the 1980s 
appear to offer rent-to-own as one means of financing. These firms appear to be general furniture 
and appliance retailers. They appear to have stopped offering the rent-to-own option in the mid-
1990s. Then a new type of business, more exclusively focused on rent-to-own services, was 
established in Winnipeg in the early- to mid-1990s. At least two of the current six rent-to-own 
businesses in Winnipeg have locations in other cities. 
 
In 1982, one rent-to-own service was established in the North End. This was the only business 
offering the service until 2000 when a second business was established and then a third in 2001. 
Today, there are three rent-to-own businesses in the North End. All three of these businesses are 
almost exclusively focused on rent-to-own services. 
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Figure 4.4    Number of Firms Offering Rent-to-Own Services** in Winnipeg and 
the North End, 1982-2002 
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Source: Winnipeg Telephone Directories 
**This includes businesses with "rentals with option to buy", "rent-to-own ", "lease to own" or similarly described 
options, under sections: General, Television, Furniture, and Appliance Rentals; Furniture, and Appliances in the 
telephone directory. These figures represent a minimum number of firms since businesses may advertise these 
options for one year but offer them in subsequent years. 
 
We interviewed two rent-to-own firm representatives. One respondent indicated that 60 percent 
of the business’s clients were from Winnipeg and 42 percent were from the neighbourhood 
(Table 4.6). The respondents claimed that on average 80 percent of their clients were Aboriginal 
and 20 percent were non-Aboriginal. Some of the Aboriginal clients are from First Nations’ 
communities outside of Winnipeg. The respondents stated that on average 60 percent of their 
customers were female and 85 percent of the respondents received Employment and Income 
Assistance.  
 
Table 4.6    Rent-to-Own Respondents Perception of Their Clients' Characteristics 
 
Clients’ Characteristics Firm A Firm B Average 
Winnipeg Residents 60% Not available  
Neighbourhood Residents 42% Not available  
Aboriginal  75% 85% 80% 
Non-Aboriginal  25% 15% 20% 
Female  40% 80% 60% 
Male  60% 20% 40% 
EIA Recipients 80% 90% 85% 
Source: Key Informant Interviews 
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The key informants claimed that rent-to-own contracts ranged from 3 to 24 months. According to 
one respondent, the value of the loan imbedded in the rent-to-own contract ranged from $1500 to 
$3000. Respondents claimed that the vast majority of their clients intend to complete the rent-to-
own contract in order to purchase the merchandise. In other words, the rent-to-own service is 
used primarily as a means to obtain credit to purchase an item as opposed to a rental service. The 
two respondents claimed that on average two-thirds of their clients complete the contract and 
keep the merchandise. Both firms had a ‘buy-out’ option that allowed clients to complete the 
contract at an early date by paying some portion of the remaining balance.  
 
One respondent was unwilling to disclose to us the fees and interest charges associated with the 
contract. This respondent explained that once the customer had indicated the monthly fee and 
down payment she/he could afford to pay, the firm would determine the number of months 
needed to complete the contract and an agreement would be written. This respondent would not 
disclose to us the fees associated with the rent-to-own service. Firm B indicated that the firm 
charged an interest rate of 10 percent per month, or an annualised rate of 120 percent (Table 4.7). 
In order to obtain a second firm’s fee structure, Firm A was contacted. This firm revealed a 
hypothetical rent-to-own agreement (Table 4.7). This agreement involved fees and an interest 
rate amounting to an annualised interest rate of 489 percent. The average annualised interest rate 
for these two rent-to-own contracts is 305 percent.  
 
Table 4.7    Rent-to-Own Example Contracts, Fees and Annualised Interest Rates 
 
 Firm A Firm B Average 
Retail Price of Item $733  $649  $691  
Months to Own 18 22 20 
Total Cost at End of Contract $1,467  $865  $1,166  
Implied Interest Rate (month) 41% 10% 25% 
Implied Annualised Interest Rate 489% 120% 305% 
Source: Key Informant Interviews and Outlet Follow-up 
 
 
4.5    TAX REFUND ADVANCE SERVICE 
 
A final type of fringe financial service considered here is the advance provided by some income 
tax preparation companies. Once the tax return is prepared, and if there is a tax refund, then some 
firms will give the client the option to receive an advance on the refund, for a fee. In a sense the 
client is receiving a loan from the firm, generally for two weeks (according to respondents from 
these businesses), the time it would take for the claim to be processed by Revenue Canada and 
the refund to be mailed back to the client. 
 
At least two tax preparation firms, with several outlets in Winnipeg, offer seasonal tax refund 
advance services. These two firms have a total of 37 branches (Winnipeg Telephone Directory). 
Of these, three are located in the North End, although on the periphery at Main and McPhillips 
Streets. These firms calculate fees for the advance as follows: 15 percent of the first $300 of the 
refund and 5 percent on any remaining refund (Table 4.8). Assuming that relying on the postal 
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system would mean the refund would arrive two weeks later, the tax refund advance amounts to 
a two-week loan. Using annualised interest rate calculation; this implies a rate of 286 percent.   
 
 
Table 4.8    Tax Refund Advances 
 
 Firm A and B 
Cost of Tax Refund Advance 15% first $300, then 5% on 
additional refund 
Approximate Time Saved 10 working days 
Cost for $500 Refund** $55  
Annualized Interest Rate 286% 
Source: Key Informant Interviews and Outlet Follow-up 
** Excludes cost for income tax preparation and cheque-cashing. 
 
 
4.6    OTHER FRINGE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
Other fringe financial services include “white label” ATMs, which are ATMs not owned and 
operated by banks or credit unions. These ATMs can only be used for cash withdrawals from 
one’s bank account. In addition to one’s bank transaction fee, the “white label” ATM charges a 
service fee. This fee is often approximately $1.50, but one respondent indicated that the 
maximum fee allowed is currently $4.00 per transaction and may be increased in the near future 
to $6.00 per transaction.  
 
 
4.7    FRINGE FINANCIAL SERVICES IN WINNIPEG’S NORTH END 
Fringe financial service firms are a growing phenomenon in Winnipeg’s North End. In 1980 we 
found that there was only one pawnshop in the area (Figure 4.5). By 2002 there were at least 19 
fringe financial service outlets (excluding white label automatic teller machines and tax refund 
advancers) as follows: nine pawnshops, two cheque-cashing firms, four payday lender s and 
three rent-to-own outlets. While pawnshops were established through the 1980s, the newer fringe 
financial service providers, cheque-cashing firms and payday lenders, have grown in the early 
2000s. 
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Figure 4.5    Number of Selected Fringe Financial Services and Mainstream 
Banks/Credit Union Branches in Winnipeg's North End, 1980-2003a 
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Source: Winnipeg Telephone Directories and Outlet Follow-up 
a. Data on numbers of payday loan and cheque-cashing outlets are approximations. During the period of data 
collections the numbers varied considerably with new ones opening up and some older ones closing down. 
***Payday loan and cheque-cashing firms are the number payday loan outlets plus the number of Money Mart 
outlets. In 2003 there is only one cheque-cashing outlet that does not offer payday loans. 
 
As fringe banks have increased their numbers in the North End, mainstream bank branches have 
declined. In 1980, there were 20 mainstream bank branches in the North End. The number 
dropped to 15 by 1997 and then plummeted to only five in 2003. There have been a total of nine 
closures in the area in the last six years. During the course of this study, a mainstream bank 
announced its plan to shut another branch in the North End in August, making it the tenth in 
seven years. When this branch is closed, only three mainstream bank branches and two credit 
union branches will remain in the North End. At present there are six bank automatic teller 
machines and thirteen white-label machines.  
 
In terms of the geography of banking in the North End, the majority of the mainstream and fringe 
banks are located on Main and McPhillips Streets and Selkirk Avenue (See Map of North End). 
Main and McPhillips Streets are major transportation corridors between the downtown and the 
suburbs. McPhillips (at Dufferin Street) is also the location of a major government run casino. 
Selkirk Avenue, once a retail and business centre for the North End, has experienced significant 
decline so that today a large share of the commercial space is vacant. There are presently three 
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pawnshops and one cheque-cashing /payday loan firm and one rent-to-own firm (that apparently 
offers cheque-cashing) there. Selkirk Avenue has been particularly negatively affected by 
mainstream bank closures given the closure of two branches at Selkirk and Salter and two other 
branches down McGregor Street. Another three branches have been closed on Main Street and 
two along McPhillips Street.  
 
 
4.8    CONCLUSION 
 
Fringe financial services are on the increase in Winnipeg and the North End. While pawnshops 
have been around for many years in the city, available statistics indicate that the first licensed 
pawnshop was established in the North End in 1980. Firms dedicated to cheque-cashing are a 
newer phenomenon although their growth has not been as dramatic as that of the payday loan 
firms. The payday lenders have only entered the Winnipeg and North End markets in the last 
couple of years. While the rent-to-own service has been around Winnipeg for many years, the 
rent-to-own firm focused almost exclusively on rent-to-own contracts and customers, is a new 
and growing phenomenon. Tax refund advancers and white-label automatic teller machines are 
fringe financial services significant to Winnipeg and the North End. Examining the reasons for 
the growth of the fringe financial service sector is beyond the scope of this research.  
 
Fringe financial services must be in demand in Winnipeg and the North End, otherwise it would 
be difficult to explain the fringe banks’ growth. These banks provide a service for their 
customers. However, this research has documented that the services provided are very expensive. 
The services are expensive regardless of how one looks at them. For instance if one considers 
simply the absolute fee for the service (e.g., $4 to cash a $100 cheque), the cost is very high in 
comparison to a typical client’s income. Alternatively, if the service fees are converted into an 
annualised interest rate associated with a loan they are very high (e.g., 260-1000 percent for a 
payday loan). Moreover, most of these services are available at mainstream banks, through such 
mechanisms as holding a basic checking account and a credit card, for a fraction of the cost. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that low-income people in the North End are generally less 
mobile than their suburban neighbours. This means that they have fewer options when it comes 
to financial services. In some cases they might be ‘captive’ to a neighbourhood fringe bank that 
can take advantage of their situation. 
 
Besides one or two anecdotal pieces of evidence, this research has not found hard data to support 
the view that fringe bankers are earning above-normal profits. That is not to say they are not, 
only that we were unable to uncover evidence to that effect. The fact the payday loan, and to a 
lesser extent the rent-to-own firms, are multiplying does suggest that there is profit to be made in 
the industry. One key informant pawnbroker indicated that his business had earned a handsome 
profit last year. The high growth rates in the number of cheque-cashing and payday lending 
outlets may reflect above normal profits that are encouraging new entrants. High fees also reflect 
expensive and risky services offered by fringe banks. Market forces necessitate that these 
services be offered at a higher cost.  
 
The problem is that the very people who need a break on financial services, who need access to 
and understanding of mainstream financial services in order to improve their situation, are the 
 77
very people who are being directed towards the fringe bankers. Fringe bankers have responded to 
this opportunity. However the quality and cost of services that fringe bankers provide varies 
considerably requiring, caveat emptor (buyer beware). The data in this section document the 
variation in fees associated with most fringe financial services. A payday loan or rent-to-own 
client can easily pay two or three times as much in fees from one firm to another.  
 
The research team also heard about other questionable practices such as encouraging payday 
loan extensions and intimidating elderly payday loan clients to make payments. The system of 
micro, household-level finance that is segmenting so that low-income people are streamed away 
from mainstream banks and towards fringe banks is at the heart of the problem. This arguably 
impedes their capacity to move out of poverty by: (1) increasing the costs they face for basic 
financial services and (2) creating or aggravating the disconnection between short-term (e.g., 
cheque-cashing, small loans) and long-term (large loans, savings) financial services. Fringe 
banks provide only the former type of services.  
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5.0 LEGITIMACY AND COMMUNITY BENEFITS OF FRINGE BANKS 
 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the goals of the research is to confirm or refute the perception that the fringe financial 
services industry overcharges low-income customers. To help achieve this goal, one component 
of the research involved interviewing specialists from a variety of groups that are concerned with 
the fringe bank industry. This research was done to gain an overall understanding of the fringe 
financial service phenomenon by exploring different views expressed, and issues identified, by 
key groups with regard to fringe banks. Respondents were selected who had specialised 
knowledge about fringe financial services or the community needs of the North End. A total of 
27 interviews were undertaken with key informants from the following categories: fringe 
financial services, banks and credit unions, community development practitioners, key 
government departments and relevant politicians. These interviews followed the key informant 
interview schedule (Appendix B). This section summarises the main issues raised by these 
respondents in the interviews and identifies different perspectives held by these groups related to 
the issue of fringe financial services overcharging customers. 
 
 
5.2    FRINGE FINANCIAL SERVICE FIRMS 
 
Obviously the most important informant group for this part of the study is the fringe financial 
sector itself. It was desirable to interview as many people as possible from the industry in order 
to develop a better understanding of the firms' motivations and experiences. The research team 
had mixed success in arranging interviews with these firms. In some cases the firms were 
reasonably open to engaging in the interviews but in other cases the firms would not allow 
interviews. Some pawnbrokers and rent-to-own operators were willing to be interviewed. Three 
pawn brokers and two rent-to-own managers participated in the interview. Other pawnbrokers 
and one rent-to-own manager declined to be interviewed. Cheque-cashing/payday loan firms 
were least willing to participate in the interviews. The team tried to arrange interviews with this 
group of firms in a variety of ways, including direct contact with office staff in Winnipeg (see 
Appendix D), telephone and email contact with management at the head office and taking out an 
add in a major Winnipeg daily for interview participants. More than ten cheque-cashing/payday 
loan firms were contacted by telephone, letter, and/or in person, with repeated attempts to secure 
interviews, but only one firm responded. That firm would not allow any local employees to 
respond to us. After consultation with their lawyer, the head office, located outside of Winnipeg 
sent written replies to our questions. This poor response to the research and low participation rate 
is unfortunate. The reasons behind the low participation reflect the sensitive situation faced by 
this industry. Clearly more research with better participation is called for. 
  
Besides collected data on services and fees (see Section 4.0), fringe bankers were asked to 
comment on the legitimacy of their services and the bankers’ perceptions of their clients’ 
motivations. Regarding legitimacy, bankers were asked to comment on whether they gouge their 
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clients, whether they follow fair business practices and whether they are associated with illegal 
activities. Bankers were also asked to comment on the motives of their clients and responses 
from some fringe bankers revealed a tension or contradiction. 
 
All the respondents in this category claimed that their businesses are legitimate and offer 
important services to their clients. Pawnbrokers, rent-to-own respondents and the sole cheque-
cashing/payday loan firm claimed that their services contribute to the community. Pawnbrokers’ 
and rent-to-own respondents’ claim to legitimacy is slightly different from the claim made by the 
cheque-casher/payday lender. Pawn brokers and rent-to-own operators claim to provide a 
financial service to people who are low-income and who have few financial service alternatives. 
The cheque-cashing/payday lender claimed that their clients are from a middle-income group and 
have access to mainstream financial services. In all cases, the fringe bankers argued that they 
face high costs, high risk and provide unique services, and thereby contribute to the community. 
One pawnbroker commented that it is mainstream banking, accounting and legal services that are 
illegitimate considering the fees they charge and the profits they generate. This pawnbroker 
argued that the profits generated in pawnbroking are no greater than in other industries.  
 
One pawnbroker commented that the pawning process is age-old --one respondent commented 
that it is the second oldest profession, after prostitution-- and allows people who lack access to 
institutional credit to get a loan. For people who have no significant assets to use as collateral, 
the pawnshop provides an alternative. Respondents claimed that the pawning process is a fair 
service that provides access to credit to people who cannot obtain it otherwise. The significant 
fees associated with the pawn loan reflect the costs associated with doing business including 
insurance and storage costs and a return on capital loaned. The argument, applicable to most 
other fringe banks as well, is that small loans involve a high relative cost of processing. These 
higher processing, or transactions' costs, are then reflected in the high service fees. One 
respondent argued that it is banks and lawyers who gouge consumers with high fees. A rent-to-
own respondent reported that their business provides a means for people with few alternatives to 
purchase goods such as a television or sofa. The argument is that these firms provide a high-risk 
and high-cost service to people with few credit alternatives. 
 
From the interviews with pawnbrokers and other key informants we learned that pawnshops are, 
relative to other fringe banks, quite highly regulated through the municipal government. Potential 
pawnbrokers must obtain a zoning variance for their proposed premises. This is done through the 
City’s Zoning Department and this requires a public meeting. According to one respondent, a 
public meeting for a proposed pawnshop in Elmwood drew a large negative community 
response. The zoning variance was denied. In another case a potential pawnbroker applied to 
establish a pawnshop on McPhillips Avenue. There was little community reaction and the 
variance was granted. Once a variance is granted, the pawnshop must obtain a pawnshop license 
from the City. The license is renewed annually, then all pawning transactions are monitored by 
the police pawnshop patrol. Pawn transactions, including serial numbers, are itemised and 
provided to the police at the end of each day. 
 
In some cases the claims made by the fringe bankers appear highly exaggerated. For instance, 
some bankers claim to offer services intended to improve the client’s credit rating. One payday 
loan firm offers a programme as follows: the client successfully repays ten loans with the firm 
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and then the firm will send a letter to the credit bureau stating that the client is a customer in 
"good standing." In the firm's literature it claims that this programme will improve the clients 
overall credit rating. However, it is not clear that a letter from the payday loan firm will affect 
the client’s credit rating. A rent-to-own respondent claimed they used a ‘graduated’ credit ceiling 
whereby clients who prove they are credit worthy through small-sum rent-to-own agreements 
can then receive higher sums in the future. Again, the client is forced to participate in very costly 
financing to obtain higher levels of credit. 
 
The cheque-cashing/payday loan respondent stated that they preferred to describe their business 
as “alternative financial service,” “convenient financial service,” “alternative consumer credit 
market,” or “money service business.” The respondent objected to being grouped with 
pawnshops and rent-to-owns within the fringe financial service category, saying this was "like 
comparing apples to oranges." The payday loan is the major component of their business which 
they say, contrary to popular belief, is used by clients that earn an average salary of $30,000, 
have bank accounts and credit cards, and are predominantly single. This respondent claimed the 
firm provides financial services to working people in a fair and convenient manner. For instance, 
they require the payday loan to be repaid at the deadline with no option for the loan to be 
extended or ‘rolled-over.’ The practice of rolling-over payday loans adds fees and significantly 
increases the total charges to the client. According to the firm's own client surveys, they have 
achieved a high level of customer satisfaction with both cheque-cashing and payday loan 
services. The respondent claimed that the firm is open to being supportive of new regulatory 
framework that governs payday lenders and indicated they "are in support of community banking 
and community non-profit organisations' involvement in providing or assisting with banking 
services." 
 
A second issue dealing with business legitimacy relates to the question of fringe bank connection 
with illegal economic activity. There is a perception held by some people that pawnshops trade 
in stolen goods. Pawnbrokers and other respondents were asked to comment on this perception. 
The pawnbroker respondents explained that all their pawn transactions are monitored on a daily 
basis by the Winnipeg Police Service. They claimed that as a result, contrary to popular 
perception, pawnbrokers do not deal in stolen property. Pawnbrokers provide transaction data to 
the Winnipeg Police pawnshop unit on a daily basis.  
 
The pawnbrokers claimed, which was supported by the police respondent, that very little stolen 
property has been identified by the police demonstrating that they do not engage in the trade of 
stolen property. According to two of our pawnshop respondents, just two items per firm were 
seized by the police last year. The failure of the police monitoring system to discover significant 
stolen property demonstrates that stolen goods are not traded in pawnshops but traded ‘on the 
street,’ or ‘in people’s homes’ (see section 5.5 “Government Policy Makers and Enforcement” 
for more). During our interviews some respondents, including one pawnbroker, claimed they 
were aware of a stolen goods trade in some pawnshop ‘hot rooms.’ The team heard stories from 
other respondents about illegal trade at pawnshops, but none of these could be independently 
confirmed.19 
                                                     
19 Another respondent had had a personal item stolen and went to a pawnshop in search of it; after describing exactly 
what it was without divulging that it had been stolen, the person was led to the "hot room" in the back where the 
stolen item was discovered. 
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Another major issue raised in these interviews dealt with the fringe bankers' perception of their 
clients. Several of the pawnbrokers and rent-to-own respondents voiced a similar view of their 
clients' nature and motivations. Respondents were asked to describe the general income level of 
their clients and explain why they thought their clients used fringe financial services. Several 
respondents commented that many of their clients have low incomes. They accepted the fact that 
their services, while fairly priced, are expensive for these people.  
 
Then why do low-income people use these services? The response was often that their clients 
lacked the self-discipline to save. This lack of self-discipline was the result of various pressures 
stemming from such things as involvement with gambling and substance abuse to consumerism. 
According to this view, gambling, substance abuse and consumerism drives some low-income 
people to fringe banks. Considering that fringe bankers claim to provide legitimate services, 
there appears to be a tension or contradiction. On the one hand some firm respondents claim that 
their financial services benefit their clients, yet the client's need for the fringe bank service is the 
result of his/her lack of self-discipline that results in the use of a relatively expensive service.  
 
 
5.3    MAINSTREAM FINANCIAL SERVICE FIRMS: CREDIT UNIONS AND BANKS 
 
The relationship between mainstream financial institutions —i.e., banks and credit unions— and 
the fringe banks is complex. This was evidenced in the interviews we had with informants from 
the mainstream banking sector. Credit unions, and to a lesser extent banks, claim they are 
populist institutions providing financial services for the common person. Credit unions have a  
more democratic governance structure than do banks20 and they describe themselves as being 
rooted in their membership and local communities: “As financial co-operatives, credit unions are 
dedicated to the people and communities they serve.”21 Both credit unions and banks face stiff 
market competition. In addition to this, banks must respond to shareholder demands for high 
profits. These pressures require mainstream banks to take advantage of new technologies, 
globalising markets and changing consumer demand. These factors place contradictory pressures 
on mainstream financial institutions. On the one hand they claim to be for all Canadians, but on 
the other hand they are closing branches in inner-cities and rural locations. Since many low-
income people are less mobile and less likely to own a home computer and use the internet, these 
bank closures arguably leave them with no other option, and this contributes to the growth of the 
fringe banks.  
 
We interviewed two informants from Manitoba credit unions. A third credit union with a branch 
in the North End declined to be interviewed. These interviews focused on the issue of fringe 
financial services. The credit union respondents were quite aware of issues of financial services 
for low-income people and about the growth of fringe financial services. In fact, one credit union 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
20 Credit union governance is based on one-member, one-vote whereas with bank governance, voting is weighted by 
the number of shares an individual owns. This explains the credit union claim to be rooted in their membership. 
Where geographic communities experience changing demographics and credit unions' do not, it is not clear that 
credit unions are more democratically representative however. 
21 See, Manitoba Credit Unions website. Available: http://www.creditunion.mb.ca/cu_info/whatis.htm [accessed 7 
May 2003]. 
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organisation had undertaken an informal study of fringe banks that documented the high cost of 
fringe bank services. However, this organisation had no concrete plan to address the issue of 
fringe bank growth. Another credit union in Winnipeg has established a branch in a low-income 
neighbourhood that offers a selection of financial services. This branch provides neighbourhood 
residents with an alternative to fringe banks. Credit union respondents did recognise the 
difficulty in offering financial services in low-income neighbourhoods. One of the credit union 
respondents noted that financial services for low-income people are generally costly to provide, 
echoing a perspective expressed by some bank respondents.  
 
We interviewed two mainstream bank representatives who were based in Winnipeg and who had 
responsibilities for the Winnipeg or Manitoba areas. We approached two other mainstream banks 
to be interviewed. After some internal processing, one bank declined to be interviewed and 
provided a one-page email message from the head office on the issue of branch closure decision-
making. A second bank representative agreed to the interview, but just as the interview was 
starting, a second bank representative called the interview off and claimed that the head office 
must be consulted. Later, we received a one-page letter from the head office outlining general 
reasons for branch closures. These mainstream bank interviews were broader in scope than the 
credit union interviews. Some of the issues that were discussed included: amalgamation and 
closure of branches, changing market/profit expectations for the banks, public relations and the 
relationship between banks and fringe banks. 
 
We asked these respondents to explain why bank branches have been closed in the North End in 
the last ten years. In response to this question the bank officials explained that they were 
undergoing a process of amalgamation of branches that would in fact improve the provision of 
financial services to their clientele. For instance, one bank official explained that four branches 
were merged into one large branch at a major shopping centre in order to provide expanded 
services for longer hours. All respondents referred to the increased use of technology like 
automatic teller machines and internet banking as reasons for closing branches. Since consumers 
can access their financial services through these new technologies, there is less need for branch 
operations. Another bank respondent indicated that there were too many bank branches in 
Winnipeg as compared to similar centres in Canada. Closing branches would still leave 
Winnipeg with a more than adequate number of branches.  
 
One respondent accented the important role that profits play in that bank’s decisions about 
branch operations. This respondent said that the major banks face stiff pressures from their 
shareholders to generate acceptable levels of profit. This high expectation places added pressure 
on the bank to close marginally profitable branches. Credit unions, the bank respondent 
compared, faced lower expectations on profitability. 
 
Respondents were asked if the average lower-income of North End residents was a factor in 
North End branch closures. Respondents' answers to this question were mixed. Two respondents 
said that community income level was not a factor in closure; two others said directly or 
indirectly that it was a factor. For one respondent, closure was based on the number of clients 
and the number of products these clients held with the bank. For another respondent, inner-city 
deterioration involved the shift of money out of the community, and that meant different services 
would be required. The respondent said that the bank treats all clients the same but added that the 
 83
bank could afford to spend more on clients using more bank products. The bank could spend 
more on a client with six bank products such as chequing and savings, mortgage, RRSPs, etc., 
than a client with one to two products. By extension, a branch closure could result if there were 
too few clients with too few bank products. This comment suggests that it is not people that drive 
the bank services but the consumer demand for bank products, itself driven by income. 
 
When asked about the distributional implications of branch closures, respondents claimed that 
closures were equally distributed around the city. Lower-income neighbourhoods were not 
harder hit by these closures. Respondents also claimed that low-income consumers could equally 
well use automatic teller machines and the internet to access their bank products. When asked 
about the mobility of low-income consumers, one respondent denied that low-income people in 
the North End had less access to transportation than people in other areas of the city.  
 
Another point that was emphasised by the banks was their desire to respond to consumer demand 
and maintain a positive public image. According to one respondent, the bank has a variety of 
stakeholders: shareholders via the capital market with its expectation for profits, bank employees 
and consumers, and the general public. Accordingly, the bank must carefully consider the 
interests of these stakeholders in its decision making. Two of the four respondents explicitly 
stated that a neighbourhood being low-income is not a factor in closure decisions. However, 
given the pressures from shareholders, consumers, and employees it is unclear how low-income 
consumers’ voices could be heard. When asked about the banks’ contribution to the community, 
two of the four respondents referred to their banks' charitable donations, primarily for social 
welfare agencies. When asked if the bank might engage in financial service outreach in a low-
income neighbourhood, one respondent claimed that this was not feasible given the stakeholder 
expectations and financial constraints outlined above. 
 
A final issue that was explored in these interviews dealt with the financial relationship between 
mainstream and fringe banks. In the US, some fringe bankers have established formal 
relationships with mainstream bankers. Recently, an American bank (Eagle Bank) was required 
by a federal authority to stop financing Dollar Financial Group's Money Mart payday loans in the 
US. In our conversations with bank respondents, we found one who described a clear 
relationship between the bank and a fringe bank, in this case “one or more” cheque-cashing 
firms. According to the respondent, the bank provides financing and cheque clearing services. In 
addition, the bank provides the cheque-cashing firm overdraft protection and lines of credit. The 
respondent stated that this relationship was equivalent to its relationship with other businesses 
and agreed that, in a sense, the bank capitalised the cheque-cashing firm. With mainstream banks 
closing inner-city branches, it becomes clear that they continue to participate in banking in low-
income neighbourhoods through finance, but are leaving service provision to fringe bankers. The 
consequence of this is that low-income neighbourhoods face a narrower and less beneficial range 
of financial services. Mainstream banks, on the other hand, are able to continue to generate 
profits from low-income neighbourhoods, but delegate financial service provision to fringe 
banks. 
If, on the one hand, fringe bank growth is the result of bank branch closures (or mergers), then 
this relationship allows the banks to continue to participate in, and profit from markets they have 
physically left. This would suggest a kind of market segmentation that is unhealthy. It involves a 
segmenting of financial services on the basis of income level such that full service mainstream 
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banks are directed at middle and upper income neighbourhoods, while fringe banks, financed and 
supported by mainstream banks, operate in low-income neighbourhoods. Income inequality leads 
to financial market segmentation that leads to further income inequality. On the other hand, if 
fringe bank growth is unrelated to bank branch closures, but due to market liberalisation and 
innovation, then the mainstream-fringe relationship might not reinforce income inequality. 
Clearly, this question requires more attention by researchers and policy makers.  
 
 
5.4 COMMUNITY LEADERS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
PRACTITIONERS 
 
We spoke with ten people whom we describe as community (economic) development 
practitioners or community leaders. We asked them about existing and potential financial service 
providers —mainstream banks, fringe banks and community alternatives— and the role of credit 
and savings in personal and community development. 
 
In terms of North End residents’ relationship to mainstream banks, respondents expressed some 
points in common and some points in tension. Respondents agreed that many low-income North 
End residents do not use mainstream banks. While the respondents agreed that low-income 
persons’ participation with mainstream banks was low, they did not agree why participation rates 
were low. The reported causes of low mainstream bank participation varied: the result of 
mainstream bank branch closures; the availability of superior –albeit more expensive– services 
offered by fringe services; and finally the claim that low-income people operate largely outside 
of the financial (credit and savings) economy. Another point raised was that picture 
identification, like a driver’s license is necessary to open a bank account and many low-income 
people don’t have this. A particularly important tension in these responses relates to the claim 
that low-income people in the North End have not traditionally used mainstream banks. Some 
respondents strongly argued that branch closures were the cause for low participation while some 
others claimed that even when the branches were open in the North End, few low-income 
residents used these services. One respondent argued that low-income residents operate in a 
“cash-only economy” for which credit and savings have limited relevance. 
 
Another community respondent reported that North End residents move their business to fringe 
banks because mainstream banks do not have comparable convenience and levels of respect for 
low-income clients. According to this respondent, many North End residents are not financially 
literate, so financial service fees are not well understood. Moreover, culture and language 
barriers for newcomers to the North End from First Nations’ communities and other countries 
compound the problem. Since most North End residents do not own cars, and bus or taxi fare is 
too high for them, travel to bank branches is not feasible; also, since most do not own computers, 
electronic banking is not possible.  
 
Respondents were asked about the usefulness of fringe banks. Several voiced the idea that, while 
fringe banks provide a service for people, the service can be destructive. Several respondents 
understood that the costs and risks associated with fringe banking are relatively higher than 
mainstream banking. The result is higher costs for financial services. Yet, one respondent 
explained that when one factors in bus fare needed to get to the bank plus the added convenience 
and respect found at some fringe banks, the economic and social costs weigh in favour of using 
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the fringe bank. One respondent pointed out that fringe banks are the only service available for 
many North End residents. Without the local pawnshop, a family may need to go without basic 
necessities; some resort to illicit means to obtain money. One respondent added that mainstream 
banks and corporations themselves overcharge consumers. Other respondents thought that some 
fringe financial services overcharge consumers by either earning above normal profits or by 
drawing people into a destructive cycle of debt. On the question of normalcy of profits, there 
were different views expressed by the respondents. There was, however, a general agreement on 
the point regarding the relationship between fringe banking and the destructive cycle of debt 
(discussed below).  
 
Respondents expressed a variety of views about the viability of a community alternative to fringe 
banks. Some respondents thought that the success of the venture was dependent on the existence 
of super-normal profits in the fringe banking sector. These respondents thought that, in the 
absence of super-normal profits, a community-based alternative could not survive. The logic of 
this argument is that if super-normal profits exist, then a non-profit agency can offer the services 
at a lower cost because it does not need to generate a profit. This assumes that the non-profit 
organisation can establish a business model that is as efficient as a fringe financial firm. A 
related issue is whether a non-profit can develop a practice that includes ‘saying no’ to potential 
clients’ request for loans. In order for a non-profit to offer financial services such as payday 
loans, they will be required to refuse some loans. A concern was expressed that employees of a 
community venture might be soft-hearted and extend risky loans, which would undermine the 
model's viability 
 
Finally, the respondents had several interesting points related to the role of credit and savings in 
personal and community development. By definition, community development practitioners are 
concerned about people’s welfare today and about their long-term well being. Examining a 
community’s constraints and opportunities, the community development practitioner seeks to 
work with residents to achieve their development goals. To a certain extent this runs counter to 
fringe banking that is focused on filling a demand for financial services today with little 
consideration of the future consequences. In that sense, it is not surprising that several 
community development practitioners were critical of fringe bankers. These respondents raised 
issues that deal with the role of credit in the cycle of poverty and the relationship between credit 
and consumerism.  
 
Some community development practitioners claim that fringe banking is one way that low-
income residents can overcome a short-term crisis to meet their immediate needs. However, 
some respondents reflected on the problem of excessive credit and its relationship with financing 
non-basic needs and building a debt problem. As debt mounted, financing the debt increased. 
The debt spiral can lead to less income being available to purchase daily needs. According to 
some respondents, this cycle of debt can spiral out of control. The long-run result is growing 
poverty with fewer resources available to devote to basic needs. One respondent spoke about 
payday loans as, “exploiting people in crisis.” Some respondents spoke about fringe credit as 
being associated with a feeling of hopelessness or an attitude of apathy.  
A final issue that surfaced in discussions related to the association between credit and 
consumerism. Several respondents reported a relationship between the use of fringe banking and 
consumerism. According to one respondent, consumerism pressures are acute for low-income 
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people because their low-income forces them into a situation of continuously denying themselves 
things that other members in society take for granted. Accordingly, in a society that emphasises 
that one’s value is dependent on one’s material possessions, low-income people are acutely 
disadvantaged. One respondent stated that credit was used to finance the purchase of goods that 
would boost the person’s self-esteem. Another respondent claimed that pawnshop and payday 
loans are often used to finance gambling, bingo and lottery tickets. One respondent thought that 
education processes that assist people to distinguish between needs and wants should be part of 
the development process. Another respondent felt that anti-poverty programs will not be 
effective unless low-income people have a sense of self-respect and do not continue behaviours 
associated with poverty. 
 
 
5.5    GOVERNMENT POLICY MAKERS AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
We interviewed four key informants from federal, provincial and municipal (police) 
governmental levels. The issues that were raised by these informants included: questions of 
government jurisdiction and limitations; assumptions about the benefit to consumers of fringe 
banking and government’s role in regulating the industry; and the monitoring and law 
enforcement of pawnshops for stolen goods.  
 
The first issue that was raised through discussions with federal and provincial government 
informants related to issues of jurisdiction. The two respondents explained that federal financial 
legislation relates to federally regulated firms22 and that fringe financial services fall under 
provincial jurisdiction. They did acknowledge a relationship between section 347 of the Criminal 
Code (the criminal rate of interest) and fringe financial services. However, the federal 
government respondent claimed that the criminal rate of interest, limiting annualised interest 
charges to 60 percent or less, was inappropriate for regulating fringe banks. The provincial 
respondent indicated that they used the criminal rate of interest on a case-by-case basis to 
regulate the fringe banks. The fact that the criminal rate of interest is used only on a case-by-case 
basis suggests that the provincial government believes the criminal rate of interest has some, but 
not universal relevance to fringe financial services. 
 
A second issue raised in these interviews related to the existing provincial legislation for the 
industry. At present, provincial legislation in Manitoba is based on the Consumer Protection Act 
and the Business Practices Act. The Consumer Protection Act addresses the issue of cost of 
borrowing disclosure and prohibited collection practices. The Business Practices Act deals with 
unfair business practices. The provincial respondents claimed that fringe bankers are required to 
disclose all fees associated with their service. These fees are to be lumped together in the form of 
an annualised interest rate.23 The provincial respondents claimed that recent case law has found 
that all fees associated with fringe bank loans constitutes the interest charge for the loan and that 
this interest rate must be below the criminal rate of interest. However, the provincial government 
                                                     
22 Federally regulated financial institutions, "include all banks, all federally-incorporated or registered insurance, 
trust, and loan companies, co-operative credit associations, and fraternal benefit societies," Department on Finance 
Canada 2003. 'Glossary' [online]. Available: http://www.fin.gc.ca/gloss/gloss-o_e.html#osfi [Accessed 16 June 
2003]. 
23 See 4(2)(h) of Part 1, 'Disclosure of Cost of Borrowing' in Government of Manitoba. The Consumer Protection 
Act of Manitoba.  
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does not enforce disclosure of fees or interest rate ceilings with the fringe bankers. The 
government will use the existing legislation if they receive a complaint. In this case, if disclosure 
has not been complete or if the interest rate is above the criminal rate of interest then the 
government will encourage the fringe bank to roll back the charges. 
 
The rationale for this ad-hoc enforcement is complicated. One reason for this patchy legislation 
and enforcement is that the responsible department has limited resources to monitor all fringe 
banks. Moreover, one respondent claimed that fringe banks provide a service to the community 
and that complaint-driven application of existing legislation adequately ensures consumer 
protection. The respondent advanced the idea that fringe bank clients have few financial service 
alternatives and stated that if legislation was universally applied, or new more forceful legislation 
was to be enacted, then fringe banks would shut down and their clients would be forced to go 
‘underground.’ Furthermore, this respondent noted that they have received few complaints about 
fringe financial services. This suggests that clients are satisfied with fringe banks and, according 
to the respondent, justifies the status quo on the part of the provincial government legislation and 
enforcement.  
 
Provincial and federal respondents explained that there is presently an intergovernmental 
committee, which the Manitoba government participates in, that is examining new provincial 
legislation for this fast growing sector. This committee has developed a model for legislation of 
fringe financial services for adoption by interested provincial governments.24 This legislation is 
designed to deal directly with the fringe financial sector, although enforcement is another matter. 
We were told that the provinces of Saskatchewan and Quebec have recently adopted legislation 
designed to regulate fringe financial services. We were told that the Manitoba government does 
not plan to introduce new legislation at present. 
 
Another point raised regarding jurisdiction relates to the growth of internet-based fringe banking, 
especially payday loans. According to the provincial respondents, internet-based payday loans 
are a growing sector that they cannot regulate. This adds an additional challenge to provincial 
legislation particularly when the internet-based payday loan company is based in another 
country. The argument being that if the government strictly regulates firms in the province, they 
might simply shift their office out of the province and offer the service via the internet. 
 
The federal government respondent emphasised that the federal government has no direct 
jurisdiction in the area of fringe financial services. However, the Financial Consumer Agency of 
Canada does have the mandate to educate financial consumers about all types of financial 
products. This work is premised on the idea that this education is accessible and it is 
transformative; that through education about financial services, consumers will make more 
informed and beneficial decisions for themselves and will have the capacity to carry through.  
The final respondent in this group was from the Winnipeg police service. Municipal regulation 
of pawnbrokers is lodged in the planning department (pawnbrokers require a zoning variance to 
open a new business), the licensing department (pawnbrokers and used goods dealers require a 
license) and the police service. The police service has a pawnshop patrol that is responsible for 
                                                     
24 Consumer Measures Committee. 1998. 'Agreement for Harmonization of Cost of Credit Disclosure Laws in 
Canada: Drafting Template,' [Online]. Available: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca [Accessed 15 October 2002]. 
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monitoring pawnshop transactions for stolen goods. The respondent described the current system 
of monitoring and enforcement of pawnshops that seeks to identify stolen property.  
 
It was clear from the interview that this system is extensive, involving submission of daily 
reports to the police on all pawn transactions. If the police identify a stolen good through this 
system they confiscate the item from the pawnbroker. The monitoring seeks to identify stolen 
property, not to regulate pawn fees. However, even with this monitoring, the respondent claimed 
that up to three-quarters of the items in pawnshops are stolen. The reason that these goods are not 
picked up by the police monitoring is that the monitoring system is limited by the fact that many 
people do not record serial numbers for their property. If the good is stolen but the owner did not 
record the serial number, then the police will have limited success in tracking it down.  
 
The respondent claimed that the police are exploring the possibility of an internet-based ‘real-
time’ system of reporting in order to improve monitoring. This new system would provide police 
data on transactions immediately and reduce the clerical work required with the existing system. 
However, since successful monitoring depends more on consumer vigilance in recording serial 
numbers than on the speed of reporting pawn transactions, it does not appear that this step will 
locate more stolen goods. Of course, it may free the police up from administrative tasks to 
physically visit the pawnshops more often. On the other hand, the respondent estimated that the 
new system would add an additional $1 per pawn transaction. This would increase the costs 
faced by the pawn consumer. 
 
 
5.6    WINNIPEG POLITICIANS  
 
We interviewed two politicians who are interested in the issues of financial services in the inner-
city. The issues they raised include: betrayal of the community by banks through branch 
closures; the relationship between bank branch closures and fringe bank growth; the lack of 
government action regarding bank closure and fringe banks; and the hope that credit unions 
and/or non-profit organisations would meet local needs. 
 
One respondent claimed that these branch closures have negatively affected elderly and low-
income people in their absence. The replacement of some branches with automatic teller 
machines has not helped those people who want to do their banking in person. According to the 
respondent, many seniors saw the personal relationship at a local bank branch as an important 
part of their community. The closure of bank branches has created a sense of loss for them. The 
respondent explained that efforts were made to stop the branch closures for these reasons, but the 
branches were shut nevertheless. The result is that those senior citizens, and others, have felt a 
sense of loss in their community. Both respondents thought bank closures in the North End were 
comparable to closures in other low-income communities in the country.  
 
One politician was less familiar with the growth of fringe banking in the North End. Another 
respondent claimed that the growth of fringe banks in the North End is directly related to the 
closure of these banks. This respondent shared a story about a man who was dependent on 
panhandling and yet used a bank account. This respondent has watched over the years and 
observed that as the bank branches have been closed, the fringe banks have grown. The fringe 
banks have filled a vacuum created by the bank closures. This respondent thought that fringe 
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banks, including pawnshops, provide financial services to the community. However, the 
consequences for the community are mixed. 
 
Both respondents thought that the federal government has not effectively responded to the 
changes they have witnessed in financial services in the North End and other low-income 
communities. One respondent has been very active in dialoguing with the federal government 
about the branch closure issue. The respondent claimed that the federal government has been 
unresponsive on this issue, claiming that former Finance Minister Paul Martin has said that there 
is nothing the government can do. The other respondent reported that the federal government is 
not interested in new legislation that would ensure bank participation in low-income 
neighbourhoods.  
 
In terms of solutions to the problem of expensive financial services for low-income people, both 
respondents thought that it would partly come from the credit union and non-profit sectors. 
Organisations such as Assiniboine Credit Union, North End Community Renewal Corporation, 
and SEED Winnipeg could play an important role in providing reasonable financial services for 
the North End. In addition, one of the respondents felt that the federal government should play a 
more active role in fostering fair financial services. One respondent would like to see legislation 
that limits interest rates applied to loans from fringe banks.  
 
 
5.7    CONCLUSION 
 
Key informants whom we interviewed had mixed views regarding the legitimacy of fringe 
bankers. Some mainstream bank respondents, some community development practitioners, and 
some government policy makers and, of course, fringe bankers themselves view fringe banks as 
plugging a hole in the financial system. The ‘formal’ or mainstream financial system cannot 
meet the needs of all Canadians and so the more costly fringe financial services are justified. 
Others, including credit union respondents, some community development practitioners and 
some government respondents view fringe bankers as illegitimate in that they charge unfair fees, 
engage in unfair business practices and/or are involved in the illegal economy. Examining the 
respondents’ views in greater depth reveals interesting tensions: 
• Some fringe bankers claim to offer a service, but argue that their clients are often misguided 
(due to gambling or substance abuse) in using the service. They claim legitimacy and then 
‘blame the victim.’ 
• Mainstream bankers claim to be for all Canadians and to offer new means for their clients to 
use their services, yet they close branches in the inner-city and must know that low-income 
people are less mobile and less likely to own computers and have access to the internet. That 
some mainstream banks finance and service fringe bankers suggests that mainstream banks 
are still benefiting from low-income clients, but less directly. New technologies mean that 
middle and upper income consumers have improved access to mainstream banks while low-
income consumers have poorer access.  
• A tension for community development practitioners related to the reasons why low-income 
people were reliant on fringe banks: was it because of mainstream bank branch closures or 
due to a lack of experience in financial institutions. Regardless of the cause, the consequence 
is that low-income people are facing limited services with high fees and community 
development practitioners are interested in addressing this need. 
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• The provincial government faces a contradictory position of, on the one hand, claiming the 
existing fringe bank legislation is adequate and, on the other hand, using the criminal rate of 
interest as a standard to rollback interest charges for people who complain. Is it a criminal 
rate of interest or isn’t it? At present it appears the government is letting the consumer be the 
judge. If that is the case, then the criminal code does not seem to be the appropriate location 
of legislation. The federal government, and in particular the Federal Consumer Agency of 
Canada, could do a lot more on educating consumers about fringe financial services.  
 
 91
 
 
6.0 COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
ALTERNATIVES  TO FRINGE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
 
6.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
The last several decades have witnessed the growth of a neo-liberal, free market ideology in 
North America that has been accompanied by increasing deregulation of the financial service 
sector, declining state services, and escalating income inequality. These dynamics, combined 
with profit demands from banking shareholders, have led to many branch closures in low-income 
communities throughout North American urban centres. These trends have solidified the 
existence of, and fostered the emergence of new fringe financial services, which tend to be more 
expensive, and have resulted in individuals in these communities being left without access to 
banking services or other alternatives to these fringe services. In response, community members 
and organisations are increasingly seeking to develop initiatives that either fill the financial 
service gap or provide services that the fringe outlets provide, but at less usurious rates. These 
alternative models frequently seek to incorporate community economic development principles 
to the services that they provide.  
 
The following section will present an explication of community economic development (CED), 
the place of CED in the context of the neo-liberal economy, various interpretations of CED, and 
CED as it relates to fringe financial services. The CED analysis will be followed by a summary 
presentation of various models established as alternatives to fringe financial services that will 
contain both descriptive and evaluative components.  
 
 
6.2    COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Over the years, as the plight of lower-income communities has increasingly come to the attention 
of communities with more resources, those committed to increasing the wellbeing of the 
marginalised have developed perspectives and initiatives aimed at the alleviation of poverty. The 
last several decades in particular have seen the evolution of a renewed ideology of development 
that is referred to as community economic development, or more commonly as CED. However, 
given the diversity of ideology inherent within any populace, it is not surprising that the various 
interpretations of CED involve a continuum that is not unlike the range of socio-political thought 
present within current society. This range of CED perspective inevitably leads to a myriad of 
initiatives, each with their own strengths and weaknesses, that seek to build up that which it 
perceives to be lacking in the targeted community.  
 
In order to provide some ideological context to the presentation of North American models of 
alternatives to fringe financial services, the concept of CED requires some elaboration. The first 
segment will describe how the neo-liberal economy gives rise to the need for CED and at the 
same time impacts the ability of CED to meet its objectives. The second segment will present the 
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divergent interpretations of CED that exist within the development community. The final 
segment will address the relationship between CED and fringe financial services.  
 
6.2.1    Neo-Liberal Economy 
 
The growth of CED is not just coincidental with the growth of the neo-liberal free market 
economy. The neo-liberal tenets of economic individualism, limited government regulation of 
economic matters, and the perpetual pursuit of profits increasingly approximates economic 
Darwinism which manifests itself in increasing economic concentration and decreasing 
accountability to community and social benefits. Technological advancements, which facilitate 
capital mobility and the automated replacement of human labour, are considered to be economic 
improvements in spite of their social cost. This dominant ideology has also pressured 
governments to cut social spending and accelerate deregulation, which has mitigated their 
capacity to invest in social capital and ensure that all citizens have access to essential services. 
This disequalibriating process has led to an increased population that is not equitably served or 
given a meaningful voice in the societal decision-making process. 
 
The impacts of the neo-liberal market economy have not spared the financial service sector. 
Technological advancements such as electronic payment methods and computerised banking 
services have greatly reduced the need for cash in today’s society. This, together with the 
development and growing accessibility of the internet for most Canadians, has also greatly 
reduced the need for person-to-person financial transactions. As a result, the closure of bank 
branches is less devastating in today’s technological age than it would have been before these 
innovations - at least for those who are able to afford the innovations. Those who cannot afford 
the technology are simply left without their banking services and, if they need these services, 
have to travel greater distances at some cost to access another bank branch or simply find 
alternative mechanisms for financial transactions, such as cheque-cashing outlets or pawnshops.  
 
In addition to the decreased need for in-person and cash transactions, bank branches have also 
been closing due to the pursuit of profits (another tenet of the free market economy) in 
conjunction with bank mergers. In the neo-liberal economy, banks are becoming increasingly 
committed to their bottom lines and to corporate growth rather than the communities they have 
served (National Council on Welfare 1998). And judging by bank branch closures in low-income 
communities, banks feel that providing financial services to these people is not sufficiently 
profitable. The branch closures have also been facilitated by government deregulation, which has 
allowed banks to close branches that they feel no longer return the desired level of profits. 
Canada does not have an equivalent to the United States’ Community Investment Act which 
requires financial institutions to invest in low-income communities even if they no longer have a 
branch in that community. This not only serves as a disincentive to branch closures, it ensures 
that even if a branch does close, the bank will continue to provide funds for community 
development.  
 
The free market economy is also built upon the concept of supply and demand. This concept 
would suggest that bank closures are the result of insufficient demand for banking services in 
low-income communities. It would also suggest that the rapid growth of fringe financial services 
in disinvested urban communities is the result of sufficient demand for those services, which 
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given bank closures and the corresponding decrease in banking services is likely accurate. What 
is also true, however, is that with the reality of decreasing mainstream banking services, 
individuals in these communities increasingly have no other option except to utilise the fringe 
financial services. 
Many non-government organisations (NGOs) have been established in an attempt to fill the 
growing service gaps that the state or business community previously filled. There is a 
noticeably inverse relationship between neo-liberal government downsizing and social service 
cutbacks and the emergence of community-based organisations (Shragge 2002, p. 41). However, 
while the NGOs provide essential services, their presence conceals the culpability of the state as 
the service shortcomings are mitigated. This lessens the demand for reversion from the neo-
liberal path and further facilitates cutbacks. This perpetuating cycle is evidenced in Canada in 
both the growth of food bank dependency (Winnipeg Harvest 2003) as real spending on social 
services has decreased, real incomes have stagnated, and is also evidenced by the burgeoning 
fringe financial service sector as deregulation and the pursuit of profits has led to numerous bank 
closures in the lower-income communities in cities across Canada (National Council on Welfare 
1998).  
 
6.2.2    CED Perspectives 
 
Community Economic Development is commonly understood to refer to development that seeks 
to address both social and economic goals (Canadian CED Network 2003). CED is a 
development approach that is more community-based, either by geography of demography, and, 
by varying degrees, is more participatory than traditional development methods which are 
sometimes delivered without any community consultation at all (Perry and Lewis 1994). One 
focus of CED is the improvement of the local economy through training and education, local 
employment creation, the use of local resources, import substitution, the identification and 
mitigation of economic leakage, and the strengthening of internal economic linkages. The goal is 
wealth creation for individuals, families, and communities in an equitable, sustainable, and 
holistic manner (National Council for Community Economic Development 2003).  
 
While social and economic betterment of the community is the universal goal of CED, there are 
various perspectives on how this objective is most effectively achieved. These perspectives, with 
various designations that divulge their unique ideological disposition, range from counter-
capitalism or progressive CED or radical CED to community capitalism or liberal CED or reform 
CED. 
 
The primary perspective of radical CED as articulated by Eric Shragge (1997) is that CED must 
be a tool for social and political change and facilitate community empowerment. The assumption 
is that the current socio-economic and political systems have failed those who now are 
marginalised and, therefore, CED must address the systemic shortcomings that underpin 
deprivation. To engage in CED without systemic change would be seen as failing to address root 
causes and, therefore, perpetuating the systemic inequities by tacitly endorsing them.  
 
Empowerment includes the grassroots solidarity, confidence, and ability to take democratic 
control of institutions and programs with the concept of a “social economy” as opposed to 
private or state-owned economy. Believing that the economy is not the sole true measure of 
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community health and wellbeing, radical CED attempts to develop a more holistic perspective by 
prioritising social needs over profitability. Government and business partnerships are considered 
to be potentially complementary and enhancing to CED, but the radical CED perspective is 
markedly wary of the ability to mobilise these relationships effectively to achieve a synergy. The 
fear is that, since governments and businesses tend to adhere to the dominant economic systems 
and structures, they will oppose reform and will, therefore, as stakeholders, co-opt the CED and 
dilute its integrity, thereby lessening the transforming capacity of CED. 
 
A variation of radical CED is articulated by Ross Dobson (1993) who advocates for the 
detachment from the dominant economic structures. This calls for a reversion to communal self-
sustaining values of internal economies where a community consumes what it produces and 
produces what it consumes. Reconstruction of more equitable, holistic, community-based 
economic structures is best done outside of the mainstream economy, as the mainstream 
economy is inherently exploitative and creates dependency. This CED perspective is in 
contradistinction to the neo-liberal market tenets of economies of scale, specialisation, focus on 
export development and the purchase of less costly imports at the expense of domestic 
production. 
 
Alternatively, the reform CED perspective as articulated by Shaffer and Summers (1989) gives 
economic development top priority. The goal of reform CED is to elevate individual and 
community income levels as problems of poverty are ostensibly remedied through private 
economic investment (pursuit of profits), job opportunities, and training. The assumption is that 
the neo-liberal market economy and its mechanisms and characteristics are the optimum 
economic system for society but that for some reason, such as inadequate opportunity or training, 
some people are not participating. Therefore, it seeks to bring the people or community into the 
market or extend the market to include the people and community.  
 
Reform CED considers economic, social, and political dynamics to be separate entities that are 
related but not inextricably interrelated. There is a more top-down approach where the state, 
business community, or CED practitioners formulate initiatives and deliver the services. 
Initiatives must be business-oriented and must pursue long-term financial viability/profitability. 
To this end, resources must be shifted to what is most efficient and profitable and barriers to 
market participation need to be overcome. Resources must be focused on maximising profitable 
exports and CED must work at bringing external income into the community while providing 
goods and services to ensure that community money is spent locally. As is clearly evident, 
reform CED believes in development based on the tenets of the free market economy.  
 
 
6.2.3    Fringe Financial Services and CED 
 
The noticeable trend of bank branch closures in low-income urban communities has occurred 
due to the pursuit of profits by the banks and has been facilitated by government deregulation. 
The result has been that the poor are left without access to mainstream financial services. People 
who live in these communities are left without access to mainstream financial services such as 
banks and credit unions and are subsequently forced to find alternatives. They are increasingly 
turning to “fringe” financial services that include services such as pawn-brokering, cheque-
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cashing, rent-to-own services, payday lending, tax rebate discounting, and fee-for-service ATMs. 
Some of these services, such as pawn-brokering, have been active in low-income communities 
for decades or longer (Caskey 1994), while most others have emerged more recently as they see 
opportunities to benefit (profit) from the unfolding financial service gap.  
 
While some fringe financial outlets may provide beneficial services with convenience unmatched 
by the mainstream institutions, others such as payday lenders and pawnbrokers, provide services 
with conditions and fees that may perpetuate debt and poverty through mechanisms such as loan 
renewals that can be “financially devastating for the borrower” (Lott and Grant 2002, p. 22). 
Some clients consider the higher fees to be worth the added convenience, while others take 
exception to the fees but feel that they are left without alternatives and must, therefore, use the 
services that they feel are exploitative. The lack of choice suggests the emergence of a multi-tier 
financial service environment in which those in higher-income communities are able to access 
less expensive financial services than those in low-income communities.  
 
The emerging inequitable or absence of financial services has prompted the development of 
several alternative institutions, organisations, or programs that are designed to meet some or all 
of the financial service needs of people in these communities. While some of the initiatives 
merely seek to offer the same services at a cheaper rate than the fringe financial service outlets, 
most of the initiatives incorporate a strong CED perspective in which they aspire to affect change 
in the circumstances and financial patterns of the individual through education, financial 
planning, and the accumulation of savings. The goal is not to eliminate the fringe financial 
service sector, but rather to ensure that these impoverished communities have meaningful 
choices and access to a range of services including inexpensive, community-oriented, holistic, 
and CED-principled financial services.  
 
 
6.3    RESEARCH METHODS 
 
As CED practitioners, organisations, and others continue to search for ways in which to enhance 
the financial services accessible to those who live in low-income communities, a review of what 
other communities in similar circumstances have attempted is essential. Granting that each 
community intrinsically contains unique dynamics, circumstances, people, and organisations, the 
successes and failures of other initiatives are able to provide valuable insights into the challenges 
of establishing new initiatives of this kind.  
 
The research consisted of a literature review which revealed several models in various cities in 
North America. With the exception of the Provident Loan Society in New York, research on 
each model was then furthered through telephone interviews with representatives of each model 
and in some circumstances was supplemented with additional printed information. This research 
was subject to the completion of a University of Winnipeg ethical review process and received 
approval as one aspect of the broader research on fringe financial services. The varying lengths 
and descriptive natures of the summaries and evaluation are not to be taken as an indication of 
their worth or applicability, but rather reflect varying amounts of available information.  
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6.4    MODEL SUMMARIES AND ANALYSIS 
 
The research sought to ascertain several characteristics of each model. One aspect that will be 
presented was each model’s structure including partnerships, administrative structure, and the 
relationship with the community and clients. Financial service delivery mechanisms will also be 
described as will the services provided and the associated fees. The research also sought to 
establish whether or not the model was based on a more community-minded, not-for-profit 
perspective that was dependent on subsidies or on a more business-minded, for-profit, self-
sustainable design. The models were also assessed for their short-term and/or long-term 
community impact and whether they sought to (or were able to) blend the two visions. The 
research also sought to assess the potential for long-term viability given the model’s income 
sources and current financial standing. Accompanying each model summary is a brief analysis of 
the strengths and limitations of each initiative.  
 
6.4.1 Cash and Save - Parkdale, Toronto 
 
Model Summary 
According to the respondent from the Royal Bank, the Cash and Save concept had roots that 
originated when, as part of a national program in the late 1990s, the Royal Bank placed a 
community banker in the Parkdale region to act as an informational liaison between the 
community and the bank. Through this relationship, and a research and business proposal from 
an interested firm, the concept of an alternative financial service outlet in that community was 
formed. Cash and Save was established in October 2002 as a branch of the Royal Bank of 
Canada and as a privately owned, for-profit initiative. They consult with a Community Reference 
Group that is made up of various community representatives who act as the community “eyes 
and ears” for the branch. The branch is still in the “test and learn” phase meaning that long-term 
viability is anticipated but not yet confirmed. Nevertheless, the Royal Bank expects this model to 
be viable (profitable) in this community and is looking for a potential second location. 
 
Services offered include: bill payments ($1.25), money orders ($1.99), money transfers 
(Moneygram rates), federal government or other social service cheque-cashing (free), and other 
cheque-cashing (the greater of $4.00 or 1.25% of the cheque value). The ceiling for money 
orders is $1000.00 per order, which is higher than that of other outlets so that larger payments 
such as rent can be made with one money order as opposed to two or three. The services 
provided are those that were identified as community needs in the research.  
 
The 520 square foot outlet is open 10:00 AM to 9:00 PM on weekdays, 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on 
Saturdays, and closed on Sundays.  The Royal Bank says that they are able to offer the lower 
fees because of low overhead and being willing to accept lower profit margins than other fringe 
financial service firms expect. They also feel that the community impetus in the establishment of 
this branch was key to gaining community support as it fostered a sense of ownership and 
partnership.  
 
Cash and Save does not address access to credit needs although this too was identified as a 
community need. They considered a secured VISA card system but decided against it as they felt 
that this would not meet the needs of low-income individuals. Their perception was that the 
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likely determinant for the use of services such as payday loans was the level of financial 
discipline rather than income, as these clients tend to be individuals who could likely access 
credit through bank mechanisms already available such as consumer loans, lines of credit, or 
even overdraft charges that would cost less than payday loans. While the Royal Bank is involved 
nationally in the learn$ave program, the Cash and Save does not advertise this program. The 
Royal Bank opens and holds accounts and provides data reports, but are not involved in the 
delivery of the service or selection of participants. In regards to encouraging fringe financial 
service users to open bank accounts, the Cash and Save established a referral system for clients 
to access the Royal Bank. To date, no one has taken advantage of this opportunity. The reason 
for this lack of usage, and the amount of in-branch promotion that occurred, is unknown.  
 
The respondent stated that while one third of those in poverty may remain there, two thirds of 
this group are dynamic and may only be in an impoverished community or situation for a few 
years. What this dynamic group needs most is affordable and convenient financial services such 
as Cash and Save provides until they move into a different environment financially or 
geographically. Those that remain also benefit from these less expensive services and from the 
presence of an institution like the Royal Bank and its community involvement and donations.  
 
Analysis 
Evaluating this model with consideration to viability and CED concepts, there are several 
strengths and weaknesses. Strengths of this model include the community impetus that led to the 
establishment of Cash and Save as well as the ongoing Community Reference Group that 
facilitates dialogue and awareness between the community and the bank of each other’s needs 
and perspectives. As well, the size and familiarity of an institution such as the Royal Bank lend 
financial stability, financial and managerial expertise, and credibility to Cash and Save. As well, 
Cash and Save provides necessary financial services to the community and it does so at a cost to 
the consumer that is less than that charged at previously existing fringe financial service outlets. 
Finally, the business-oriented approach of a for-profit model that charges moderate service fees 
and maintains a bottom line awareness will increase the branch’s financial viability. Its 
independence also means that the branch will not be vulnerable to required subsidies such as 
donations, grants, depositors who receive lower-than-market returns, or funding to partner 
agencies.   
 
A weakness of the Cash and Save is that, as a venture of the Royal Bank of Canada, a minimal 
return on investment is demanded as part of its global competitiveness and shareholder 
accountability obligations. This means that if Cash and Save operates at a break-even level or 
even at a level of profitability that is lower than Royal Bank’s targeted benchmarks, the branch is 
susceptible to closure. There is a “social gain” aspect of the program’s measurement of success, 
but clearly this is secondary to the “financial gain” evaluation. Additionally, the pursuit of 
shareholder profits means that the service fees charged will necessarily be higher than the cost of 
providing those services. Money from the impoverished individuals and communities is 
transferred to shareholders who are likely middle and high-income earners. CED values the 
retention and circulation of money within the impoverished community and the for-profit model 
fails to meet this ideal, although lower service fees leave more of the money in the community.  
 
An additional shortcoming is that, while the Royal Bank participates in the Learn$ave program, 
the Cash and Save itself does not appear to have a concerted long-term vision of improving the 
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financial conditions, literacy, and habits of the people in the community. Finally, access to credit 
is not addressed at the Cash and Save and, therefore, does not provide the community with an 
alternative to the payday lender or pawnbroker. Given the identified need for credit in this and 
other low-income communities, and given the exorbitant interest rates charged by the fringe 
financial service providers, this is clearly an area of need that is not being met. Cash and Save 
appears to be maintaining the status quo, albeit at a less expensive rate. And although there is a 
mechanism through which to open deposit accounts at the Royal Bank, the fact that no one has 
utilised this option suggests that, unless no one in the community desires an account, the 
mechanism is inadequate. 
 
6.4.2    Florida Central Credit Union – Florida 
 
Model Summary 
Florida Central Credit Union (FCCU) has assets of $160 million and 40% of its 50,000 members 
are defined as low-income individuals (Galagly and Dernovsek 2000). FCCU first became 
involved in Tampa Bay’s low-income inner city in the early 1990s when it worked together with 
the city’s affordable housing initiative. Through working with community leaders and 
organisations, such as the Tampa Hillsborough Action Plan (THAP), a community development 
corporation, FCCU became aware of the need in this community for affordable financial 
services. As elsewhere in North America, bank closures in the impoverished neighbourhood left 
residents without many options other than to rely on fringe financial service outlets. Since FCCU 
and THAP had mutual interest in addressing the financial service needs of this community, and 
since they recognised capacities and expertise in each other that would be greatly beneficial to 
such an initiative, a close partnership developed. THAP had an annual budget of nearly $10 
million, assets of $100 million, and a staff of 100 (Black 2002). The established community 
partnership was essential in gaining the trust of the community who had developed a deep 
distrust of traditional financial institutions. 
 
According to the respondent, a basic savings account at FCCU can be opened for a $5 share 
purchase and a chequeing account is available for a $25 share purchase. Members receive six 
free in-person transactions per month and unlimited electronic transactions including ATMs. 
Members also receive free cheque-cashing while non-members may cash cheques under $500 for 
$3 and cheques for more than $500 for $5, although non-members are encouraged to rather 
purchase a basic savings account rather and, as a member, receive free cheque-cashing in the 
future. Money orders are available to members and non-members for $.89.  
 
FCCU decided to open an inner-city branch in 1998 in conjunction with THAP. THAP provided 
the building and covered its costs except for security, which they shared. FCCU contributed 
supplies, data processing services, managerial expertise, and paid for the five salaries. While 
FCCU’s total financial contribution in the first year totalled $93,000, they envisioned that a 
business-minded approach would make it possible for the branch to break even or even return a 
profit to members. According to the respondent, THAP’s annual average cost to operate the 
branch was $50,000 while FCCU’s average was $60,000.  
 
The joint branch took deposits, cashed cheques, provided money orders, and offered small 
unsecured loans for members with marginal credit. Financial counselling was seen to be a key 
component of the loan program, both from the perspective of giving the client an opportunity to 
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tell their story as well as providing the client with guidance. This “working with” strategy 
facilitated many more credit opportunities than the traditional banking formulas would have. 
Loans were made for as little as $200 for periods of between two weeks and six months with an 
interest rate of 15-18% annualised percentage rate (APR) and FCCU attempted to respond to 
loan requests within 15 minutes whenever possible. Members were encouraged to utilise 
electronic payroll deductions and direct deposit mechanisms to build up a savings account 
simultaneously to their loan repayment so that their future access to money in a time of need 
could be self-ensured. Members who attempted to withdraw part or all of their savings would be 
encouraged to rather consider making a loan secured by the savings. The terms for these fully or 
partially secured loans were only 6% interest, which was sufficient to cover the risk and 
administration of the loan while at the same time providing the member with access to credit that 
would both ensure that their savings were not depleted and facilitate the improvement of their 
credit rating. The loan program had a 1.1% delinquency rate (late payment) and a default rate 
(non-payment) of 0.5%.   
 
Another feature offered was “courtesy pay” which acted as an unofficial line of credit available 
for each member through which the credit union would cover bounced cheques for up to $700. 
FCCU did charge $22 for each NSF cheque, but the member would be spared paying charges at 
both the financial institution and the place the cheque was written to. The member had ten days 
to repay FACU after which they would be approached by a financial counsellor who would 
recommend turning the deficit into a loan. Again, payroll deductions and direct deposits were 
encouraged for paying off the loan and building up a savings account. A financial service gap 
eventually identified was that the branch still had to deny some small loans because of a state 
regulated interest ceiling of 18% APR for credit unions which was not sufficient for higher risk, 
high-transaction-frequency loans like payday loans. 
 
In response to the need for higher risk credit, and with research and other assistance from the 
state, FFCU and THAP created a Credit Union Service Organisation (CUSO) in 2000 just two 
blocks away from the joint branch. As a CUSO, while still a subsidiary of the FFCU, this outlet 
was able to serve non-members as well as members and allowed for more organisational and 
service flexibility. The community partnership continued to be an integral part of the 
organisation as THAP brought an understanding of the community, community connections, and 
community credibility.  
 
The CUSO provided payday and car title loans (6-8 months at 30% APR), cheque-cashing for 
the same fees as at FACU, money orders and travellers cheques for $1, and facilitated utility bill 
payments for $1 as well. Envelopes and stamps for bill payments and bus tokens were also sold. 
Financial counselling was a component of all transactions. The vision was that as customers 
became familiar with the CUSO, they would gain trust in the credit union, improve their 
financial literacy, and transfer their transactions to the credit union. The FCCU was initially 
enthusiastic about the success of the CUSO and was looking state-wide and nationally for other 
locations in which to test the model. The FCCU respondent stated that these ventures were not 
for philanthropic purposes; they were priced to be profitable. They felt that, while abject poverty 
could not be appropriately addressed through banking, providing banking services to the working 
poor made good solid business sense as long as you were able to find the right partners and the 
right plan. 
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However, in the last year THAP’s own funding was discontinued and the joint branch was 
subsequently closed. FCCU envisioned that 3-5 years would be required for this joint branch to 
operate at a break-even point and, although the branch was nearing sustainability, the branch was 
not yet able to operate without THAP’s subsidy. FCCU does operate another branch 1.5 miles 
from this location and, according to the respondent, 3,000 of the 3,600 members of the joint 
branch have transferred their memberships there. Clearly, some individuals no longer have 
access to financial services as a result of this closure, but most individuals appear to have been 
able to make the transition.  
 
The CUSO is also on hold at the present time. It operated from 1998 to 2000, but the volume of 
transactions remained below what was required to make the outlet financially viable. The low 
volume resulted from ongoing competition from other fringe financial service outlets and 
insufficient visibility and credibility in the community. FCCU fully intends to attempt this 
initiative again in the near future believing that it meets an important community need and that it 
has the potential to be a financially viable program. Soliciting and mobilising endorsement from 
well-established and trusted community groups and leaders will be essential to the credibility and 
increased use of the outlet.  
 
Analysis 
A strength of the model was the networking that involved various stakeholders with unique 
capacities. They linked an organisation that had financial service capacities and expertise with an 
organisation that understood and advocated for the low-income neighbourhood. Not only is this 
positive from the perspective that community networking is important, but these two expert 
capacities would seem to play an essential role in the development of any alternative financial 
service model.  The Credit Union provides organisational stability, existing infrastructure and 
technological capacity, money handling and administrative mechanisms, and financial strength. 
THAP’s community first perspective, community understanding, and focus on poverty 
alleviation provide an ideological synergy with the credit unions own strengths and objectives. 
The participation of the state likewise brings certain expertise as well as “ownership” from 
another influential sector. Another beneficial aspect of sharing resources is that the initial 
infrastructure and start-up costs as well as ongoing operational costs are less formidable and the 
risk is not borne solely by one organisation. 
 
Another strength of the FCCU model is that it integrated a short-term perspective in meeting the 
community’s immediate financial service needs with a long-term component. Establishing 
separate entities that would meet somewhat diverse needs did not divert from the long-term goal 
of increasing the community’s access to financial services, increased financial literacy, and 
enabling low-income individuals to improve their financial stability and positions through 
participation in the Credit Union. The individual who required cheque-cashing, a payday loan, a 
money order, or needed to pay utility bills could receive instant service at the CUSO at more 
affordable rates than at other fringe financial outlets and could also receive financial counselling 
if so desired. The individual also had access to a financial centre that took deposits, encouraged 
savings, and managed other conventional banking services at the nearby joint branch.  
 
Nevertheless, one of the criteria in measuring the success and effectiveness of a CED initiative 
must be its sustainability and neither outlet is currently operational. FCCU was not as committed 
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to significant returns on investment as a private, for-profit initiative might be, but it was 
unwilling to operate a program that carried a perpetual financial deficit. In trying to balance the 
“financial bottom line” and “social profit” perspectives, FCCU set up the two ventures in a 
manner that was dependent on subsidies received by THAP. Notwithstanding the advantages of 
subsidies and partnerships, it rendered the ventures vulnerable as evidenced by the branch 
closure upon the termination of THAP’s funding. The respondent reiterates that it is important 
not to count on perpetual grants and funding from government or non-profit organisations as this 
leaves the program too vulnerable. The respondent stated that the keys to successful initiatives 
that provide financial services to low-income individuals include independent economic 
viability, strong and appropriate partnerships, clearly identified risks and loss parameters, 
visibility and credibility, and a clear understanding of the regulations involved with financial 
institutions such as credit unions and banks.  
 
6.4.3    First American Credit Union - Window Rock, Arizona 
 
Model Summary 
First American Credit Union (FACU) of Window Rock, Arizona is located in the heart of the 
Navajo Nation reservation. Eighty percent of its 19,000 members are Native Americans from 
twenty-one tribes in three states, most of whom have loans at FACU. Memberships are available 
for one dollar and five dollars is required to be kept in a membership share/savings account in 
order to keep an account active. There are no monthly fees for the accounts and no minimum 
balance that must be kept. Transactions at FACU ATMs are free of charge for members. Four 
withdrawals are permitted per quarter at no charge, but are $2.00 each after this. FACU does not 
provide money orders, but will cash a cheque for a member for $2.00. Credit Union services are 
not available to non-members. 
 
For clients who are unable to access conventional consumer loans, FACU offers loans for as 
little as $50.00 through a line of credit arrangement and also through partially securing the 
member’s savings. Members may borrow the total amount of their line of credit at any time in 
addition to 110% of what they have in their savings account at an interest rate of between 12% 
for a home improvement loan and 16% for an otherwise unsecured loan. The goal is to provide a 
flexible, low-cost alternative to fringe financial services such as pawnbrokers and payday 
lenders. Financial counselling and education are seen to be an integral component of member - 
credit union relationships. Clients are required to apply for the first loan/line of credit in person, 
provide verification of income (employment, government, etc.), and grant access for electronic 
income deduction to the Credit Union as their loan payments. Thereafter, the loans are also 
accessible by phone (an 800 phone number is available) or by mail. Loans are deposited 
electronically immediately upon authorisation and the money is then available to be withdrawn 
from any ATM, of which fourteen are provided throughout the area by FACU without service 
charges to members. This system reduces the arduous administrative process normally inherent 
in a loan procedure for both the member and the credit union. Since opening in 1962, FACU has 
approved $234 million in loans in total and currently averages $1 million per month in new 
loans. In 2002 FACU made 34,516 loans averaging $378 for a total of $13, 037, 290. The loans 
have a default rate (non payment) of .75% and a delinquency rate (late payment) of 2.25%. In 
addition to loan interest, revenues are also realised by NSF services charges, non-member ATM 
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service fees of $1.50, and by offering an interest rate of only .5% on members’ chequeing 
accounts. 
 
FACU recognises that for those who are interested in immediate access to cash regardless of the 
cost, their services may not meet the needs of those individuals. However, for those who are 
somewhat financially literate and disciplined, this loan structure provides a much needed service 
in a reputable, trustworthy community organisation at a significantly reduced cost to the 
member. FACU maintains that adjusting expectations and being flexible are key to facilitating 
credit to low-income earners who are vulnerable to financial emergencies such as layoffs or 
medical bills as they lack sufficient savings or other access to credit to deal with the 
circumstances.  
 
Analysis 
Banking accessibility at FACU appears to be somewhat limited to the poorest individuals when 
considering that there are only four free transactions per three months with high per-transaction 
fees of $2.00 thereafter, the $2.00 fee for cashing a cheque, and the lack of money order services. 
While the cheque-cashing fee would be significantly lower than at Canadian fringe financial 
service outlets, these and the other services fall short of the standards for affordable member 
services set by most Canadian Credit Unions. 
 
On the positive side, the loan mechanism is innovative and a great strength of the FACU. It is 
able to provide credit to those in need of even small amounts of money at very reasonable 
interest rates and with minimal administrative energies. The use of technology (phone, electronic 
transfer, ATM) makes the process very accessible, simple, and quick. And the concepts of 
ownership inherent in credit union membership will likely increase the feelings of ownership 
within the community of borrowers. FACU integrates meeting a short-term need with long-term 
financial health by bringing individuals into the Credit Union membership and combining 
financial counselling with the loan process. FACU appears to have found a viable, community 
based, accessible, and affordable mechanism by which to provide low-income individuals with 
credit.    
 
6.4.4     Four Corners Community Savings - Vancouver Eastside, British Colombia 
 
Model Summary 
The Four Corners Community Savings, which is organised as a bank, was opened in 1996 by the 
New Democratic provincial government to address the unmet financial service needs of 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. The province created the B. C. Community Financial Services 
Corporation, which governs the Four Corners Community Savings, after passing the Community 
Financial Services Act. A Community Advisory Council is elected by the depositors and this 
council appoints three members to the Board of Directors, while the province appoints the 
balance. As a bank and a crown corporation, Four Corners is subject to the accompanying 
regulations and limitations. The province contributed an authorised share capital of $10 million, 
guarantees deposits, and must approve business plans annually. The province also provided $6.9 
million for building purchase, start-up, renovation, and operating costs in the first year (National 
Council on Welfare 1998). 
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Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside is known as the ‘poorest postal code’ in Canada where 80% of 
its residents live below the poverty line, nearly 10% of residents live with serious mental health 
problems, 90% of injection drug users are infected with hepatitis C, and the highest rate of new 
HIV infections in the developed world is evident (Four Corners Community Savings 2003). 
 
Community concerns included a lack of accessible banking services in this area due to branch 
closures and the increased use of fringe financial services and the associated usurious costs were 
identified. The challenge of opening and maintaining accounts due to lack of proper 
identification, required minimum monthly balances, and costly service charges were seen as 
additional banking barriers. The resulting danger of having to carry significant amounts of cash 
after cashing a cheque due to the lack of deposit accounts was also noted.  
 
Four Corners is not the first attempt at meeting financial service needs in this community. The 
Royal Bank of Canada, with direction from a community advisory committee, operated a 
“community bank” in this neighbourhood from 1976 to 1985. It cashed welfare cheques for no 
fee and encouraged people to have their cheques mailed directly to the branch. The branch also 
made small loans to individuals, financed small mortgages, and provided income tax refund 
advances. The impact of the latter service was evidenced by the effective elimination of tax 
discounters in the community. However, the Royal Bank branch, which failed to attract broader 
community interest and remained primarily a welfare cheque-cashing outlet, eventually closed 
due to perpetual financial losses (National Council on Welfare 1998). 
 
Four Corners currently provides chequeing and saving accounts with no minimum account 
balances, term deposits, cheque-cashing, money orders, utility bill payments, electronic deposit 
of cheques, and no charges on ATM transactions (although Four Corners does not have any 
ATMs of its own, so the individual still has to pay the machine fee). There is a graduated service 
fee structure with an inverse relation between a client’s income and their service fees. Non-low-
income individuals and commercial accounts pay rates comparable to other financial 
institutions and, while there were initially no transaction fees for low income individuals, a 
minimal monthly fee of $3.50 has now been introduced.  
 
Additionally, over a period of time some board members placed their stipends into a micro-loan 
pool that accumulated to $50,000 - $60,000. It was set up as the Four Corners Support Society, a 
separate entity that was administered by the bank. It began in March 1999 and by October of that 
year one hundred loans ($300 to $1500 average) had been made mostly to low income 
individuals. Interestingly, they found that clients preferred an overdraft arrangement to a loan. 
The fund, which has reached approximately $90,000, is now administered by Partners for 
Economic And Community Help (PEACH). Four Corners also began a business loan program, 
but the only significant loan it made was to a community Laundromat that eventually folded.  
 
Other services provided by Four Corners include: free photo ID (saved on a computer database 
for future transaction reference or for replacement purposes), financial counselling, public 
washrooms, chairs for those waiting and a number service system instead of line-ups, a Human 
Resources Development Canada job bank in the lobby, a children's play area, meeting space for 
community groups, free coffee, full wheelchair access, free telephones,  community "information 
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tables" on cheque issue days, and service in multiple languages (Four Corners Community 
Savings 2003).  
 
During the initial years Four Corners focused on drawing government and union accounts and 
pension funds to Four Corners, but two things worked against them. Accounts were not insured 
for more than $2 million, which was less than many commercial, governmental, and non-
governmental organisations required. As well, major depositors were not willing to accept or risk 
receiving less than market rates of return on their deposits and investments. The chain reaction 
put Four Corners in a tough spot. Without the deposits, loans could not be offered. Banks make 
their money on service fees (which Four Corners was hoping to do without) and the spread 
between the deposit and loan interest. The lack of income from both of these sources rendered 
the bank incapable of breaking even. Compounding the lack of “spread” income has been the 
falling interest rate in the last number of years, which has served to shrink the potential spread.  
Additionally, due to the nature of the clientele, the per-transaction costs at Four Corners turned 
out to be significantly higher than expected.  
 
There have been no ongoing subsidies from the province although the province’s initial $10 
million base capital has been eroded each year through perpetual deficits averaging almost $1 
million per year. The capital is now down to $5.6 million. Considering that the financial 
governing body of British Colombia requires banks to have a minimum of five million dollars to 
operate a bank, it is clear to see that another year of similar losses will result in termination of 
operations. A respondent stated that even after significant restructuring the current deficit is 
expected to be $500,000. 
 
The new provincial government is not favourable to the concept of Four Corners, which does not 
fit ideologically with their privatisation and budget reduction agenda, particularly when 
considering the perpetual deficits Four Corners runs and the real crisis of sinking below 
minimum capital requirements. When they were elected in 2002, they called for immediate 
changes to Four Corners, which include new management and several new directors. They 
terminated all lending functions including mortgages, business loans, consumer loans, and lines 
of credit. These and other cuts to services have induced organisations to remove their accounts 
from Four Corners as the remaining services no longer meet their needs. This further reduces 
bank revenues. To increase revenues, the bank instituted the $3.50 per month minimum charge 
on each account although they still receive unlimited transactions for free. And although some 
individuals subsequently closed their accounts, the bank felt that this strategy was necessary in 
light of the fact that if Four Corners did not come closer to balancing its budget, it would cease to 
exist shortly and would therefore not be of service to anyone at all. Downsizing and introducing 
minimum user fees were seen to be the only possible manner in which to ensure long-term 
viability.  
 
Four Corners also considered working through the Vancouver Agreement in a partnership that 
would see the city, province, and federal governments each put in $200,000 per year. The federal 
government declined to participate citing the issue as a provincial one. They did agree to provide 
funding for building renovations aimed at attracting non-profit CED tenants that would facilitate 
a symbiosis of operations, vision, values, and would ease budget constraints through shared 
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overhead costs. The city has bought the building and charges little to no rent to Four Corners and 
is pursuing further participation.  
 
One respondent advised that there were three main aspects that required adherence when 
considering the development of other alternative models to fringe financial services. First, 
determine and aim for the minimal threshold of service that still meets the core of the 
community’s needs. It is easier to expand a program later than to downsize in a financial crisis. 
Secondly, establish the initiative with a minimal regulatory base. Being both a Crown 
corporation and a Bank, Four Corners is required to conform to all relevant legislation, which 
significantly increases administrative costs. The amount of revenue from loan/deposit spreads or 
service fees required to pay for this administration is substantial. The regulatory confinement 
also limits the range of CED initiatives that Four Corners is able to engage in. Thirdly, minimise 
costs on administration and transactions by contracting out as many “backroom” costs as 
possible such as data processing. Other organisations with established capacity are able to offer 
these services at significantly less than it would cost a small bank like Four Corners to do it 
themselves. Utilising electronic banking would be another way of minimising per-transaction 
costs.  
 
Analysis 
Four Corners truly provides community-minded financial services as evidenced by the many 
community meetings leading up to the formation, the presence of the Community Advisory 
Council which is elected by the depositors and plays a real role in the governance of the bank, 
and the non-financial services offered which demonstrate the awareness of, and commitment to 
meeting the holistic needs of the community. The environment is hospitable and comfortable. In 
fact, it turns modern neo-liberal financial service trends on its head by charging no fees to those 
who cost the bank the most and higher fees to those that cost the bank less to service and who 
actually bring in revenues. Mainstream bank accounts and transactions are usually less expensive 
for those who are able to leave sizeable deposits in the bank (National Council on Welfare 1998).  
 
Four Corners also seeks to integrate meeting short-term and long-term community financial 
needs. The short-term needs are addressed through services such as cheque-cashing and the no-
fee service ensures that each client will retain their whole, albeit meagre, financial allotment 
which would not be the case at any other financial service institution. The long-term needs are 
addressed by employing local individuals, providing financial counselling, encouraging savings, 
and integrating community organisations such as the job kiosk and community information 
displays into their service network.  
 
Four Corners also greatly increases the safety of the community (Bancroft Planning and 
Research Associates 2000). Fewer cheques are lost or stolen because they can be electronically 
deposited directly into clients’ accounts. Additionally, clients do not need to carry around as 
much cash as they are able to leave some of each cheque in their account, which has led to a 
noticeable reduction in the number of assaults and thefts in this neighbourhood. As well, the 
provision of free money orders ensures that individuals are able to carry these instead of cash 
when paying their rent or other bills that they cannot pay through Four Corners.  
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The innovative identification mechanism contributes to smoother delivery of services for both 
clients and the bank. The client is able to exercise transactions without ID since the information 
with a picture is available in the computer system. Four Corners has also been successful at 
convincing a few local organisations and businesses to recognise the ID cards as well.  
 
However, the community focus clearly overshadowed the economic perspective and this 
rendered Four Corners unstable and potentially defunct in the near future. It appears that the 
initiative was conceived out of a vision to serve the poor and the hope was that the financing for 
the project would somehow materialise. Unfortunately, an outlet focussed on providing 
individualised and inexpensive or free services to low-income clients will have a considerable 
challenge soliciting funds or accounts that might actually make money. 
 
The failure to achieve financial independence, together with its being a program of the province, 
has left the bank vulnerable to the political will of the provincial leaders. And while restructuring 
is underway, the oversight of the economic perspective for the sake of the community 
perspective has placed the bank in a precarious position from which it may not be able to 
recover. It could be argued, from this perspective, that the long-term needs of the community 
have not been adequately considered as the dissolution of Four Corners would clearly be 
detrimental to the community.  
 
However, when considering the costs and benefits of this initiative, a perspective beyond the 
financial bottom line at Four Corners is necessary. The government (and the taxpayer) saves 
money on replacing lost or stolen cheques, they save money on the decreased violence in the 
community which leads to policing and health care costs, they save money on the fees they have 
to pay to other cheque-cashing outlets to cash government cheques, and they save money on ID 
replacement. These real savings, in addition to the “social profit” benefits of the Four Corners 
community services, need to be considered in regards to the banks “net worth.” 
 
6.4.5     The Provident Loan Society of New York - New York 
 
Model Summary 
The Provident Loan Society (PLS) was founded in New York in 1893 by wealthy, philanthropic 
business and community leaders. They identified a lack of access to low-interest credit for low-
income individuals, which was accentuated by minimal social and government services of that 
era. Capital was raised by selling certificates to socially-minded investors who received half 
(6%) of the going interest rate (12%) in order to subsidise the start-up of this financial service. 
Costs were kept low by accepting only small items, primarily jewellery, which required minimal 
storage space. Having been created as a not-for-profit organisation, PLS was also tax-exempt 
(Caskey 1994, p. 24-25). 
 
According to their web site, the PLS currently serves 100,000 people annually through five 
outlets (Provident Loan Society 2003). Appraisers are always present to ensure that transactions 
are completed with the speed that the clients would experience at other pawnbrokers. The pawn 
loans are made for terms of 12 months with an interest rate of 2.167% per month (26% APR). 
There are no additional fees and the loan may be repaid in less than full-term time, owing only 
interest for the number of days that the money was loaned, not the amount of one full year. The 
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client is also able to renew the loan after the term expires for another term at the same rates. If 
the loan is not repaid, the item is sold at an auction. Money received for the item at the auction 
that is more than the loan’s principal, interest, and auction fees are returned to the borrower. In 
1991 56,428 loans (new and renewed) averaging $270 were made for a loan total of 
$15,213,129. Nine percent of the collateral was forfeited (Caskey 1994, p. 24-25). 
 
Analysis 
The PLS model focuses on meeting the immediate access-to-credit needs of individuals. Clients 
receive necessary credit when they require it, the rates are superior to other high-risk lenders, and 
the length of term allows for the individual to “get their house in order” before the loan comes 
due. Payday lenders typically request payment within four weeks, which is often an insufficient 
time period for the individual’s personal financial circumstances to change significantly. 
 
The PLS clearly has a community focus and aims to meet community credit needs as well as 
possible while maintaining independent viability. This balanced perspective has greatly 
contributed to its success as evidenced by its current outstanding loan total of more than fifteen 
million dollars involving more than fifty thousand individuals and its century-long viability. The 
community perspective is also illustrated by their policy of returning surplus cash to the client 
when defaulted items are auctioned. 
 
Although PLS originated with a subsidising mechanism, it now operates as a self-sufficient 
establishment. One of the strengths of the PLS was that it aimed for minimal overhead costs and 
structural regulations. In light of Four Corners’ requirements as a bank and a crown corporation, 
the fact that PLS focussed on only the most urgent need, did so with collateral that required 
minimal storage space, and set up as a not-for-profit organisation to escape taxation and other 
business demands has greatly enhanced their viability and their ability to offer the loans at lower-
than-market rates.    
 
6.4.6    VanCity Credit Union - Vancouver, British Colombia 
 
Model Summary 
VanCity is Canada’s largest Credit Union with 286,000 members, $8.2 billion in assets, and 39 
branches throughout south-western British Colombia with several more planned for the near 
future (VanCity Credit Union 2003). Membership shares of $50.00 are required to open an 
account. In 2002, $4.8 million was returned to members and $3 million was granted and donated 
to community initiatives that pursued environmental and community development initiatives. 
 
VanCity has established a reputation as one of Canada’s most socially and environmentally 
conscious organisations and has received several national awards of recognition. To this end in 
1998, they began with a process of soliciting an external social audit of VanCity to evaluate 
organisational performance on issues such as environmental responsibility, staffing conditions, 
and community development. One shortcoming of the credit union that was identified was that 
accessibility to banking services was still an obstacle for many individuals in VanCity’s 
communities. As a result, VanCity developed an accessibility strategy that has manifested itself 
in four programs.  
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The first program is designed to simply make membership and financial transactions more 
accessible and affordable. Recognising that a $50.00 membership can be an obstacle to low-
income individuals, the new strategy allows individuals to open an account with $5.00 with the 
understanding and commitment to build up the share value to $50.00 within one year. During 
this time all transaction and account fees are waived. Once the share threshold is reached, an 
account package is selected with the Plan 24 account being available at the lowest rate. This 
account has no monthly fee and ten transactions per month are offered at no charge. Subsequent 
transactions cost $.50 for electronic transactions and $.70 for teller transactions. One mechanism 
that VanCity did establish to circumvent some of the identification requirements was in regards 
to refugees who had a significantly difficult time producing identification and manoeuvring in 
the government and financial systems. If the refugee is affiliated with ISS, a non-governmental 
immigration support organisation, VanCity will initiate services based upon a record of landing.  
 
The second program that was initiated was a low-limit VISA card for clients that would not 
qualify for a regular credit card or other forms of credit. The two-fold purpose was to facilitate a 
system that would allow low-income individuals to access emergency funds and build up their 
credit rating at the same time. Clients purchase a term deposit for $100 and secure their VISA 
card limit of $100 with it. The interest rate is a competitive 17% APR. As the credit card is used 
and payments are made, clients hopefully gain a better understanding of how to manage their 
money and the importance of financial planning and discipline. And as their credit rating 
improves with prompt payments over time, the clients are able to increase the limit of their VISA 
card so that it is only partially secured. Over time, the percentage of unsecured credit available 
increases to the point where the client is able to remove the term deposit if they so choose and 
continue with completely unsecured credit. This initiative began as a pilot project involving 
women leaving violent relationships who were now single parents. This group of people were 
seen to be very needy but yet very determined and motivated to make a better future for their 
children. To date, 400 individuals have taken advantage of this program. 
 
The third program is designed to facilitate small loans. These contain the same rates and 
eligibility criteria as the VanCity’s conventional consumer loans, but allow for loans for as little 
as $300, which is less than mainstream financial institutions would normally administer.  
 
The fourth aspect of the accessibility efforts is community education regarding financial literacy 
including financial counselling, budgeting and saving values and skills, the method and value of 
obtaining and managing credit, banking orientation sessions, and seminars in basic money 
management. VanCity commits a full-time staff person to work in this capacity. But since the 
demand for such a service would be limitless in a city the size of Vancouver, they have focused 
their efforts on organisations that are members of VanCity and who serve single mothers leaving 
violent relationships and the resettlement assistance program for refugees. 
 
Cheque-cashing for non-members is also available. Due to provincial regulation that prohibits 
cheque-cashing fees from being applied to government issued cheques, these are cashed for free. 
Non-government cheque-cashing charges for non-members are left to the discretion of the 
branch manager. The respondent from VanCity observed that managers in low-income 
neighbourhoods are less likely to apply such charges than are their fellow managers in more 
affluent communities. One resulting concern, however, has been that mainstream banks in the 
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area are more likely to send their “questionable” clients over to VanCity, taking advantage of 
VanCity’s community minded values and initiatives. This means that VanCity deals with more 
than its share of higher risk transactions.  
 
Analysis 
VanCity is a member-owned, community minded organisation. And while it does pursue profits, 
they go toward membership dividends and therefore stay in the community. As well, the evolved 
values of VanCity include an holistic perspective in which social and environmental values are 
included in the consideration of organisational operations. As a result, VanCity is willing to take 
a financial loss on these four accessibility programs in light of the social “profit” that they 
produce. And since the subsidies come from within the organisation, the programs are not 
vulnerable to external budgetary or ideological fluctuations as in the cases of FCCU and Four 
Corners. VanCity members themselves will decide on the future of these types of programs.  
 
The fact that these programs operate within the structure of a large and wealthy institution is a 
significant strength. Similar to the models developed by FCCU and FACU, the technological, 
administrative, and financial expertise and capacity together with the existing infrastructure can 
be utilised much more efficiently than if these programs were to be established outside of the 
VanCity system. The asset size of VanCity also is a strength as it allows for the subsidisation of 
less or non-profitable initiatives. A smaller financial institution could not as easily designate 
significant resources to meeting needs that would not contribute to membership dividends.  
 
VanCity programs also integrate the short and long-term needs of clients. Clients, even non-
members, are able to cash cheques for little or no charge and they are able to access no-fee bank 
accounts and transactions. When clients are ready to make an effort at longer-term credit 
availability, VanCity’s low-limit VISA addresses the need for available credit in certain 
circumstances and an improved credit rating. Both of these needs are met in a way that is of 
minimal risk to both the client (the limit is low so that the debt can not easily accumulate beyond 
what they are capable of managing) and the credit union (it is secured). When their credit rating 
is established, VanCity offers unsecured credit through credit cards and through a loan program 
that is willing to make smaller loans than conventional banks would. And all these programs are 
delivered with financial counselling and financial literacy and skill enhancement that benefit the 
client both in the short-term and in the long-term.  
 
6.4.7    Assiniboine Credit Union West Broadway Branch - Winnipeg, Manitoba 
 
Model Summary 
Assiniboine Credit Union (ACU) in Winnipeg is a sixty-year-old financial institution that 
consists of 52,000 members and manages $800 million in assets (Assiniboine Credit Union 
2003). In the last decade, ACU has formulated a strong community development mandate and 
has subsequently entered into and supported many CED initiatives, partnerships, and community 
organisations. It is the only financial institution in Manitoba to have a full time CED manager.   
 
West Broadway, a lower-income neighbourhood in Winnipeg, is similar to other lower-income 
urban communities across North America in that it has witnessed the exodus of mainstream 
financial institutions in the last decade. The respondent stated that ACU perceived this to not 
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necessarily be an indication that the closing branch was not realising a profit, simply that it was 
not realising enough profit to satisfy shareholder demands and expectations. 
 
ACU, in response to the community’s need for financial services and supported by the 
confidence that a mini-branch would be financially viable, opened a satellite branch in West 
Broadway in 2001. The branch is expected to be operating at a break-even point within a few 
years of opening. The West Broadway branch currently manages accounts for more than 950 
members.  
 
ACU offers a variety of services through its West Broadway Branch. Membership is $5 and a 
low-fee account is available for $1.50. Deposits, online transactions, statements, and telephone 
transactions are free while in-person transactions are $.75 and electronic transactions (ATM, 
debit card purchases) are $.50. Youth and seniors are offered accounts with no monthly fee, daily 
interest, and unlimited transactions at no cost. Any person may purchase money orders for $4.00 
and cheque cashing is free for members, although there is a five day hold placed on personal 
cheques (standard banking practice) for the first six months. Non-members may cash federal and 
provincial issue cheques at no charge with three pieces of identification, although policy in this 
regard has been more flexible at the West Broadway branch. Non-government cheques are only 
cashed for members. Conventional loans and credit lines are available upon approved credit, but 
members are encouraged to establish a savings plan to provide themselves with financial 
stability. Savings are also important as they provide the branch with assets upon which to offer 
the loans that are necessary to bring in the revenues to make the branch viable.  
 
In response to the unique needs of this community and the mandate of accessibility, ACU’s West 
Broadway branch is open on Saturdays. And as an ACU branch it administers IDA program 
accounts for those who live in West Broadway (IDA is a matched savings and financial 
management program described in a later model summary). 
   
Analysis 
A strength of this model is that it inherently brings the structure and ideology of the ACU with it. 
ACU has substantial human, technological, and financial resources that are very important in 
establishing a financial services outlet. The ideology of the ACU brings credibility in the 
community, an understanding of working with low-income individuals and communities, and a 
willingness to provide a community service even if expected financial returns are less than at 
other branches. The ACU ideology also includes the “member-owned, one-person-one-vote” 
perspective that contributes to the feeling of community ownership of the branch. Both of these 
ACU components are significant foundations for the establishment of any financial service 
initiative.  
 
The ACU branch does not offer a direct alternative to fringe financial services in that quick 
contingency loans are not available. ACU does, however, offer affordable deposit accounts and 
free (with a five day hold for personal cheques) cheque cashing for members. By offering 
unbanked individuals these services, ACU hopes to strengthen the members’ financial capacities 
as they access the inexpensive financial transactions and build up a savings account that might 
eliminate future reliance on the fringe financial service sector. 
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6.4.8    Desjardins – Quebec 
 
Model Summary 
The Desjardins Caisses Populaire (DCP) of Quebec is a centralised financial institution system 
that consists of Caisses (credit unions) across the province. It consists of 671 outlets and 5.16 
million members with assets of $85.3 billion (Desjardins 2003). Each Caisse is independent and 
has its own board of directors, although it may have several outlets. Caisses are federated 
together in the Federation des Caisses Populaires du Quebec (FCPQ). 
 
DCP has implemented a pilot project recently that seeks to provide small loans to members who 
would not otherwise qualify for loans and to engage these members in financial planning. After 
positive results during the first year, DCP has decided to extend the project for another two years 
with the hope that every region of Quebec will have access to the loan funds by the end of that 
period. The goal of the loan fund is support for people in need rather than profits.  
 
Information from Desjardins states that the FCPQ allocates a minimum of $33,000 and a 
maximum of $66,000 to a fund, which must be matched by the Caisse(s) involved. The FCPQ 
has set aside $500,000 for the establishment of these funds. Since credit unions distribute annual 
profits to the members, members of participating Caisses must agree by vote to redirect some of 
the Caisse profits to the establishment of this fund. During the first year, the salaries of the credit 
agents were paid by the government of Quebec, as part of its anti-poverty agenda, and it has 
continued participating in the second year by paying half of these salaries with the local Caisse 
paying the other half. The FCPQ is seeking to establish a foundation with private and public 
donations and grants that would finance the entire salaries of the loan administrators.   
 
Each loan fund is established by one or several local Caisses in partnership with a financial 
consulting agency (FCA). There are currently 85 Caisses participating in these loan funds 
throughout Quebec. The FCA is considered to be a key element of the loan fund as they screen 
out individuals not capable of participating and they also deliver the educational component of 
the process which empowers clients, increases their financial management skills, and increases 
the loan repayment levels. Out of 488 financial consultations 259 loans have been granted for a 
approval rating of 51%. A total of $131,279 has been lent out for an average loan size of $527. 
The reimbursement rate is 92%. More than 2/3 of the clients are women and more than 2/3 of the 
clients are single or single parents. More than 2/3 had incomes of less than $10,000 and 90% had 
incomes of less than $15,000. More than 40% of non-single households had income of less than 
$15,000 and more than 80% of these households had income less than $25,000. The top reasons 
for the loans in order of frequency were to: purchase appliances, pay utility bills, buy furniture, 
pay rent, consolidate debt, and purchase employment related tools.   
 
In response to the nearly 50% of clients who apply and do not qualify for even these types of 
loans, some Caisses are planning to establish a parallel loan fund to meet these needs. This fund 
will not be self-sufficient and loans will be defined more as a donation. The FCPQ has agreed to 
explore this option, but wants the two types of loans to be distinct so as not to compromise the 
self-supporting goal of the original loan funds. 
 
The annual loan interest rate is capped by the FCPQ at 5%, although individual Caisses are able 
to set their own rates within this guideline. Money gained from the interest collected can only be 
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reinvested in the fund or be returned to the client after repayment is completed for investment in 
a saving plan. To date only one Caisse has chosen to charge any interest rate at all.  
 
Those accessing loans must be members of the Caisse and must agree to participate in financial 
consultations. The Caisse is able to refuse clients that present a very high risk of loan default. 
However, there is flexibility in unique circumstances.  
 
Analysis 
The Desjardins loan model is a community-minded initiative that clearly is not intended to 
realise profits. With a sufficiently low loan default rate, the 5% interest may in fact allow the 
fund to operate at a self-financing balance. However, as evidenced by the disinclination to charge 
any interest at all, the perspective guiding the loan fund is not one that is primarily business 
minded. The lack of loan interest charges coupled with an 8% default rate will mean that the 
fund will require permanent subsidisation. 
 
Subsidisation and the absorption of losses are made feasible by the strength of FCPQ and the 
partnerships under which the loan fund is administered. FCPQ with its considerable membership 
and asset base brings significant administrative, financial, and stabilising capacity which is 
important for the delivery of the loan fund as is the fact that, as a credit union, the mechanisms 
and capacity for administrating financial transactions such as loans are well established. The 
mechanism whereby sub-regional loan funds are created brings the delivery to the community 
level and involves the individual community person in the initiative as an owner of the initiative, 
as Caisse members vote on the establishment and contributions to the fund. Political will on 
behalf of the provincial government brought in another stakeholder with considerable capacity to 
assist the loan fund, although the plan is not to rely on these resources indefinitely. 
 
The Desjardins model is designed to meet individuals’ immediate needs for credit and it does so 
at non-arduous terms (no interest). Yet, the process ensures that clients, in the process of 
accessing the loan, meet with a financial management consultant to discuss the loan itself as well 
as plan for the repayment of the loan. They also lay the groundwork for ensuring increased 
financial stability for the future through mechanisms such as a savings plan. According to the 
respondent, an overwhelming majority of persons surveyed (Caisse administrators, credit 
officers, clients) think the experiment is a success. Additionally, the Caisses have clearly 
identified a desire and the tendency to be flexible in certain circumstances including the desire to 
establish a new fund to meet the needs of those who are not served by the current structure. 
Recognising that these loans would realise an even greater rate of default has not deterred their 
ambition. This desire to make credit and money as accessible as possible to those clearly in need 
is a truly commendable community-minded perspective.  
 
6.4.9    E-Money Models - Various  
 
Model Summary 
The trend toward electronic money has its risks for those needing credit. Insurmountable debt 
can be accumulated quickly as it is easily accessed repeatedly and the reality of the debt is “out 
of sight, out of mind.” However, many benefits can be seen for those without alternatives to the 
fringe financial services and as a result several initiatives have utilised electronic mechanisms to 
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make their services cheaper, safer, and more accessible. They range from for-profit enterprises 
run by large corporations to free-of-charge components of community-minded programs.  
 
Four Corners in Vancouver noticed that having cheques electronically and directly deposited 
greatly reduced the number of stolen and lost cheques that the government had to replace or that 
the individual simply lost out on. Additionally, this increased the likelihood that the individual 
would use the less expensive outlet and also increased the opportunity for them to leave some 
money in the account for future use instead of cashing it all.  
 
FACU uses electronic means to administer its loans. Members are able to apply by phone and 
then are able to access the loan at free-of-charge ATMs. Loan payments are guaranteed through 
securing electronic direct deposit of income and subsequent automatic loan payments. This 
increases member accessibility, decreases loan payment delinquency and defaults, and decreases 
the arduous administrative procedures normally associated with processing a loan.  
 
Other models have been set up as privately owned, for-profit initiatives and operated as 
“electronic kiosks” in convenience stores. Some offered only a bill payment service (free to the 
consumer, the utility company paid a small fee) while others also include cheque-cashing, money 
orders and transfers, and ATM functions. Future kiosks will include internet access and will 
thereby facilitate all financial transactions that are possible online including account management 
and bill payment. 
 
One aspect of this has been the development of a “chip card” to replace the “swipe card.” The 
purpose would be that the card would carry account information on the card itself. The “smart 
card” would have deposits transferred to it and would have payments transferred from it.  
 
Analysis 
Positive aspects of electronic financial transactions include the safety of cash-less transactions, 
24-hour accessibility, which competes with fringe financial services, and increased geographic 
convenience as these mechanisms are less costly than full-service outlets and therefore more can 
be provided within a community. And for those who are at ease with electronic machines this 
method of financial transactions might provide a less intimidating medium for their transactions 
than in-person transactions would. Also, savings are more likely as electronic transactions 
decrease the likelihood that a cheque will be cashed and promptly spent in its entirety. 
 
Alternatively, a negative aspect of electronic transactions would be that some individuals would 
likely feel intimidated by technological processes and may distrust the machines. Another 
dynamic is that the increasing abstraction of money has risk attached to it. When accessing 
money and credit no longer includes the physical transaction of cash but rather involves the 
abstraction of electronic exercises, the temptation and potential for many is to decrease caution 
which leads to the precipitated withdrawal of funds or perpetually mounting levels of debt. A 
potential compromise, which has been suggested by FCCU, is to use ATM cards rather than 
debit cards. The ATM cards would not be usable at retail outlets, only at ATM machines. This 
would maintain all the advantages of electronic transactions mentioned above while lessening the 
potential harmful dynamics of further “abstracting” money. Another drawback of electronic 
transactions is that it takes the person-to-person dynamic out of financial transactions. The social 
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aspect is already one that is increasingly being removed by our neo-liberal economy, so perhaps 
community-based economic development should not rush to use mechanisms that may further 
isolate people from each other. In addition to building community, person-to-person transactions 
facilitate education, financial counselling and planning, and provides the opportunity for 
emotional or other support for those in need. 
 
6.4.10    IDA, learn$ave, and Saving Circles - Winnipeg, Manitoba 
 
Model Summary 
The models presented to this point have been full-scale financial service initiatives or have at 
least been a program offered within the auspices of a significantly large financial institution. The 
following model does not fit this category, but is nevertheless worth mentioning as it addresses 
some of the root causes and conditions that contribute to individuals choosing to utilise the 
services of fringe financial outlets. Although one of the newer aspects of this initiative has 
reduced its length of time frame, the savings and education initiatives tend to address long-term 
financial health, knowledge, stability, and achievement.  
 
The Individual Development Accounts (IDA) are matched savings and financial management 
programs for low-income persons. The services are delivered through a SEED Winnipeg/ North 
End Community Ministry (NECM) partnership and the savings accounts and transactions are 
provided free of charge by the Assiniboine Credit Union (ACU). SEED Winnipeg is a CED 
micro-enterprise development and support organisation and NECM is a church-based, 
multifaceted community organisation. A Project Management Committee, composed of IDA 
staff and SEED/NECM executives, provides the decision making body for the IDAs. The 
Alternative Financial Services Coalition (AFSC), which acts in an advisory capacity, is a group 
consisting of community members, community agency representatives, and community 
development practitioners. 
 
Funding from federal and provincial departments, local foundations, and other non-profit 
organisations enables the IDA programs to match client savings at a rate of 3:1. Completion of a 
financial management course is a compulsory component of the savings programs during which 
one-to-one and peer group support is available for participants as well as child care if required. 
The accrued savings may be used for a variety of purposes such as housing, education, business 
ventures, or household items such as appliances and furniture. The four initiatives currently 
operating are learn$ave, Winnipeg IDA, Housing IDA, and Saving Circles. 
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Table 6.1   Asset Building Projects Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
learn$ave 
 
Winnipeg IDA 
 
Housing 
IDA 
 
Saving Circle 
 
Total 
 
Total Participants 
 
140 
 
33 
 
20 
 
28 
 
221 
 
Average Deposit 
 
$64/month 
 
$72/month 
 
$60/month 
 
$32/month 
 
NA 
 
Total Money Saved 
 
$33,550 
 
$39,704 
 
$903 
 
$3,415 
 
$73,262 
 
Total Match Earned 
 
$105,338 
 
$110,507 
 
$2,710 
 
$9,431 
 
$205,591 
 
Total Match Released 
(# of participants) 
 
$10,820  
(3 participants) 
 
$37,483 
(15 participants) 
 
$0 
 
$3,937 
(8 participants) 
 
$43,770 
(26 participants) 
Source: January 31st, 2003 (Simbandumwe 2003) 
 
learn$ave is a ten-site national demonstration project initiated by Social Enterprise Development 
Initiative (SEDI) and funded by Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) out of the 
Employment Insurance surplus. HRDC, not the Project Management Committee, makes most of 
the decisions regarding the learn$ave demonstration project. However, while HRDC initially 
hoped that the savings goals would be completely educational, they compromised with IDA staff 
and settled at 80% for education and 20% for micro-enterprise. The target demographic is 
individuals living below 120% of the Low Income Cut-Off (LICO). Winnipeg’s Project 
Management Committee additionally stated their aim of ensuring that 60% of the clients would 
be below 60% of LICO. The maximum that a participant is able to save through learn$ave is 
$1500, which is then matched by $4500 for a total of $6,000.  learn$ave began in the spring of 
2001 with a total capacity for 150 participants, the last of which have just recently been 
registered in March of 2003. The federal government will wait until these last participants have 
completed the demonstration project and withdrawn their saved and matching funds before 
evaluating the project and will then consider further involvement - a process that will take 
several years. Until then, no new learn$ave participants will be accepted. 
 
The Winnipeg IDA program actually preceded learn$ave, initiating participant recruitment in 
October of 2000, although it was done with the knowledge that learn$ave was imminent. It was 
initiated by the SEED/NECM partnership together with the ACU and AFSC. Funding was 
provided by the United Way, Thomas Sill Foundation, Winnipeg Foundation, and the provincial 
government. The savings focus was for personal education, children’s education, home purchase 
or renovation, and micro-enterprise. As with learn$ave, the income criteria was LICO, although 
they ensured that 60% of the participants were at less than 60% of LICO. 
 
When learn$ave began, the IDA staff channelled individuals wishing to save for education and 
micro-enterprise to that program. However, new participants wishing to save for housing projects 
were without a savings program as the Winnipeg IDA was full and learn$ave did not accept 
housing goals. As a result, in December of 2002, they received additional funding for a new 
Housing IDA program. Again, the income criteria was 120% of LICO with the goal of having 
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60% of the participants at lower than 60% of LICO. With the Housing IDA, however, the 
savings cap is $1,000 instead of $1,500. The hope was that the available money could be 
stretched to allow more people to participate while not detracting from the participant’s ability to 
finance their housing project upon program completion. 
 
One aspect of the IDA program that the administrators wished to address was that of 
accessibility. Some low-income individuals do not have the capacity to save significant amounts 
of money each month or save for such a long period of time. As well, some low-income 
individuals who desired participation in the program were not interested in housing, education, 
or micro-enterprise goals, but would rather pursue more practical and simple goals such as 
furniture, appliances, and medical devices. As a result, the Saving Circle program was 
established in the spring of 2001 with funding from the United Way and Investors Group. The 
3:1 matched saving ratio and the financial management training are the same as in the other IDA 
programs. However, the group sizes are smaller (5-8) than other IDA programs (12-15) in order 
to facilitate more interaction and a tighter peer support network. The participant’s income must 
be less than 60% of LICO, the savings period is shorter (6 months), and the maximum total 
saved is $160 for a matched total of $720. 
 
Analysis 
The IDA program is clearly a community-minded initiative with no financial profit consideration 
whatsoever as there is no income other than from grants and funding that cover costs and finance 
the matched savings. As such, however, the program is completely dependent and therefore 
vulnerable to government and community funding as well as to the in-kind contributions of 
agencies such as the NECM, SEED Winnipeg, and ACU. They do feel cautiously optimistic that 
additional funding from one of their current supporters will soon be secured for another five 
years and ACU has not indicated any desire to alter the current arrangement. However, the long-
term viability will always be dependent on subsidies and the program is therefore vulnerable to 
future economic and political changes.  
 
Another issue with a non-income service such as the IDAs is that they are only able to accept as 
many participants as the funding provides for. At present, for example, they have filled every 
available position and if a fully qualified individual applied now, they would be denied until 
further funding arrives. Participation interest is demonstrated by the fact that available spots have 
been filled without much advertising; most low-income individuals in Winnipeg have not yet 
heard about the IDA program. As IDA visibility increases, the demand will escalate as well. 
While the goal is to benefit the maximum number of people at any given time, it is unfortunate 
when needy and eligible individuals have to be turned away from the program.  
 
One strength of the IDA program in Winnipeg has been its ability to be creative and flexible in 
meeting the needs of present and potential participants. They have managed to meet the needs of 
those interested in housing even though learn$ave would not allow for this and they established 
the Saving Circles when they identified a needy and eligible demographic that was not being 
served by the current IDA programs. To this end, they continue to look at others who might not 
yet be served, such as people with disabilities, and are looking at setting up a new IDA or 
modifying existing programs to meet their needs as well. Another possibility is the establishment 
of satellite IDAs in other regions of Winnipeg to increase the opportunity for low-income 
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individuals to access the program across Winnipeg. Additionally, they continue to consider the 
need for additional saving targets such as the purchase of computers for children. 
 
Another testament to their creativity is the financial management curriculum and workbook that 
they developed. The workbook incorporates aspects of Aboriginal culture and spirituality and 
addresses budgeting, financial literacy, consumerism and consumer choices, fringe financial 
service costs, managing credit, and intelligent purchasing decisions among other topics. And to 
further improve on the curriculum, it is in the process of being revised to more adequately 
address the needs that are being observed through the educational process. The curriculum 
clearly has educational value as it has been adopted by up to ten other adult education 
organisations such as the Brandon Literacy Council and the John Howard Society. IDA staff feel 
that this financial management training component, combining education with one-to-one and 
peer support, is the strength of the IDA program. The importance of support is also demonstrated 
by the identification of the lack of formal after-care case management as a weakness of the IDA 
program.  
 
The IDA program does not address short-term financial service needs such as payday loans, 
cheque-cashing, pawnshop loans, and the like. However, it does address long-term and root 
issues such as access to bank accounts, familiarity with banking transactions, the discipline of 
savings, the lack of sufficient income to accumulate significant savings, individual and structural 
support, and improved money management skills. The IDA empowers the poor by placing 
money in the hands of those individuals in a structured manner that works at building skills and 
capacity while focussing on participant-set targeted goals. This facilitates their acquisition of 
education, housing, or a business venture and increases individual and community capacity. 
Participants of the IDA program report that they perceive their employability and 
saving/spending habits to be greatly improved upon completion of the program. 
 
While some might want to be critical of the IDAs as a handout for the poor, the financial benefit 
and incentive to save is not dissimilar to other savings incentives offered by the government 
which middle and high income earners are able to access such as RRSPs and RESPs. 
Additionally, the improved economic condition and increased personal capacity of low-income 
individuals makes this an investment that reduces poverty and truly embodies the tenets of CED.   
 
 
6.5    CONCLUSION 
 
As demonstrated, the models of alternatives to fringe financial services contain a wide range of 
CED perspectives and correspondingly seek to provide a wide range of services, although the 
ideological spectrum is primarily within the framework of reform CED. This may reflect the 
inescapably dominant nature of the market economy in modern society, particularly within the 
context of providing financial services. The models also reflect the conundrum of whether or not 
to create an initiative that is driven by a business model that, while not necessarily pursuing 
profits, involves a mandate of viability independent of subsidisation or dependence on 
community partners. The alternative being to create an initiative that is able to provide 
community services that are maximally accessible and most needed regardless of corresponding 
income and thereby requiring subsidisation that makes the initiative vulnerable to changes of 
economic resources and political will. 
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The experiences and analysis of North American models of alternatives to fringe financial 
services reveal several aspects that are worth drawing on when considering “best practices” by 
which to develop such models. Mobilising community participation is one aspect that is 
important both for business viability and for ensuring that the model is indeed meeting the needs 
of the people and community it is seeking to serve. Business viability is enhanced by higher 
transaction volumes when services fees are involved and service appropriateness is also 
enhanced by soliciting feedback from the community and providing them with the opportunity to 
determine the services provided and model structure. The mobilisation of the community, the 
appropriateness of the services, and the resulting feelings of community ownership will, in turn, 
increase participation and the likelihood of business viability.  
 
The role of the community also demonstrates the benefit of networking with other stakeholders. 
In addition to the community at large, community organisations are often well-rooted in the 
communities through established relationships, community understanding, and trust. This can be 
influential in the success and appropriateness of a model. Networking with various organisations 
can also bring diverse capacities and expertise into the model, and a network of service providers 
also has the potential to address community needs such as geographic convenience for services. 
Multiple stakeholders also spread the responsibility and risk for the model’s success to more than 
one lone entity. Networking with government can also bring additional and sometimes critical 
resources and expertise. However, dependency on government participation can also render a 
model vulnerable to funding alterations or termination.   
 
Regardless of the stakeholders involved, the presence of at least one stakeholder with 
considerable financial resources appears to be key to model viability. As previously mentioned, 
if this stakeholder is government, long-term viability may be tenuous. The preferred and most 
successful structure appears to include a financial institution with a credit union being the most 
likely given its community-oriented mandate. This type of stakeholder provides financial 
stability and depth for a model that may at times require subsidisation. It also provides 
managerial, technical, and  financial management and handling capacity and expertise that is 
integral to any alternative model to fringe financial services. A credit union is also more likely 
than a bank to be willing to operate or participate in a model that does not return profits in 
meeting community needs. This is not to say that a sound business plan is not needed. Indeed, 
long-term viability is enhanced greatly if the model is able to achieve self-sufficiency. However, 
particularly in the formative and early operational stages, such a model may not return the profits 
demanded by bank shareholders. Additionally, credit union participation would increase the 
likelihood that any realised profits would be reinvested in that community.  
 
Services provided would need to address both short-term and long-term needs. Short-term 
services would include affordable access to small amounts of credit and cheque-cashing as well 
as easy access to low-fee deposit accounts. Services should also integrate savings plans, financial 
literacy, and money management education in an effort to improve the economic conditions of 
the community in the long-term. The use of technology and “e-money” could be integrated, with 
caution for potential drawbacks, to make financial transactions more accessible, safe, and 
expedient. 
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Bank closures in low-income communities and the resultant increase in fringe financial services 
in those communities has led to the creation of alternative models to these institutions. Most such 
models are relatively new and they continue to learn, evaluate, and adapt as they proceed. 
However, the ability to effectively analyse their viability and community impact is thus limited. 
In the context of long-term community development and initiative viability, it is important to 
remember that a re-evaluation of these same models in a decade could and likely would bring 
different results and insights. Nevertheless, there is a clear need for such models but the 
challenge is to find the model that will work. Drawing on the aforementioned best practices 
provides some insight into potential strategies for success. However, beyond this is the reality 
that each community contains its own strengths and needs, its own leaders and organisations, its 
own laws and regulations, and its own history and culture that necessitate model development to 
be tailored to each particular community. These differences will impact the applicability and 
viability of any given model in any community outside of the one that it is in. Nevertheless, the 
need for alternatives has been repeatedly demonstrated, as has been the ability for communities 
to develop and implement dynamic and creative solutions to their financial service needs.  
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APPENDIX A:    INTERVIEWEE CONSENT FORMS 
 
Client Survey Consent Form 
 
I understand that the research team, under the supervision of Dr. Jerry Buckland and Dr. Thibault 
Martin, are undertaking a study of the use of high-interest financial institutions (pawnshops, 
cheque-cashing firms, etc.) and their use by the residents of Winnipeg’s North End.  I understand 
that my participation in this project is voluntary and, if I agree, it will involve the recording or 
the transcription of the interview. I understand that any time during the interview I may refuse to 
answer any number of questions, or I may request that the tape recorder be turned off or 
withdraw from the project entirely without prejudice or consequence. If I request that the 
interview not be recorded, I understand that the researchers will be taking notes. Participants will 
be compensated for childcare, travel and incidental costs at a rate of $20. 
 
I understand that the information I provide during the interview and survey materials will be held 
in strict confidence. Only the interviewers and the research supervisors (Dr. Jerry Buckland and 
Dr. Thibault Martin) will have access to the information. Confidentiality and anonymity will be 
maintained at every stage of the research and in the publication of the results. Interview materials 
will be kept in strict confidence in the offices of the researchers. Once the survey will be 
completed the interview materials will be stored and locked in a secure place at Menno Simons 
College or the University of Winnipeg. 
 
I understand that the purpose of the research is to assist in the understanding of the use of non-
conventional credit institutions. I understand that to participate in this survey I must be at least 
18 years of age. I understand what my participation will involve and that reports and subsequent 
publications will arise out of this research. I give permission to the researchers to use the content 
of our interview for research purposes, academic publications and conferences. I understand that 
my words might be quoted in the research report and in some academic publications. Should I 
have any questions concerning the nature or the legitimacy of the research, I am free to contact 
the research supervisors, Dr. Jerry Buckland at (204) 786-9171, Dr. Thibault Martin at (204) 
786-9187 or Professor Michael Weinrath, Chair of the Ethical committee of the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Winnipeg (204) 786-9364 or to contact Dr. Laura Sokal, Chair of 
the Senate Committee on Ethics in Human Research and Scholarship (204) 786-9915. Copies of 
the final report will be made available to the public. One copy of the report will be send to the 
North End Community Renewal Corporation and one other will be made available at The 
University of Winnipeg’s library.  
____________________  _____________________  ______________ 
Name of Participant   Signature of Participant   Date 
____________________  _____________________  ______________ 
Name of Researcher   Signature of Researcher   Date 
____________________  _____________________  ______________ 
Name of Researcher   Signature of Researcher   Date 
____________________  _____________________  ______________ 
Name of Research Supervisor  Signature of Research Supervisor Date 
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Key Informant Interviewee Consent Form 
 
I understand that the research team, under the supervision of Dr. Jerry Buckland and Dr. Thibault 
Martin, are undertaking a study of the use of high-interest financial institutions (pawnshops, 
cheque-cashing firms, etc.) and their use by the residents of Winnipeg’s north end.  I understand 
that my participation in this project is voluntary and, if I agree, it will involve the recording or 
the transcription of the interview.  I understand that any time during the interview I may refuse to 
answer any number of questions, or I may request that the tape recorder be turned off or 
withdraw from the project entirely without prejudice or consequence.  If I request that the 
interview not be recorded, I understand that the researchers will be taking notes.  
 
I understand that the information I provide during the interview and survey materials will be held 
in strict confidence. Only the interviewers and the research supervisors (Dr. Jerry Buckland and 
Dr. Thibault Martin) will have access to the information.  Confidentiality and anonymity will be 
maintained at every stage of the research and in the publication of the results. Interview materials 
will be kept in strict confidence in the offices of the researchers. Once the survey will be 
completed the interview materials will be stored and locked in a secure place at Menno Simons 
College or the University of Winnipeg. 
 
I understand that the purpose of the research is to assist in the understanding of the use of non-
conventional credit institutions.  I understand that to participate in this survey I must be at least 
18 years of age. I understand what my participation will involve and that reports and subsequent 
publications will arise out of this research.  I give permission to the researchers to use the content 
of our interview for research purposes, academic publications and conferences. I understand that 
my words might be quoted in the research report and in some academic publications. Should I 
have any questions concerning the nature or the legitimacy of the research, I am free to contact 
the research supervisors, Dr. Jerry Buckland at (204) 786-9171, Dr. Thibault Martin at (204) 
786-9187 or Professor Michael Weinrath, Chair of the Ethical committee of the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Winnipeg (204) 786-9364 or to contact Dr. Laura Sokal, Chair of 
the Senate Committee on Ethics in Human Research and Scholarship (204) 786-9915.  Copies of 
the final report will be made available to the public. One copy of the report will be send to the 
North End Community Renewal Corporation and one other will be made available at The 
University of Winnipeg’s library.  
 
____________________  _____________________  ______________ 
Name of Participant   Signature of Participant   Date 
 
____________________  _____________________  ______________ 
Name of Researcher   Signature of Researcher   Date 
 
____________________  _____________________  ______________ 
Name of Researcher   Signature of Researcher   Date 
 
____________________  _____________________  ______________ 
Name of Research Supervisor Signature of Research Supervisor  Date 
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APPENDIX B:    INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
CLIENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Name, postal code and telephone number of interviewee: 
 
 
Interview Code (Date/Interviewers/Interview #[e.g., Sep. 11; Jerry & Thibault; #1 = 911J&T1]): 
 
 
Client Questionnaire 
[Interviewer: explain this:] Introduce the research project to the interviewee: We are currently 
conducting research concerning the existence and the prospect of high-interest financial services 
in the Winnipeg's North End.  For the purpose of this research, high-interest financial services 
refer to: credit through local stores and/or bars, pawnshops, rent-to-owns, check cashing 
businesses, tax preparation facilities and household finance. Throughout the course of this 
interview, I will be asking you to describe your experience with each of these high-interest 
financial services. Questions will also be asked in regards to your experiences with financial 
institution such as banks and credit unions. Through these questions we are hoping to gain 
information about your financial needs and the potential for the development of alternative 
financial services 
       Then read/walk through the consent form with the interviewee. Have all members of the 
interview sign two(2) copies of the form. Give one copy to the interviewee. 
       I would like to thank you in advance for your participation and valuable insight into this 
matter. 
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Client Questionnaire 
Section I. Demographic Characteristics 
[I would like to start by asking you some general questions about where you live, your age, 
education, occupation and financial situation.  These questions will allow me to get to know you 
better as well as provide some valuable information that will be used in our study.] 
 
1) Interview Code: 
 
2) Are you currently a resident of the North End in Winnipeg? 
 
3) How long have you been a resident in this area? 
 
4) Where did you live before? 
 
5) How long did you live there? 
 
6) (Observation) Gender? 
 
7) What was your age on your last birthday? 
  
8) What would you define as your racial/ethnic background? 
 
9) What is your current level of education? 
 
10) Do you have a partner?  
 a) How long have you been involved? 
 b) What type of relationship is it? [boy/girl friend, common law, married] 
  
11) How many people are living with you? 
 
12) Are there any dependants living in the household? [children, elderly, disabled] 
 
12) How would you describe your current residence? [rented, owned, other] 
 
13) How long have you lived there? 
 
14) How many people in the household share the financial responsibilities? [rent, food, bills]  
 
16) Are you employed? 
 a) What type of job is it? 
 b) Would you describe it as full-time, part-time, casual, or self-employment? 
 c) How long have you been working there? 
 
17) Are you unemployed? 
 a) How do you support yourself financially at the present time? [CPP, social assistance, 
employment insurance, long term or short term disability] 
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18) What is your approximate average personal gross income? 
 a) less than $10,000  
 b) $10,000-20,000  
 c) $20-25,000  
 d) $25-30,000  
 d) $30-35,000  
 e) $35-40,000  
 f) $40-50,000  
  g) more than $50,000  
 
19) Are you able to save some money from  each paycheque (or each month or over the year)? 
  
 20) Do you have any investments/assets? Please list. [bank savings, RRSP, pension plan, stocks, 
bonds, home, car, property, jewellery, vehicles, business] 
  
 a) What is the total value of these investments/assets? 
  
 b) Is there anything owing on any of your investments/assets and how much? 
 
 c) How long have you owned these investment/assets? 
 
 
Section II. Mainstream Institutional Financial Services 
[The following questions deal with your participation in mainstream institutional sources of 
financial services, i.e., banks, credit unions and credit cards.] 
 
21) Do have a deposit account at a bank or credit union? 
  
  a) What type(s) of account(s) do you have? [savings, checking] 
  
 b) How long have you had the account(s)? 
 
c) How often do you use the account(s)? [per month, per year] 
 
 d) What do you use the account(s) for? 
 
 e) How do you access the account(s)? [ATM, in-person, telephone, computer] 
 
f) What is (are) the name(s) and location(s) of the bank or credit union that you have the 
account(s) with? [North End, downtown] 
 
g) Are you aware of the service fees, interest or pricing packages on the                  
account(s)? [Ask details to check] 
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22) Have bank closures in your neighbourhood made it more difficult for you to maintain a 
deposit account or stopped you from opening an account? 
 
23) Do you have a loan at a bank or credit union?  
  a) How many loans do you have? 
 
 b) What did you need the loan(s) for? 
 
c) How often do you make payments on the loan(s)? [daily, weekly, monthly, yearly] 
 
d) What is the interest rate charged on the loan(s)? 
 
e) What is the repayment period for the loan(s)? 
 
f) What is the value of the loan(s)? 
 
g) What are the name(s) and location(s) of the bank or credit union that you have the 
loan(s) with? [North End, downtown] 
 
24) Do you have a mortgage at a bank or credit union?  
 a) How many mortgages do you have? 
 
 b) What did you need the mortgage(s) for? 
 
c) How often do you make payments on the mortgage(s)? [daily, weekly, monthly, 
yearly] 
 
d) What is the interest rate charged on the mortgage(s)? 
 
e) What is the repayment period for the mortgage(s)? 
 
f) What is the total value of the mortgage(s)? 
 
g) What is the remaining principal owed to the bank? 
 
h) What are the name(s) and location(s) of the bank or credit union that you have the 
mortgage(s) with? [North End, downtown] 
 
25) Do you have any credit cards through either a financial institution or some other institution? 
[Visa, Zellers, Canadian Tire]  
 a) How many cards do you have? 
 
 b) What type(s) of card(s) do you have? [Royal Bank Visa, Canadian Tire] 
 
c) What do you use the card(s) for? [food, clothing, bills, emergencies, extra spending 
money/entertainment] 
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d) How often do you use the card(s)? [daily, weekly, monthly, yearly] 
 
 e) How much is owing on the card(s)? 
 
 f) What is your credit limit? 
 
 g) How much is the interest rate on the card(s)? 
 
26) Are there any other types of financial services that you use from a financial institution such 
as a bank or a credit union? [If yes, describe in detail] 
 
[If you are not currently using a bank or credit union] 
27) Have you ever used a financial institute such as a bank or credit union? 
 a) When did you last use a bank or credit union? 
 
 b) What type of services did you use? 
 
 c) How long did you use the bank or credit union? 
 
 d) Where was the bank or credit union located? 
 
e) Why do you no longer use the bank or credit union? 
 
f) Would you like to have access to the services provided by a bank or credit union? 
 
g) If there was a bank or credit union in your neighbourhood (within 3-4 blocks), would 
you use it? 
 
 h) Which services would you like to use? [bank accounts, loans, credit cards] 
 
[If you have never used a financial institution such as a bank or credit union] 
28) Why have you not used a financial institution such as a bank or credit union?  
 a) Would you like to use the services provided by a bank or credit union? 
 
 b) Which services would you like to use? [bank accounts, loans, credit cards] 
 
c) If there was a bank or credit union in your neighbourhood (within 3-4 blocks), would you 
use it? 
 
Section III. Family/Friend and Moneylender Financial Services 
[The following questions deal with your participation in family/friend and moneylender sources 
of financial services. For newcomers to the North End ask these questions for two periods: 
now and in their old community.] 
 
29) Do you borrow money from your family or friends? 
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a) How often do you borrow money from family or friends? [per month, per year] 
 
b) From how many different people do you borrow money? 
 
c) Do you currently have any outstanding loans from family/relatives? How many? What 
are the value of these loans? 
 
 d) Why do you borrow money from family/friends (as opposed to other sources)? 
 
 e) Have there been periods in your live when you could not get these loans? 
 
 f) When these loans are not available, what other alternatives do you have? 
 
 g) What is the typical amount of money you borrow from the family/friends?  
  
h) What do you use the money for? [food, clothing, bills, emergencies, extra spending 
money/entertainment] 
 
i) What are the terms of these loans? [interest rate or amount, timeline, complete or 
partial repayment, in-kind repayment] 
 
j) Do you expect family/friends that lend you money will expect you to loan them money 
in the future? 
 
30) Do you loan money to your family or friends?  
 [If yes] 
a) How many times did you lend money to a family/friends? [per month, per year] 
 
 b) Do you currently have any outstanding loans to family/relatives? How many? What 
are the value of these loans? 
 
 c) Why do you loan money to family/friends? [repaying a favour, being helpful] 
 
d) What was the total amount of the money you loaned to the family/friends? 
 
e) What do your family/friends use the money for? [food, clothing, bills, emergencies, 
extra spending money/entertainment] 
 
f) Under what conditions was the money loaned? [interest rate or amount, timeline, 
complete or partial repayment, in-kind repayment] 
  
31) Are you aware of people in the community who lend on an informal basis such as 
moneylenders? 
 
31) Do you borrow money from a moneylender?  
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 [If  yes] 
a) How many times have you borrowed money from moneylenders in the last month? In 
the last year? What was the value of these loans? 
 
 b) Why do you borrow money from moneylenders as opposed to other sources? 
 
 c) What are the terms of these loans? [interest rate or amount, repayment time]  
 
d) What is the total amount of money you owe a moneylender right now? 
 
e) What do you use the money for? [food, clothing, bills, emergencies, extra spending 
money/entertainment] 
 
33) [If no to above] Why don't you borrow money from community moneylenders? 
 
Section IV. High-interest Banking 
[The following questions deal with your usage of the high-interest banking in the North End such 
as local stores and or bars, pawnshops, rent-to-owns, check-cashing businesses, tax preparation 
facilities and household finance.] 
 
34) Do have credit (or a credit line or a ‘tab’) with a store or bar? 
 a) What store(s) or bar(s) do you have credit with? [location] 
 
 b) How often do you use you credit at these places? [per month, per year] 
 
 c) What do you typically purchase with the credit? 
  
 d) What is the present total credit outstanding in these places? 
 
e) What are the terms of credit from the store/bar? [interest rate, fees charged, repayment 
period] 
 
  f) Why do you have credit with a store or bar as opposed to other options? 
 
 g) How do you feel about the service fees charged by the store/ bar? [satisfied, 
dissatisfied] 
 
35) Do you cash cheques at a store/bar? 
 a) Name and location: 
 
 b) What are the terms of the cheque-cashing? [type of cheque, cash limit, fees] 
 
 c) Do you have a long-term relationship with that store/bar? 
 
36) Do you pawn items at pawnshops?  
 a) How often do you pawn items? [per month, per year] 
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 b) Do you have any items pawned at present? 
  
 c) What are the items you have pawned? 
  
 d) How much money did you receive for each item? 
 
 e) Did you haggle/bargain with the shop owner to get the price you wanted? 
  
 f) Did the haggling/bargaining raise the value of the item? By how much (%)? 
  
g) What was the money used for? [food, clothing, bills, emergencies, extra spending 
money/entertainment] 
 
h) As best you can, explain the terms of the pawn. [interest rate, other fees, maturity 
period, grace period]  
 
 i) Is the interest rate you were charged within the legal limit? 
 
 j) What is the name and location of the pawnshop? 
 
 k) Did you re-claim the item(s)? 
  
[If you reclaimed the item] 
 l) How do you feel about the interest rate charged or the cost to reclaim the item? 
[satisfied, dissatisfied] 
 
m) Why did you use pawnshops as opposed to other financial service firms or 
family/friends? 
 
[If you did not reclaim the item] 
n) When the item was sold, did the pawnshop refund you the difference between the loan 
you received and the price they received for the item? 
 
[If you did not pawn items] 
37) Why do you not use pawnshops to pawn items? 
 
[All respondents] 
38) Do you purchase additional items at the pawnshop?  
 
 a) How many items do you purchase from pawnshops? [per month, per year] 
  
 b) What are some of the items purchased? 
 
 c) What was the cost of each of these items? 
  
 d) Why do you purchase items from a pawnshop? 
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 e) Do you worry that some of the pawn shop goods may be stolen? 
 
[If you do not purchase items from a pawnshop] 
39) Why do you not use pawnshops to purchase items? 
 
[For all respondents] 
40) Without mentioning names of people or businesses, are you aware of illegal transactions 
taking place through/at pawnshops? 
  ______ YES _______ NO 
 
41) [If yes] 
  
 What type of illegal activities? 
  _______ Sale of Stolen Goods 
 
  _______ Other, Specify: _______________ 
 
42) Do you use rent-to-own services?  
 
 [If yes] 
 
 a) Name and location of rent-to-own shop: 
 
 b) What are the items you are or have rented-to-own? 
 
 c) How many items do you rent-to-own? [per month, per year] 
 
 d) Do you know the interest rate or other fees charged for this service? 
 
 e) Describe the value of the good, the monthly fees and the payback period. 
 
g) Why do you participate in rent-to-own plans as opposed to buying used, or new, or 
taking out a loan? 
 
h) How do you feel about the cost of renting items to own them? [satisfied, dissatisfied] 
 
[If you do not use rent-to-owns] 
43) Why don't you use rent-to-owns? 
 
44) Do you use check-cashing services through firms such as Money Mart, Money Now, and 
Financial Stop? 
 
a) What type of services do you use? [cash checks, payday advances/loans, money orders, 
money transfers] 
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 b) How often do you use these check-cashing facilities? [per month, per year] 
 
c) Why do you use check-cashing facilities instead of banks/credit unions or 
friends/family? 
 
d) What is the amount of money you cashed, borrowed or transferred? What is the 
interest rate and what are the other fees applied to this service? When do you have to 
repay the payday loan?  
 
 e) Have you ever renewed a payday loan? 
 
 f) What is the money typically used for? 
 (food, clothing, bills, emergencies, extra spending money/entertainment) 
 
[If you do not use these services] 
45) Why don't you use check-cashing services?  
 
46) Do you use a tax preparation/quick refund service offered by firms such as H&R Block or 
Financial Stop?  
 
a) What services did they provide you with? [preparation of tax return, quick refund] 
 
 b) How often have you used these services?  
 
 c) What is the name and location of the firm? 
 
d) Can you explain the costs (interest rates, fees) and benefits (value of refund, how much 
earlier did you receive the refund) of this service? 
 
 e) Why do you use tax preparation/quick refund services? 
 
f) How do you feel about the fee/interest that these facilities charge? [satisfied, 
dissatisfied] 
 
[If you do not use this service] 
47) Why don't you use tax preparation/quick refund services? 
 
48) Do you use the services of other financing firms such as household finance through H&R 
Block?  
 
 a) How often do you use these financing firms? [per month, per year] 
 
 b) What services do they provide you with? 
 
c) Can you explain the costs (interest rates, fees) and benefits of this service. 
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d) What did you use the money for? [food, clothing, bills, emergencies, extra spending 
money/entertainment] 
 
e) Why do you use household financing companies as opposed to other financial service 
firms like banks/credit unions? 
 
f) How do you feel about the interest rates and fees that they charge? [satisfied, 
dissatisfied] 
 
[If you do not use these firms’ services] 
49)  Why don't you use financing firms? 
 
[For all respondents] 
50) Are there any other high-interest-banking facilities that you use? If yes, describe in detail 
your dealing with this high-interest facility. 
 
51) Do you think that the fees and interest rates for these high interest services (pawnshops, etc.) 
were clearly posted and understandable?  
 
52) Did you find that there were there ‘hidden’ fees or costs? If yes, explain. 
 
53) Do you think that the fees and interest rates for high interest services (pawnshops, etc.) are 
equivalent to those charged at banks/credit unions? 
 
54) In general what is your perception of high-interest financial services? [satisfied, dissatisfied] 
 
Section V.  Alternatives Financial Services 
[Up until this point in the survey, the focus has been on the effectiveness of financial services 
provided by informal, mainstream and high-interest firms. The focus will now shift to exploring 
what you would like to see in the future in terms of financial service firms in the North End.] 
 
55) In your opinion, what do you think of the financial services (informal, mainstream and high-
interest) currently existing in your community? [satisfied, dissatisfied] 
 
56) What kinds of financial services or institution/organisation would you like to see in the 
community? [informal, high-interest, mainstream] 
 
57) Are you aware of community-based programmes such as Individual Development Accounts 
(Savings Circles, learn$ave, Housing IDA), Seed Winnipeg (business training and loans), 
North End Housing Project (rent-to-own houses), or the PATH Centre? 
 
58) [If yes] Do you or have you used these services?  
 
 [If yes,] 
 a) How often do you use this service? [per month, per year] 
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b) [If applicable] How much have you borrowed and on what terms? [interest rate and other 
fees, maturity period] 
 
  c) What is your evaluation of this service? [satisfactory, dissatisfactory] 
 
  d) Will you use the service again? 
 
  e) What would make this service more attractive to you and the community? 
 
[If you do not use these services] 
59) Why don't you use these services?  
 
[For all respondents] 
60) Are you interested in learning more about these services? Why or why not?  
 
61) If a community-based alternative firm were to come into your neighbourhood, what 
service(s) would be most important for you?  (cashing checks, accessing loans, financial 
planning)  
 
62) If the establishment of a bank is unlikely, would you be willing to help with a community 
alternative project through personal use, promotion within the community, volunteering 
personal time to assist the program, or buying shares in a community initiative such as a co-
operative financial services centre? 
 
63) Are you interested in participating in a follow-up focus group discussion for this research 
project?  
 
64) This completes our survey, is there any other information you would like to tell us about 
anything we have covered? 
  
 If you are interested the final report will be available here at the office, and at the 
University of Winnipeg. 
 
 [Thank-you for your co-operation in this interview.] 
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Key Informant Schedule of Questions 
[Interviewer: explain this:] We are currently conducting research concerning the existence and 
the prospect of financial services in the Winnipeg’s North End. For the purpose of this research, 
financial services refer to, credit through local stores and or bars, pawnshops, rent-to-owns, 
check-cashing businesses, tax preparation facilities, money order/money transfer outlets, payday 
loans and household finance. Throughout the course of this interview, I will be asking you to 
describe your experience with each of these financial services. Questions will also be asked in 
regards to your experiences with financial institution such as banks and credit unions. Through 
these questions we are hoping to gain information about your financial needs and the potential 
for the development of alternative financial services. 
 Then read/walk through the consent form with the interviewee. Have all members of the 
interview sign two (2) copies of the form. Give one copy to the interviewee. 
 I would like to thank you in advance for your participation and valuable insight into this 
matter. 
 
Section I. Background Information 
1) Name, postal code and telephone of interviewee: [This information will be kept confidential 
and used if a follow-up focus group discussion is necessary: Are you interested in 
participating in a follow-up focus group discussion? _______]: 
 
 
2) Work place: 
 
 
3) Employment designation: 
 
 
4) Describe your role in the context of Winnipeg’s North End or inner-city economy. 
 
 
5) Interview Code [Date/Interviewer/Interview, e.g., Sep. 11; Jerry & Brendan; #1 = 911J&B1]: 
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Section II. Financial Services and Firms 
6) Interview Code: 
 
7) List the firms, services and rules/costs of the financial sector that you are aware of as 
follows, 
 
a) List the financial firms and services available in the North End. [pawnshop, cheque-
cashing, retailers with rent-to-own, payday loans, financing company, retail 
stores/bars providing credit, money orders, money transfers, moneylenders, 
friends/relatives] 
 
b) Explain the types, rules and client costs associated with the different financial 
services available through financial service firms. [provide sufficient detail to 
determine annualised interest rate, including timing, fees and interest rate] 
 
8) In your opinion, do financial services and firms ‘gouge’ their clients? Why or why not? 
 
9) In your opinion, do you think these firms contribute to the North End economy more 
generally? 
 
10) Why do you think people use these services? 
 
11) What are the typical characteristics of clients of these firms? [ethnicity, gender, income, 
education, long-standing residents or recent migrants, people with extended family 
networks or people without] 
 
12) Do you think these firms are engaged in any illegal market services? 
 
[If yes] 
 
a) What type of illegal services? 
 
b) Do these illegal services contribute a large share to the firms’ business? 
 
13) [For pawnshops] Do clients ‘haggle’ for the price?  
 
a) How many of your clients haggle (%)? 
 
14) What are your perceptions of the general market dynamics of the financial service 
firms in Winnipeg’s North End?  
 
a) Are these firms growing or declining in numbers?  
 
b) Are there particular types of firms or services that are growing? [pawnshops are a 
traditional way of providing credit to high-risk clients, whereas cheque-cashing 
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firms are relatively new. Have these firms faced similar market dynamics in the last 
10-20 years?] 
 
c) [If yes to the above] Please list growing and/or declining firms or services. 
 
d) Do you think the market dynamics you have described for the north end are 
comparable to other parts of Winnipeg, inner-city and suburbs? 
 
15) What are your perceptions of the general market dynamics of mainstream financial 
services, banks and credit unions in the North End? 
 
16) How do you explain the market dynamics you have described? [inner-city under-
funding, insecurity issues, city policy re peri- and sub-urban real estate, growing 
poverty and inequality, government cutbacks] 
 
17) Please provide us with estimates of the costs and profits of providing financial services. 
 
18) Why do these firms offer these services? [they are profitable; they are used as a ‘front’ 
for, or in combination with, other services; tradition] 
 
19) What government (city, provincial and federal) policies apply to the financial services? 
 
a) Are these policies enforced? 
 
 
Section III. Community and Policy Alternatives 
20) What financial services are presently being offered by community agencies in the North 
End? 
 
a) Do you think these services are successful in terms of impact and viability? Why or 
why not? 
 
b) What are the obstacles to their further success? 
 
c) Do they foster community development? 
 
21) Do you think that community agencies should explore further participation in the 
provision of financial services in the North End? 
 
a) In so doing do you think these organisations are fostering community development? 
 
22) What other kinds of activities should community agencies be involved with? [education, 
advocacy with government] 
 
23) Do you think a community-based agency could offer financial services in an efficient 
and competitive manner? 
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a) Why or why not? 
 
b) What services could the community-based agency offer? [community-based 
pawnshop or cheque-cashing firm, education about the costs and alternatives to 
financial services] 
 
c) How would the community-based agency design such a programme? 
 
d) How would the community-based agency minimise its costs in order to keep interest 
rates and fees low? 
 
24) What city, provincial or federal government policies are central to improving the 
quality of financial services available to north end residents? 
 
a) What policies constrain a community agency from fair participation in the financial 
sector? [lack of control of monopoly, licensing] 
 
b) What policies are absent or poorly enforced allowing for unfair treatment of North 
End residents? [lack of enforcement, posted complaint line, interest rate ceilings, 
minimum number of fees allowed per transaction, clearly visible and simple fees 
posted at outlet and on tickets/receipts, surplus return, minimum maturity length 
and grace period, mandatory submission of an annual report to be used in annual 
industry report ] 
 
25) Finally, do you know of other key-informants, data/statistics or other resources that will 
help us in this project? [community development, bank/credit union, 
government/policy, financial service firms, other research] 
 
[Thank-you for your co-operation in this interview.] 
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Key Informant Schedule of Questions: Mainstream Banks 
[Interviewer: explain this:] We are currently conducting research concerning the existence and 
the prospect of financial services in the Winnipeg’s North End. For the purpose of this research, 
financial services refer to, credit through local stores and or bars, pawnshops, rent-to-owns, 
check-cashing businesses, tax preparation facilities, money order/money transfer outlets, payday 
loans and household finance. Throughout the course of this interview, I will be asking you to 
describe your experience with each of these financial services. Questions will also be asked in 
regards to your experiences with financial institution such as banks and credit unions. Through 
these questions we are hoping to gain information about your financial needs and the potential 
for the development of alternative financial services. 
 Then read/walk through the consent form with the interviewee. Have all members of the 
interview sign two (2) copies of the form. Give one copy to the interviewee. 
 I would like to thank you in advance for your participation and valuable insight into this 
matter. 
 
Section I. Background Information 
1) Name, postal code and telephone of interviewee: [This information will be kept confidential 
and used if a follow-up focus group discussion is necessary: Are you interested in 
participating in a follow-up focus group discussion? _______]: 
 
 
2) Work place: 
 
 
3) Employment designation: 
 
 
4) Describe your role in the context of Winnipeg’s North End or inner-city economy. 
 
 
5) Interview Code [Date/Interviewer/Interview, e.g., Sep. 11; Jerry & Brendan; #1 = 911J&B1]: 
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Market Dynamics  
Since 1995 nine bank branches have been closed in Winnipeg’s North End. Two of these 
closures were Toronto-Dominion Banks (Redwood and Main branch in 1995 and Inkster and 
McPhillips in 1998).  
 
6) Interview Code: 
 
7) Why do you think banks in general are closing branches in Winnipeg’s North End? 
 
8) Why did your bank close these branches? 
 
9) Are these reasons unique to Winnipeg’s North End and inner-city neighbourhoods or are the 
reasons similar to closures in more affluent neighbourhoods? 
 
10) What roles do new technologies such as automated teller machines (ATMs) and the Internet 
play in branch closures and locations in general? 
 
11) Can you explain the factors that are taken into account when making a decision to close a 
branch?  
 
12) We assume that low-income people in Winnipeg’s North End are more dependent on public 
transportation than middle- and upper-income people in other parts of the city. This makes 
them less mobile. They are also less frequent users of computer-based technologies like the 
Internet. Does your Bank consider mobility and technology use of area clients as factors to 
determine if an inner-city neighbourhood Bank branch should be closed? 
 
13) Does your bank offer and advertise a low-fee account to their clients? Do you think this 
option reaches people with low incomes and poor access to transportation? 
 
Growth of Fringe Financial Services 
14) In Winnipeg’s North End, and more broadly in Winnipeg and across North America there 
has been a growth in the number of cheque-cashing and payday loan firms. These firms 
provide some financial services that banks offer. What do you think about this change in the 
financial services market?  
 
15) Do you think these new firms compete with your services or complement them? 
 
16) Do you think that the clients of these firms would be better served at a bank? Why or why 
not? 
 
17) Does your Bank provide cheque-clearing services or credit to cheque-cashing firms or 
payday loan firms in Winnipeg or elsewhere in Canada? 
 
[Thank-you for your assistance with these questions] 
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Key Informant Schedule of Questions: Cheque Cashing Firms 
[Interviewer: explain this:] We are currently conducting research concerning the existence and 
the prospect of financial services in the Winnipeg’s North End. For the purpose of this research, 
financial services refer to, credit through local stores and or bars, pawnshops, rent-to-owns, 
check-cashing businesses, tax preparation facilities, money order/money transfer outlets, payday 
loans and household finance. Throughout the course of this interview, I will be asking you to 
describe your experience with each of these financial services. Questions will also be asked in 
regards to your experiences with financial institution such as banks and credit unions. Through 
these questions we are hoping to gain information about your financial needs and the potential 
for the development of alternative financial services. 
 Then read/walk through the consent form with the interviewee. Have all members of the 
interview sign two (2) copies of the form. Give one copy to the interviewee. 
 I would like to thank you in advance for your participation and valuable insight into this 
matter. 
 
Section I. Background Information 
1) Name, postal code and telephone of interviewee: [This information will be kept confidential 
and used if a follow-up focus group discussion is necessary: Are you interested in 
participating in a follow-up focus group discussion? _______]: 
 
 
2) Work place: 
 
 
3) Employment designation: 
 
 
4) Describe your role in the context of Winnipeg’s North End or inner-city economy. 
 
 
5) Interview Code [Date/Interviewer/Interview, e.g., Sep. 11; Jerry & Brendan; #1 = 911J&B1]: 
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6) Interview Code: 
 
7) Please describe the financial services that you provide. 
 
8) What are the costs of these services to the client? 
 
9) How many outlets do you presently have in Canada? In Winnipeg? 
 
10) Can you provide data on the number of outlets you have had for each of the last twenty 
(20) years in Canada and in Winnipeg. 
 
11) In your opinion, do these financial services and firms ‘gouge’ their clients? Why or why 
not? 
 
12) In your opinion, do you think these financial services contribute to the North End 
economy more generally? 
 
13) Why do you think people use these services? 
 
14) What are the typical characteristics of clients of these (your) firms? [ethnicity, gender, 
income, education, long-standing residents or recent migrants, people with extended 
family networks or people without] 
 
15) What are your perceptions of the general market dynamics of the cheque-cashing 
industry in Winnipeg’s North End?  In Winnipeg in general? In middle-income versus 
low-income communities? In Canada in general? 
 
16) Are these firms growing or declining in numbers?  
 
17) What are your perceptions of the general market dynamics of mainstream financial 
services, banks and credit unions, in the North End? 
 
18) How do you explain the market dynamics you have described? [inner-city under-
funding, insecurity issues, city policy re peri- and sub-urban real estate, growing 
poverty and inequality, government cutbacks] 
 
19) Please provide us with estimates of the costs and profits of providing high-interest 
financial services.  
 
20) Are your income statements publicly available? 
 
21) What are your principal sources of financial capital? 
 
22) What government (city, provincial and federal) policies apply to the high-interest 
financial services? 
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23) Are these policies enforced? 
 
 
Section III. Community and Policy Alternatives 
24) Do you think that cheque-cashing firms foster community development? 
 
25) Do you think that community, non-profit organisations should offer these services? 
Why or why not? 
 
26) Are you aware of pending provincial government legislation related to ‘Disclosure of 
Cost of Borrowing’? 
 
27) Do you agree or disagree with this legislation? Why? 
 
28) Finally, do you know of other key-informants, data/statistics or other resources that will 
help us in this project? [community development, bank/credit union, 
government/policy, high interest firms, other research] 
 
[Thank-you for your co-operation in this interview.] 
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APPENDIX C:    REPORT ON FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
Report on Focus Group # 1: Community-oriented Key Informants 
27 February 2003 
 
The goal of this focus group was to determine what services and models were necessary and possibly 
feasible in the realm of alternatives to fringe financial services in Winnipeg's North End. The group 
consisted of community development practitioners from the North End. The facilitators were as follows: 
Nancy Barber, Jerry Buckland (lead facilitator), and Brendan Reimer. This report summarises key points 
raised during the discussion. 
 
Important Values and Concepts 
The values and concepts articulated by the key informants as being integral to any service and model 
included a holistic vision for community health (environmental, social, economic, and political). Services 
should increase community and individual independence, self-confidence, and should be done in a way 
that reduces the fear that many users have of utilising financial services such as banks. This would mean 
working with the client as opposed to creating solution for the client - involving the person in the process. 
Clients and service providers should feel safe and respected, with the safety of seniors being of particular 
concern. Also important would be other client concerns including convenience and cost factors. There 
should also be an anti-poverty and counter-consumerism education and advocacy component targeted at 
both low-income people and those with money and decision-making capacities. 
 
Services 
Identified service needs included traditional banking services such as cheque-cashing (without a five day 
hold period) and small loans, both of which would provide an alternative to fringe financial services such 
as pawnshops and cheque-cashing outlets and perhaps also to rent-to-owns and payday lenders. As not 
everyone has a satisfactory credit rating, there should be a mechanism by which individuals are able to 
prove themselves and build up a favourable credit rating, perhaps through some sort of initial pawn 
transaction or some other such mechanism that would allow them to earn a good credit record while 
minimising the risk to an organisation. Services offered should also include mechanisms for savings such 
as deposit accounts and matched savings programs such as the IDAs, or even a mechanism whereby those 
paying off loans would also pay into an accumulating savings account simultaneously. Community 
ownership and/or community investment options and mechanisms should also be integrated into the 
services. There should also be crisis counselling available for those who find themselves in a financial 
crisis and need someone to talk to or assistance in figuring out a short-term plan. Counselling/education 
services should also be offered to individuals seeking to improve their financial literacy and money 
management skills which would include topics such as budgeting, understanding credit concepts, working 
with creditors, and developing the capacity to make regular credit payments. It was also mentioned that 
existing peer support and networks should be utilised and taken advantage of, perhaps by capitalising on 
informal family borrowing, or by establishing a consumer credit circle. As well, services should include 
advocacy and education to bring awareness of CED to the broader community. Finally, services should 
address the needs of businesses in the North End that may include financing, accounts, credit card 
processing, and technical/financial support and expertise.  
 
Delivery Mechanism 
Key informants felt that the preferred delivery mechanism would consist of a decentralised, yet 
integrated, network structure that would be made up of a broad network of existing, recognised 
 150
community organisations who have established trust and healthy community relationships. Several 
locations would address the convenience-of-location issue and the use of existing institutions would take 
advantage of existing infrastructure, staffing, networks, diverse skills and capacities, and community 
relationships. Model terminology included “a web-like structure” as well as “a wheel with a central hub 
connected to and connecting the other service providers.”  
 The idea would be to have as many of the services delivered at each outlet, with the 
understanding that not every institution would desire or even be capable of delivering them all. But 
institutions would be brought into the network on the basis of what they could bring to the structure in 
existing capacity and strength as opposed to what aspects they could not offer. Some could offer cheque-
cashing if they had the capacity and security for handling and storing cash (grocery or drug stores, credit 
unions), some could offer crisis counselling (women’s centres and shelters, counselling services, religious 
organisations, community education centres), and some could facilitate loans (credit unions or credit 
union subsidiary). Endorsement or character referencing for loans and cheque-cashing could be provided 
by community services organisations that have established relationships with those individuals in the 
community. Agencies not comfortable with having to turn down requests for endorsement or referencing 
could divert this responsibility to a credit counsellor, someone who is from the community and is 
known/trusted, who could rotate through the various organisations on a set schedule to meet with these 
individuals. Loans could also be facilitated by non-cash-handling organisations. These organisations, if 
they decided to approve a loan, could write a cheque or transfer funds electronically and the individual 
could then cash the cheque or withdraw the money at one of the cash-handling partners or an ATM. Risk 
factors of handling cash were mentioned, which is why the concept of networking was suggested in a 
manner in which cash-handling would be left to those already capacitated to do so. Nevertheless, a 
comprehensive insurance package would be important to cover risks taken by agencies. 
 The network could take advantage of technology through phone communication, electronic 
money transfers and deposits, and ATMs (as long as they are free or low-fee). As well, an ID card could 
be developed that would be accepted by the network partners. This ID card could be kept on a computer 
network so that it could be easily reproduced for replacement, but also so that transactions could occur 
without requiring the person to carry the card at all times. The ID card would be on the computer and 
could be accessed whenever needed. Perhaps this ID card could become recognised by other 
organisations/institutions in the area as well. Each partner organisation/institution would display a 
network logo prominently visible to the outside that would also include the names, addresses, services 
provided, and hours of operation for other partner organisations so that individuals could access other 
partners even if that particular one was closed at the time.    
 Since this model would involve commitment for the individual, this service mechanism would not 
be for everyone. Some, particularly those who desire instant and no-questions-asked service, would not be 
drawn to this mechanism. This would decrease the potential volume of service transactions, which may in 
turn decrease the independent viability of providing these services - the per transaction cost would 
escalate with decrease volume.  
 There was some discussion, without consensus, regarding the need for a “hub” to oversee or co-
ordinate service delivery and network operations. Some felt that the strength came in the decentralised 
and informal nature of the structure while others felt that an administrative capacity and centre would 
strengthen the consistency, standards, efficiency, and smoothness of the delivery network.  
 
Subsidies 
Subsidies would likely be required for most of these services. However, the risk is that if a 
network/organisation is completely dependent on subsidies, it becomes vulnerable to funding changes or 
termination. Subsidies are less important if you build on an existing network of structures and 
organisations and capitalise on existing staffing and infrastructure, but it is important to remember and 
recognise the implicit agency subsidies if they take on this new capacity. Perhaps existing organisations 
could access funding to increase their service delivery capacities. The risk of utilising existing 
organisations is that the new responsibilities may be too much of an added burden. This might weaken not 
 151
only the network, but also that organisation and might compromise the services that the organisation 
originally provided.  
 Services such as crisis counselling and education/training/mentoring would definitely require 
subsidy and a savings program, particularly a matched savings program, would also require a subsidy. 
Alternative services to fringe financial services have the best chance of bringing in some revenue and 
perhaps even subsidising the others. However, this would depend completely on the volume of 
transactions and the pricing structure for these services. As already mentioned, the decentralised, 
integrated community network model would not be for everyone. This would result in lower transaction 
volumes that would decrease the chances of independent viability. 
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Report on Focus Group #2: Fringe Financial Service Clients 
March 25, 2003  
 
The goal of this focus group was to follow up on key results from the client survey and to gather ideas 
from fringe bank clients about alternative financial services they would be interested in. The focus group 
involved four fringe bank clients who participated in the client survey. The facilitators for the focus group 
included: Nancy Barbour, Jerry Buckland (lead facilitator) and Rana McDonald. The following is a 
description of the questions that were asked and the points that were raised by the participants.  
 
What financial services are most important to you to meet day-to-day needs and longer-term 
needs? 
 
Day-to-day needs: 
- Get short-term loans for $50 to $150 without hassle and less interest than pawnshop 
- Face-to-face financial advice for those with low and fixed incomes 
- Pay bills 
- Cash cheques 
- Picture ID 
 
Longer-term needs: 
- Larger loans for household items like furniture and appliances, car repairs 
- Reasonable rent-to-own or layaway programs for household items for those on Employment and 
Income Assistance 
- Mortgages for homes in areas where some banks will not approve 
- Financial advice for retirement savings on low and fixed incomes 
- Dollar matching program 
- Locked-in savings for children and retirement 
- Financing for education in order to get a career/job 
- Welfare policies that allow you to save 
- Easy to understand information on existing programs from city, province, federal, Hydro, community 
agencies 
- A means to build a credit rating while on a low income 
 
What types of delivery means are best for you (face-to-face, hours and location, electronic, ATM, 
direct deposit)? 
- Face-to-face, personal service is important so a relationship can be built with client and trust 
developed; therefore greater flexibility and leniency will be allowed with some rules such as no holds 
on cheques; being able to get a loan without collateral 
- Walking distance; easy access for parents who must walk with small children especially in winter 
- more ATMs without fees at numerous locations which are easy to walk to 
- ATMs which give five and ten dollar bills instead of just twenty dollar bills; money in hand tends to 
be spent; smaller withdrawals allow for more control 
- Central location like Selkirk Ave and Powers or Andrews Streets 
- Longer hours of operation than standard bank hours (Money Mart is open Mon-Fri 9 a.m. to 
midnight, Saturday 9-9, and Sunday 10-6), weekends 
- Availability of computer for those who bank electronically 
- If there was a bank or credit union it should employ more tellers on days when Employment and 
Income Assistance cheques are released 
 
What kind of organisation is best for you? (bank/credit union, community-based service requiring 
voluntary co-operation, or limited service outlet with referral) 
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- Community-based service would be preferred by some over a bank; would switch from current bank 
account to a community-based service if it was offered 
- Local credit union is preferred by some 
- Most would be willing to take the time to sit down privately for 20 minutes to develop a character 
reference with a bank/credit union employee if the interview was personal and free from stereotypic 
views of Aboriginal people or North End residents 
- The process of developing a character reference should be a one time thing 
- Use of the repayment of micro-loans as a means of establishing a credit rating and enhancement of 
character reference 
- If people have to pawn once or twice a month now, and manage to redeem their items, they could be 
counted upon to repay micro-loans given for less interest. 
- Most like the idea of an institution which would take a small amount from every cheque cashed and 
put it into a fixed savings account for the person 
- An organisation which is tailored to and personally friendly to North End residents 
 
 
Additional Comments: 
- pawnshops are a key to survival for many people in the North End who are on Employment and 
Income Assistance and do not have a network of friends and/or family in place to borrow from 
between cheques 
- virtually everyone on Employment and Income Assistance cannot get from one cheque to the next 
without having to borrow small amounts of money in between 
- the idea of long-term savings is not even brought to mind for most on Employment and Income 
Assistance; they are totally focussed on how to survive from one day to the next 
- mothers who receive back-pay from family allowance cheques (as late as five months after a child is 
born), have their Employment and Income Assistance cheques reduced by the amount of the back-
pay, leaving them with a larger family to feed on the same amount of money before the new child 
arrived 
- all income must be declared for those on Employment and Income Assistance; if a small inheritance 
is received then the Employment and Income Assistance cheque is reduced by the amount of income, 
thus disabling the person from saving any money 
- financial assistance is needed more in the winter since many of the houses in the North End are not 
properly insulated and heating bills are huge 
- those administering the Special Needs aspect of Employment and Income Assistance are required to 
give money for a bed allowance for young children but they will often give parents a hard time 
making them believe that the money is not available to them. 
- a local drug store is a convenient and inexpensive place to cash cheques and pay bills, but cannot 
always be used if the store does not have enough money on hand on a given day 
- banks require picture ID; most picture ID (eg: drivers licence) is too expensive for people on 
Employment and Income Assistance to obtain 
- for those with bank accounts, paying bills via telephone is inexpensive 
- the number of bank ATMs are few in the North End so those who have bank accounts may have to 
spend $1.50 to get to the ATM so they do not have to pay the service fee of the white label ATMs, 
thus defeating the purpose 
- most banks require $50 to start an account and will put holds on cheques; these factors make it 
completely unfeasible for low-income people 
- since you can't get a loan when you are on Employment and Income Assistance, the easy cash from 
the sale of drugs and involvement in gangs is appealing to some 
- what will the consequences of the Kyoto Accord be?; if the money spent on gas for winter heating 
was spent instead on renovating houses so they get off the grid, the savings would turn things around 
in the North End 
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- some insurance companies will not insure North End houses; some banks and credit unions will not 
give mortgages for houses in the North End 
- day care is too expensive for young mothers to use so they can go to school so they can get a job, thus 
a vicious circle of poverty 
- the welfare system does not allow people to save money, so no funds can be put aside to ensure their 
children's education 
- everyone could manage and would want to put $5 in a locked-in savings account if it was available 
- rent-to-own programs or layaway plans for larger household items are desired by some on 
Employment and Income Assistance since this is the only way some things can be obtained, but lack 
of credit rating can prevent them from participating 
- some are afraid they will be robbed when walking home after having cashed a cheque at a store  
- most believe that the local credit union has a closed membership 
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APPENDIX D:    RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS 
       FROM CHEQUE-CASHING AND PAYDAY LOAN FIRMS 
 
 
One of the research assistants endeavoured to contact cheque-cashing and payday loan firms for 
an interview; however, these firms were generally unwilling to be interviewed. The following is 
a description of the efforts made by the research assistant to contact these firms.   
 
Firm A 
• the manager was pleasant but said I would have to speak with the regional manager and 
provided the regional manager’s name and phone number 
• the regional manager was very receptive on the telephone but said the board of directors 
would have to be consulted first  
• several days and phone calls later, the regional manager said an answer would be available 
by the next week and confirmed that Monday would be a good time to call 
• on the designated Monday, the regional manager was out of town for a week 
 
Firm B 
• the manager at one branch was rude and abrupt on the telephone but did provide the name of 
the top manager, who was at another branch 
• the top manager was also rude and abrupt and repeatedly challenged the request for an 
interview with "What's in it for me?" 
• appealing to a sense of community service had no effect whatsoever 
 
Firm C 
• at my first visit to the store, I was told to come back in an hour when the owners would be 
there 
• upon returning I met one of the owners who, with her husband, had bought the business a 
few months before; she said that she would discuss the request for an interview with her 
husband 
• she telephoned me a few days later to say that they had decided against the interview but 
wouldn't give a clear reason why 
• when I mentioned that because no payday lender would speak with us, we wondered if the 
firms have something to hide, she was very defensive 
 
Firm D 
• the first thing I was asked when I walked into the store was: "Are you here for a loan?" 
• after being made to wait for several minutes I spoke with the manager who told me they were 
no longer in the payday loan business, but were now running "Home Phone Reconnect - NO 
ONE REFUSED - NO DEPOSIT REQUIRED" 
• the manager repeatedly refused an interview, then would start speaking about the very things 
our research is looking at 
• the manager finally consented to an interview after some persuasive encouragement  
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• when phoned the morning of the day when the afternoon appointment was scheduled, the 
manager cancelled the interview 
• when asked if the appointment could be rescheduled on several different specific dates, the 
manager stated that all potential dates were already too busy and stated that we should wait 
for a call back about what would work 
 
Firm E 
• after waiting for a full half-hour at one branch, I was able to speak with the staff person in 
attendance who deferred me to the regional manager, who works out of another branch 
• at this branch I was invited into the regional manager’s office after waiting for fifteen 
minutes  
• the regional manager was friendly and receptive but said that an interview without consent 
from the superiors would be impossible and would require a letter outlining the nature and 
purpose of the interview and a copy of the consent form 
• the requested letter and form were sent to the regional manager 
• the regional manager has not returned phone messages. In one subsequent phone 
conversation, the regional manager stated that they had not yet heard back from the proper 
authorities 
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APPENDIX E:    EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME ASSISTANCE 
  RATES AND POLICIES REGARDING PERSONAL SAVINGS 
 
For many of the fringe bank clients interviewed during the research, the stated income source 
was “Social Assistance.” “Social Assistance” or “SA” are the common terms used to describe a 
program which has undergone many changes over the years and is now officially called 
Employment and Income Assistance (EIA). The clients reported varied accounts regarding the 
policy and/or practice of saving money under current EIA policy. Many perceived that savings 
was not permitted and would invoke EIA deductions. As the presence of savings is considered to 
be an important determinant in the use of fringe financial services, this policy or practice became 
of interest in the context of the research project on fringe financial services. To clarify the rates, 
policies, and practices of EIA, a person in a key administrative position within this government 
program and a community leader outside the program, who assists people to understand their 
EIA entitlements, were consulted. 
 
EIA is meant to be a last resort when all other means of generating an income are exhausted. 
While the EIA policy manual is publicly accessible, it is a lengthy and complex document that is 
difficult to decipher. To remedy the lack of clear and easily attainable information, EIA is 
currently in the process of developing single information sheets in basic language that outline 
various elements of the policy. 
 
The policy manual outlines three categories of EIA basic allowance rates. The first is for 
"Persons with Disabilities" who "by reason of physical or mental ill health, or physical or mental 
incapacity" are given a monthly basic allowance which ranges from $254.80 for a single person 
to $989.40 for two adults and three children aged 12 to 17 years (Table 1). There are about 
16,000 individuals receiving disability EIA in Manitoba. The second category, "Persons Without 
Disabilities," is predominantly for single parents with the basic monthly allowance beginning at 
$407.20 for a parent with one child, and ranging to $743.20 for a parent with three children aged 
12 to 17 years. Out of 9,054 single parents receiving EIA in Manitoba, 94% are single mothers. 
The third category is called "General Assistance" for people who are free and able to find 
employment; this ranges from $175.00 monthly for a single adult to $929.40 for two adults and 
three children aged 12 to 17 years.  
 
In addition to the basic allowance, assistance is available for various special needs including: 
providing items such as a crib or layette for a new-born, major appliances, essential household 
furnishings, beds and bedding, moving costs, and school supplies. While the written policy 
appears straightforward, its implementation may vary widely on a case by case basis. Case loads 
average from 170 to 230 per worker and the administrative respondent described the staff as 
“hard-pressed just to keep up with phone calls." The community leader respondent said it is the 
caseworker’s responsibility to inform the clients of and provide the various special needs funds 
to which they are entitled. The administrative respondent was aware of inequities resulting from 
policy implementation, which is at the discretion of the social workers, and explained that the 
new information sheets are partially intended to address this problem. The administrator also 
stated that policy complexity is a factor as different policies apply to different people. 
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A single mother with three young children on EIA who says she uses a pawnshop monthly to 
access the small loans which enable her feed her family, reported that her caseworker deducted 
the back-pay from the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) for her last child from her EIA cheque. 
The back-pay, which comes from Ottawa, arrived six months after the mother's third child was 
born. The woman could not understand why this money, which she thought was designed to 
assist in paying for her infant's needs, led to a deduction in her basic allowance, putting her into 
an extremely fragile financial position. The administrative respondent did not have an 
explanation for this story other than to suggest that it must predate current policy. This 
respondent insisted that the social workers were intent upon satisfying the needs of their clients, 
not depriving them. This positive depiction was in contrast to the community leader respondent, 
who stated that in the cases of many government employees, "their minds are poisoned to the 
poor."  
 
 
Table E.1    Monthly EIA Rates and Allowable Liquid Assets 
 
Category EIA Basic 
Allowance 
Rates (Single 
Adult) 
EIA Basic 
Allowance 
Rates (2 Adults 
& 3 Children 
12-17) 
EIA Allowable 
Liquid Assets 
(Individual) 
EIA Allowable 
Liquid Assets 
(Family) 
Persons with 
Disability 
$254.80 $989.40 $2,000.00 $4,000.00 
Persons without 
Disability 
$242.10 $743.20** $1,000.00 $3,000.00 
General 
Assistance 
$175.00 $929.40 $400.00 $2,000.00 
Source: Manitoba EIA Policy Manual 
** As the majority of those in this category are single parents, this number reflects the EIA Basic Allowance Rate 
for one adult and three children ages 12-17.  
 
With regard to allowable savings, the administrative respondent said there is a fair amount of 
flexibility "per application." The policy manual's printed guidelines state that Persons with 
Disabilities may as individuals have liquid assets up to $2,000.00 with a family maximum of 
$4,000.00. For Persons Without Disabilities the figures are $1,000.00 with a family maximum of 
$3,000.00. And for General Assistance cases the first person may have $400.00 with a family 
maximum of $2,000.00. The majority of fringe financial service clients on EIA interviewed were 
unaware that they were entitled to save or have these liquid assets as outlined. It is commonly 
understood by these clients that they must report any money received by inheritance, gifts, and 
other sources, and that amount is then deducted from their basic EIA allowance. Lack of 
information about what they are entitled to, and the perceived or actual intervention of social 
workers, has created the general assumption that people on EIA are not allowed to save. 
 
The administrative respondent described a new policy announced in April 2003, which allows 
permanently disabled people on EIA to have up to $100,000.00 held in trust. These funds may be 
passed on to a child if the person dies, or may be used for social worker-approved expenditures 
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such as technological aids or special needs in accommodation. This respondent also explained 
that other gifts of "small value" (less than $100.00) given on occasions such as birthdays may be 
allowed, but if the gifts are ongoing the amount will be deducted from the person's assistance 
cheque. 
 
In addition to EIA, parents may be entitled to federally-funded Canadian Child Tax Benefits 
(CCTB) and National Child Benefits (NCB). The CCTB has evolved through many forms and 
phases since the Family Allowance Program, or "baby bonus," began in 1944. The CCTB has 
two components: the CCTB base benefit for low- and middle-income families and the National 
Child Benefit (NCB) supplement for low-income families. The annual maximum CCTB for the 
July 2002 to June 2003 benefit year for families with net incomes below $22,397.00 in 2001 
begins with a monthly benefit of $203.66 for the first child and approximately $186.50 for each 
additional child (Table 2). Those with an income between $23,397.00 and $32,960.00 receive the 
maximum CCTB benefit and a partial NCB supplement. 
 
 
Table E.2    Maximum (Per Child) Canadian Child Tax Benefit and National Child 
Benefit  
 
Children Basic CCTB 
(Annual) 
NCB 
(Annual) 
Total 
(Annual) 
Monthly 
Benefit 
1 $1,151.00 $1,293.00 $2,444.00 $203.66 
2 $1,151.00 $1,087.00 $2,238.00 $186.50 
3+ $1,231.00 $1,009.00 $2,240.00 $186.66 
Source: Government of Canada 
 
Pregnant women with a net family income less than $21,744.00 may also receive the Healthy 
Baby Benefit through the Manitoba government. The maximum monthly benefit is $81.41 and is 
designed to assist pregnant women on low incomes to eat properly so that their babies are born 
healthy. The benefit stops once the child is born. 
 
One problematic aspect of the EIA system arises out of the policy of deducting  child support 
and maintenance payments from the single parent's EIA. A common predicament many women 
experience is that when the father does not pay, the amount of the expected support is still 
automatically deducted from their cheques, leaving them in a precarious or even desperate 
financial position.  
 
The community leader respondent said that EIA workers generally give ample opportunities to 
young mothers. However, if a worker is for some reason not supportive of a mother who, for 
example, may want to attend an adult education centre to gain a high school diploma, the mother 
may not be made aware of or provided with the available funds. As a result, the funds for this 
education would need to come out of her EIA and CCTB income. This would make it difficult 
and therefore less likely that the young mother would get the education needed to increase her 
employability and income potential that would be helpful in raising her family out of the vicious 
cycle of poverty. 
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APPENDIX F:    COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICE CENTRE MODEL 
         FOR THE FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT STUDY 
 
One of the goals of the research project was to examine whether a community-owned non-profit 
service that could lower prices North End consumers face has prima facie feasibility and to 
examine whether alternative models to provide these financial services show any basic evidence 
of market feasibility while striving to meet the social and economic needs of users. In order to do 
this, the research team hired an independent contractor to complete a preliminary feasibility 
assessment. The team developed an alternative model drawing on the client and key informant 
surveys and the focus group discussions. This model is outlined below. The feasibility report 
follows the outline of this model. 
 
The Community Banking Centre Model  
A consortium of agencies including a deposit-taking institution (preferably a credit union) and 
community economic development (CED) agencies will own the outlet. The outlet will provide a 
variety of core financial services. The outlet will also have the mandate to deal with additional 
services either by providing them directly or referring clients to an affiliated agency. As well, the 
outlet will draw on affiliated CED agencies for such things as character referencing.  
 
Services Provided 
The community banking centre will provide a set of core services. In addition, the feasibility 
assessment will consider if another set of services can be provided by the centre. Alternatively, 
the centre may refer clients for these services to other agencies in its network. 
 
Core Services: 
1) Cheque-cashing 
2) Micro-loans (possibly a loan fund or pawning): $50-200 (approximate range) 
 
Additional Services: (may be provided or may be referred by the centre) 
1) Credit counselling 
2) Financial planning, education and training 
3) Deposit accounts for savings including access to government and community 
agency savings schemes, e.g., Individual Development Accounts, Learn-Save, 
Savings Circle 
 
In addition to these services the feasibility assessment might also examine the following: 
- Electronic transactions such as automatic teller machines and direct deposits 
- Money orders and bill payment services 
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 1.0  Model Overview 
 
The creation of a Community Financial Services Centre is predicated on the belief that 
basic financial services should be available to all citizens at approximately the same 
cost. At present, low-income individuals are more likely to pay more for financial 
services and access to credit than are middle and upper income citizens.   
 
Low-income individuals who pay the same flat monthly or annual service charge on an 
account pay a relatively higher rate when viewed as a percentage of their disposable 
income. Of more concern is the cost of utilising fringe financial services such as 
pawnshops, payday loans, and cheque-cashing outlets.   
 
A research project, sponsored by the Alternative Financial Services Coalition and 
funded by the Winnipeg Inner-City Research Alliance, has studied the fringe financial 
sector in Winnipeg’s North End. The research team, led by Professor Jerry Buckland 
and Professor Thibault Martin explored both the reality of transactions in the fringe 
financial sector, and common motivations of low-income consumers. 
 
One intended outcome of the research has been to describe a potential alternative model 
for delivering financial services to low-income people. This document, prepared by 
Dungannon Consulting Services, outlines such a model and carries out some basic 
feasibility calculations. The document is meant to stimulate discussion regarding 
alternative financial services, with some reference to costs. Implementation of the model 
will necessarily entail modifying the model to meet the demands of various partners, 
and will require a more detailed business plan based on these modifications. 
 
Low-income people use fringe financial services for a variety of reasons. Most 
commonly, they are used because low-income people lack access to mainstream 
financial services. This lack of access may be attributed to one or more factors such as 
inner-city location, low personal mobility, poor credit history, a low level of personal 
financial skills, or the way in which the financial institution and the individual perceive 
each other.   
 
The establishment of a Community Financial Services Centre model will aim at 
lowering these barriers through a variety of means. In some cases this will mean the 
creation of parallel “alternative” services, in others it will mean  finding ways to 
effectively bring the individual into the credit union or  bank  as a “legitimate” member 
or consumer. While a Community Financial Services Centre would attempt to provide 
services across a wide spectrum of need, there are issues it will not address. The 
provision of financial services (including credit) can not, in and of itself, resolve the 
issue of insufficient income.  As well, there are users of fringe financial services who are 
part of an underclass that deals in illegal transactions. Clearly,  a Community Financial 
Services Centre will not accommodate their needs. Rather, such a Centre is aimed 
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primarily at those people in the low-income strata who are striving to normalise their 
relationship with the financial services sector. 
 
The creation of such a Centre, with the social mandate indicated above, will entail the 
development of a model that combines elements of both social service and private 
business. The provision of financial services to low-income people involves dealing in 
transactions that are high in both risk and the actual cost of the transaction. The price of 
borrowing from a pawnshop is often described as “gouging” yet likely reflects the costs 
of such lending accurately.  
 
One can not expect such services to offer lower fees and to  be self-supporting. In order 
to offer more reasonable fees, the cost of providing these services must somehow be 
shared between the user, broader society, and the highly profitable financial services 
sector. The model proposed strives to establish a service that is sustainable, yet not self-
supporting. In this model, user fees should be more affordable, yet still bear some 
relationship to the cost of the transaction. At the same time, it presumes ongoing 
supportive roles for government, foundations and the financial services sector. 
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2.0  Potential Demand for Services 
 
The following section attempts, in summary fashion, to describe the demand for various 
financial services that might exist in Winnipeg’s inner-city. It is based on a combination 
of research done by the project research team, industry data, anecdotal evidence, and 
observed trends. Each subsection evaluates whether there is a rationale for including 
that service in a Community Financial Services Centre, and if so, what assumptions 
should be made about the volume and size of transactions.   
 
2.1   Pawning Services 
 
The pawnshop serves two functions in the community. In one sense, it is a place to buy 
and sell used goods such as jewellery, musical instruments, electronic consumer goods, 
and tools. The second function is as a lender, where small loans may be procured by 
offering personal possessions as collateral. 
 
The presentation of collateral secures the loan, reducing the risk to the lender. This 
allows the lender to forgo lengthy applications, references, and credit checks which are 
more mainstream risk management tools. Taking this collateral does entail certain risks 
and costs on behalf of the lender, which are reflected in the interest rate and various 
surcharges applied to the loan. The collateral is sold to repay the loan if the lender fails 
to pay. The pawnbroker’s risk is in correctly assessing the re-sale value of the item. If 
the item is eventually sold for less than was lent out, the pawnbroker suffers a loss. The 
pawnshop has to maintain records and provide documentation on each transaction to 
the police. If an item is stolen, it may be forfeited to police, resulting in a loss to the 
pawnbroker. Other costs include the staff time to process the transaction, the cost of 
capital lent out, and the costs to store the collateral. 
 
There is a history of “progressive” or socially responsible pawnshops. When an item is 
forfeited and then sold, these shops will only retain the amount needed to repay the 
loan and cover the cost of selling. Any balance is returned to the borrower. These shops 
may or may not lend out a higher amount relative to the value of the collateral.   
 
The literature suggests that the average pawn loan would be around $50. Pawnbrokers 
will normally lend an amount from 50 – 60 percent of the re-sale value of an item. (Re-
sale value should not be confused with replacement value, which is often much higher). 
Most loans are redeemed by the lender (approximately 70 percent), although many of 
the loans are extended beyond their original term. (40 – 50 percent). 
 
According to data from Caskey, the amount of business done by a single pawn shop can 
vary widely. In Indiana and Oklahoma, each pawnshop does over 3,000 loans per year, 
totalling about $165,000 lent. Some annual data for the period 1998-2001 is available for 
the state of Illinois. In Illinois, each pawnshop employee (counting both part-time and 
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full-time) made an average of 1,374 loans for a value of $107,448 (5 year averages). This 
suggests, at least at an intuitive level, that a “typical” pawnshop would have 2-3 
employees, at least one of which is part-time. In Delaware during 1989, a single 
pawnshop was tracked over 8 days, according to individual transactions. In those 8 
days, 221 loans were made (27.6 per day). The collateral offered for these loans was 
distributed as follows: 
 
   Watches & Jewellery 68% 
   Electronics   21% 
   Musical Instruments 4% 
   Camera Equipment  2.7% 
   Firearms   2.7% 
 
Although we do not have data that accurately defines the extent of pawning in 
Winnipeg, we can make some rough estimates. A project interview with Winnipeg 
police suggests 300 loans per month for each shop. When we multiply this by the 29 
pawnshops listed in the phone book, there are roughly 8700 pawns per month. At an 
average of $50 per loan this translates to an annual market of $5.2 million in Winnipeg 
pawnshop loans. (Around 3,600 loans and $180,000 per pawnshop). This suggests that 
pawning activity is higher in Winnipeg than in Illinois, and roughly comparable to 
Indiana and Oklahoma. About 40 percent of the pawnshops are located in the North 
End of Winnipeg, so the “local market” is over $2.0 million annually.   
 
The business case can be made that there is sufficient demand in the North End to 
support a community-based pawning service. However, the project team research 
seems to indicate that many occasional users of pawning services only do so as a last 
resort. Many of these people expressed a desire to have a credit union or bank account, 
and the ability to borrow small amounts from time to time. If they had access to these 
basic services, they would no longer use pawnshops. There are other people who prefer 
to pawn, in order to avoid straining relationships with family or friends.   
 
Appendix B contains a feasibility calculation on how a community-owned pawnshop 
might operate. It uses some of the margins and industry data described above. This 
example assumes that any surplus from the sale of forfeited items is returned to the 
borrower. It further assumes that the community pawnshop charges a net interest rate 
(inclusive of storage and other fees) of 30 percent per month, typical of existing 
pawnshops. The example assumes an average $70 pawn, which is likely higher than the 
actual average. The benefit provided by this community pawnshop would only be  
marginal relative to existing pawnbrokers.    
 
The example shows that the given the stated assumptions, the community pawnshop 
would essentially break even. The fact that existing pawnshops continue to operate 
profitably using roughly the same margins, suggests that a combination of the 
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following factors are at play: 
 
 a) Pawning may not represent the entire revenue stream for existing 
  pawnshops, but co-location with payday loans or other services may 
  achieve some economies. 
 
 b) Some pawnshops may be dealing in goods and transactions that are  
  are not recorded or reported to the authorities.   
 
 c) The number of pawns done by each employee may be higher than  
  the statistics cited here.   
 
 d) Existing pawnbrokers may own their own building and use their 
  own loan capital, which would require a lower rate of return in  
  order to break even. 
 
 e) Pawnshops likely achieve significant surplus profit from the sale of  
  forfeited goods. In this case, surplus profit is where the selling price 
  exceeds the total of the loan principal, the accrued charges, and the cost 
  of selling.   
 
Our rough feasibility calculation makes no real provision for any costs related to 
regulatory requirements, bonding/insurance costs, loss to theft,  or other likely 
expenses. It also assumes that the employees in this hypothetical example are 99 percent 
accurate in their assessment of the re-sale value of pawned items.   
 
This calculation suggests that the feasibility of a conventional pawnshop would be 
linked to the conversion of forfeited goods. In other words, the success of the pawnshop 
would be predicated on a certain percentage of community members losing their 
collateral. This would seem to be an unacceptable basis for a community-based service.    
 
Addressing this inequity by returning the surplus from sold goods to the borrower is 
only a partial remedy. It applies to the 30 percent of  borrowers who do not redeem 
their collateral. This feature would not benefit the bulk of borrowers, and would 
jeopardise the viability of any community pawn service.   
 
 
2.2  “Micro” loans 
 
The “micro” loan is typically for an emergency or an overdue bill, and is for a small 
amount ($20-$200). Most people would generally use a credit card, a bank account 
overdraft or borrow from family/friends. The low-income individual without access to 
credit may borrow from family/friends or may go to the  pawnshop to meet this need.    
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Based on the demand for pawn loans, as well as project team interviews, it is clear there 
is significant demand for a micro-loan service. It is also clear that the regulatory 
environment, start-up capital required, and physical infrastructure for a micro-loan 
service would be much less onerous than that required for a pawnshop. There are 
however, a number of considerations to be weighed: 
 
 a) Transaction costs: The cost of staff time to write, disburse, administer, 
     and collect the loan are prohibitive, unless a  
     separate fee is charged. This fee will push the  
     effective annual interest rate into triple digits, unless 
     it is entirely subsidised. 
 b) Collateral:  Unlike the pawn loan, the micro-loan is a character 
     loan based on direct knowledge of the individual, or   
     through character and credit references. This  
     reference process will either add to the transaction 
     cost or need to be subsidised. 
 
 c) Demand  If no-collateral loans with no service fee attached  
     become available, demand will quickly outstrip the 
     available capital. It is likely that eligibility for the  
     micro-loans would be limited to people who are 
     affiliated with some sort of community program, 
     which may also provide the character referencing.   
 
 d) Term   Are the loans short-term bridge loans to be repaid in 
     full within 30-60 days, or are they to be repaid over a 
     longer period?  The longer loans have easier 
     payments, but are more expensive to administer.   
 
 e) Risk   The risk affiliated with making character loans to  
     poor people is hard to quantify. Assuming a proper 
     screening and eligibility mechanism is in place, the  
     risk may be manageable. The project team has  
     discovered a Caisse Populaire program that offers  
     these type of loans and the portfolio apparently has 
     a 6 percent default rate. This rate is linked to both the  
     screening process, and the relationship of the  
     individual with the Caisse as a community  
     institution.     
 
Based on the above, it seems that a community-based micro-loan service will be heavily 
subsidised, and available on a restricted basis.   
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2.3   Payday loans 
 
The payday loan sector provides short-term loans (generally 2 weeks or less) to 
individuals with steady employment and an established bank account. The borrower 
receives the loan by granting the lender an automatic debit or post-dated cheque on 
their bank account, due on the day the borrower is next paid. More and more of the 
payday loan services operate on the basis of fax applications and electronic debits, 
lowering their overhead.   
 
Based on data collected by the project team, the effective annualised interest rate for 
payday loans is in the range of 500 – 600 percent, driven mostly by item or application 
fees. Industry proponents take the position that payday loans are never taken out for 
long periods, and an annualised interest rate calculation does not represent the true cost 
to the consumer. Most payday loans appear to cost the consumer about 25 percent of 
the amount borrowed.   
 
Appendix C shows some rough calculations for a payday loan service scenario. In this 
hypothetical example, we assume that we can access loan capital of $40,000 at an annual 
cost of 8 percent. We further assume the capital can be fully lent out and repaid every 2 
weeks. Two hundred loans are distributed among $100, $200 and $300 loans, and are 
granted for a transaction fee of $5 per $100 and at an interest rate of 4.5 percent for the 2 
week period. Assuming a single staff person staff person at $26,000 per annum (who 
can do 3 loans per hour), and a loan loss ratio of 2 percent, we can arrive at a better than 
break-even position. This scenario also includes some allowance for rent and overhead. 
 
This hypothetical service would be providing payday loans at approximately half of 
their current cost to the consumer. Yet the annualised interest rate would still range 
between 160 percent and 247 percent. While such a competitively priced service may 
prove popular with payday loan clientele, it is unlikely to meet the mandate of a 
community-based service provider. The payday loan client is employed and has a bank 
account, but does not have an account overdraft or a useable credit card. Given this 
established access to mainstream financial services, the need for the short-term loan can 
usually be attributed to poor financial discipline or bad credit history. The interests of 
this consumer are likely best served by education rather than access to cheaper credit.   
 
 
2.4   Cheque-cashing 
 
Based on interviews by the project team, access to cheque-cashing services is not 
problematic. Aside from outlets such as Money Mart, a number of local merchants will 
also cash cheques readily. The fees are based on differing formulas, but generally 
speaking, one can expect to pay about $4 per hundred as a net fee. When weighed 
against the time and cost to travel to a bank or credit union, the expense is not 
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unreasonable. As well, the money is immediately available, where a bank or credit 
union may place a 5 day hold on the cheque. 
 
If we were to examine the viability of a community-based cheque-cashing service, we 
must first establish how low we want the fees to be. Let us assume that we wish to 
charge a straight 2 percent of the cheque, about half of current rates. Let us further 
assume that demand for cheque-cashing can be concentrated into two afternoons per 
week, that the service can be administered by a half-time employee who is paid $300 
per week, and that $587 per month will be required for uniformed (unarmed) security 
and a security camera.   
 
If this service cashes an average  of 125 cheques per week at an average cheque size of 
$350, it will require a minimum of $44,000 in capital, revolving through the service 
every week. If we allow for the ebb and flow of consumer demand, the capital required 
will be closer to $58,000. This capital, acquired at 8 percent, would cost $388 per month. 
If we assume a bad cheque ratio of .5 percent for every time the capital is sent out, that 
cost would be $940 per month. A nominal allowance for rent and overhead is made at 
$500 per month.   
 
On the highly optimistic assumptions above, the service would break even. It would 
save the community a total of $3,548 savings in fees every month. The volume of 125 
cheques per week is still highly restricted, and would not be a service available to the 
community-at-large. If the economies stay proportionate, and the service cashed 250 
cheques per week, $116,000 in capital would be required. This would increase the need 
for security substantially.   
 
Of course, if there was a locally available bank or credit union and a person can wait for 
the hold on funds, cheque-cashing would be free, a much better alternative. If the bank 
or credit union is locally available (perhaps through an ATM), the need to cash cheques 
at all would be reduced.   
 
Given the security and capital issues related to a cheque-cashing operation, it seems 
much more feasible to apply resources to breaking down the barriers that prevent 
people from accessing mainstream financial institutions. 
 
 
2.5   Tax Discounting 
 
Historically, tax discounting has been a notoriously predatory practice in the inner-city. 
Income tax firms would charge a fee for preparing the return, and then offer to finance 
the immediate disbursal of monies in exchange for a percentage of the refund. 
 
A number of changes have impacted on this practice. Firstly, the child tax credit is now 
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paid to low-income families on a monthly basis. In the past, these refundable tax credits 
were part of the tax return process, making refunds often worth several thousand 
dollars. The monthly payment of these credits puts money in the hands of families 
sooner, and reduces the size of the annual refunds, making them less vulnerable to 
discounting. 
 
The second development is the ability to file taxes electronically, and to receive the 
refund by direct deposit. The application of technology to this process has reduced the 
time to have the return processed. What was once a waiting period of several months, is 
now as short as 10 days.  Some people are able to wait this short period when they 
realise the savings (about $55 on a $500 refund).  
 
Interviews by the project team indicate that perhaps 25 percent of interviewees use the 
tax discounters, often motivated by force of habit or poor financial discipline. A 
community-based tax discounting service would simply reinforce these bad financial 
habits.   
 
Many interviewees were more concerned with the $25 - $35 fee charged for preparation 
of the return itself. It would seem from the reduced impact of the discounters, and the 
apparent motivation behind “quick cash” solutions, that extending a free or low-cost 
income tax service would have a more beneficial effect for the community.   
  
 
2.6   Rent-to-Own 
 
The rent-to-own transaction is typically between $1,000 and $3,000 and is used to 
acquire furniture, appliances, or other household goods. The customer pays a monthly 
fee over a period of time. This monthly charge is apportioned between a rental fee for 
use of the items and the actual retail cost of the goods. The customer often ends up 
paying 2 to 2.5 times the retail value of the goods.   
 
Using an hypothetical example, if a customer buys goods with a retail value of $1,000 
and agrees to 24 monthly payments of $84, they will end up paying $2,016, or just over 
2 times the actual value. This means the customer is paying 6.6 percent per month, or 79 
percent per year in effective interest (categorised as rental fees). While these rates are 
low when compared to pawnshop and payday loan rates, they are still very high when 
compared to mainstream alternatives. By way of comparison, if the same customer paid 
for the purchase with a credit card at an annual interest rate of 16 percent, over the 
same 24 months, the payments would be $49 per month. The total cost of the goods 
would be $1,176.   
 
Rent-to-own customers are motivated by a number of features. The goods are available 
with no down payment, and with no credit check. The contract can generally be 
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cancelled by returning the goods and foregoing all payments made to date. It is 
precisely these features which increase the risk to the rent-to-own provider. Rent-to-
own stores must account for the cost of repossessing items where the payments are not 
made. In cases where the customer moves and cannot be traced, the store may have to 
write off the cost of the goods.   
 
A community-based rent-to-own program would face many of the same risks. The chief 
way to reduce risk would be to limit this type of financing to people who have been 
screened and/or referred by community agencies. It may be best to limit loans of this 
size to those who have established their character and credit worthiness through past 
performance at lower levels (i.e. through micro-loans).   
 
In addition to the element of risk, a community-based rent-to-own would have other 
challenges. It would have both overhead costs related to a storefront, and inventory 
costs for the consumer goods. Both of these factors require the store to sell a minimum 
amount of merchandise to break even. As well, the community store would be in direct 
competition with local small business who sell similar products. The best solution 
would seem to be a community financing program that could identify good credit risks 
and provide them with the financing to allow purchases at local businesses. Such a 
financing program could be structured in partnership with a financial institution and 
local merchants, and could maintain viability even with small or fluctuating numbers of 
loans.   
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3.0  Proposed Service Model 
 
Section 2 examined the basic features of transactions in the most common fringe 
financial establishments. This section proposes a model that addresses some, but not all, 
of the needs currently being met by the fringe financial services. Section 4 attempts to 
project some of the revenues and expenses related to offering such a service. 
 
The model for a community financial services centre is based on a series of values-based 
assumptions. These assumptions include: 
 
 a) Costs for financial services should be made more affordable, but should 
  also reflect some relationship to the cost of providing these services. 
 
 b) Subsidies for financial services to low-income people are not likely to be  
  politically attractive, nor are they likely to be universally applied. 
 
 c) Services and subsidies should be utilised as a means for low-income 
  individuals to build skills and demonstrate credit worthiness.   
 
 d) Most low-income people would prefer to have a normalised status 
  with a credit union or bank where they are viewed as valued  
  members and customers.   
 
This suggests that services should be structured in a “stepped” fashion, where low-
income individuals progress from small loan amounts with higher levels of social 
intervention to larger loan amounts delivered through conventional services. 
Developing a credit history that is of use both locally and with a recognised financial 
institution is as important a goal as the provision of credit itself.   
 
The following sections describe a potential model, with a specific array of services that 
strive to address the articulated values and the demonstrated community need. While it 
is believed the model has “replicability”, it is developed in the context of Winnipeg’s 
North End. There are other combinations and permutations of the described services, 
which may be of equal benefit. 
 
3.1  General Features 
 
The community financial services centre will be operated by a non-profit entity that 
enters into a series of strategic alliances with financial institutions, local merchants, 
philanthropic organisations, government departments, and community agencies. Such a 
centre should be a physical location where an array of services can be provided by 
different organisations. The delivery agent for any specific service should be 
determined by a careful review of organisational capacity, internal expertise, applicable 
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regulatory environment, and the appropriate delineation between social service and 
private sector roles.   
 
The core features of the proposed model start around the most basic requirements  and 
builds upon these services incrementally. These core features are: 
 
 i) a capacity to build a local credit file and provide affordable picture  
  ID to community members (see below). 
 
 ii) access to small micro-loans that replace pawn transactions and build a 
  credit history (see section 3.2). 
 
 iii) a strategy to provide initial access to a financial institution through 
  a supported “special” account (see section 3.3). 
 
 iv) serve as a location and environment where complementing services 
  can be delivered, and act as a platform to pilot new service innovations. 
 
It is recommended that the non-profit entity design and issue a photo ID card that is 
common to all programs offered at the centre. A digital Polaroid camera system that 
interfaces with a desktop computer can be purchased for about $3,000. This system, 
similar to that used for driver licenses, would print an ID card for about $4 in material 
costs. This local picture ID could be offered to eligible area residents on a cost-recovery 
basis (likely for  a $5-$10 fee).    
 
The application process to obtain this ID card would be a logical point at which the 
referencing from community organisations could occur. From that point forward, the 
non-profit would be able to build a credit file which reflected which services the 
resident utilised, and how they have handled credit. This would give the non-profit the 
ability to give references to partner organisations, affiliated credit unions/banks, and 
perhaps local merchants.   
 
 
3.2  “Micro” Loans 
 
It is recommended that the non-profit entity establish a revolving micro-loan fund for 
the purpose of providing very small consumer loans to those that can demonstrate 
credit worthiness. Such a loan fund could be capitalised to the amount of $10,000 in a 
manner similar to the Jubilee Fund. Social investors could provide the capital for below-
market rates, and the revolving fund would need to generate enough income to offset 
loan write-offs. Staff costs to administer the fund would be subsidised through 
foundation and government funding, or through secondment of existing non-profit 
staff. Some projections for such a fund are described in section 4. 
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The micro-loan fund described above is simply one delivery option. Different structures 
could eventually be offered in response to demonstrated demand. For instance, a peer-
lending model could be another delivery option for small consumer loans that helps to 
manage risk through peer relationships. 
 
3.3   Credit Union/Bank Access 
 
As discussed in earlier sections, access to credit unions and banks is limited by the 
actual physical locations, by certain policy positions, and by how low-income people 
perceive the institution (and vice versa). The Assiniboine Credit Union has undertaken 
a project in West Broadway, offering a “mini-branch” in a low-income neighbourhood. 
At present, indicators are favourable, but the long-term viability of this model has yet to 
be demonstrated. Should the model prove sustainable, co-location of such a branch with 
a community financial service centre would be optimal. In the absence of such a 
possibility, it is recommended that access to a partner credit union or bank be 
configured in the manner described below. 
 
It is recommended that the community financial services centre install a deposit-taking 
ATM machine on site. The capital cost of this ATM, installed with appropriate security 
would be about $53,000, and should be raised by the non-profit organisation. The ATM 
would then be leased to a partner credit union or bank for $1 per year. The terms of the 
lease would require the credit union/bank to service the machine, and these terms 
would be linked to a commitment to provide some special services. By absorbing the 
capital cost of the machine, the non-profit makes the business case for the operation of 
the ATM more viable. The ATM would need to conduct some 5,600  transactions per 
month to justify its operation. (see Appendix D for a more detailed description of ATM 
economics). 
 
The provision of the ATM provides a locally accessible link to a full-service financial 
institution, set in a friendly community environment. This ATM would allow cheques 
to be deposited and cash to be withdrawn on an as-needed basis. The ATM technology 
should be supplemented by additional technical access. The centre should have two 
small kiosks (one with a phone line and another with a computer and internet 
connection). This would allow area residents to do telephone and internet banking from 
the site. Staff of the non-profit could provide coaching on use of this technology, as part 
of a support service. The Assiniboine Credit Union offers a basic chequeing account that 
has a monthly service charge of $4.00 (which compares favourably with cheque-cashing 
fees described earlier). The account allows 15 free debit transactions per month, so an 
account holder could electronically pay 5 regular bills (rent, heat, hydro, telephone, and 
cable), make a weekly cash withdrawal, and write up to 6 other cheques per month 
without incurring additional fees.   
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The strategy to enhance access to the partner financial institution should also include a 
commitment from the financial institution to perform an outreach function. This would 
require the institution to provide a staff person on-site for 3 hours per week. This would 
allow users of the centre to open accounts, and to ask questions about various services 
and products, including mortgage eligibility, RRSP’s, credit cards, etc. It is recognised 
that this would be an out-of-the-ordinary internal cost to the financial institution. 
 
It is recommended that the non-profit entity and the financial institution negotiate the 
creation of a limited number of “special accounts”. These accounts would incorporate 
features that are meant to address some of the policy barriers for low-income people. 
These accounts would waive the mandatory 5 day hold on deposited cheques (perhaps 
to a certain dollar maximum). Releasing this requirement would entail a certain risk to 
the financial institution, which could be shared by the non-profit. The non-profit entity 
could secure this commitment with a term deposit it raises independently.   
 
These “special accounts” would be limited in number and duration (say 12 months). 
The intent is to create a realistic alternative to the cheque-cashing operation, while 
recognising the risk to the financial institution. Only residents who have shown 
reliability in repaying micro-loans and/or have participated in financial skills programs 
like learn$ave or the IDA programs would be eligible. If 100 such accounts were opened, 
and each account holder could receive up to $400 of a cheque without waiting for the 
mandatory hold, the total maximum risk would be $40,000 at any given time. The non-
profit would secure this risk with a $20,000 term deposit. Actual losses would be much 
lower, and need to be tracked over time to determine a predictable ratio. For interim 
purposes, losses on these special accounts are estimated at 10 percent. 
 
Once the account holder has demonstrated credit worthiness, they can “graduate” to a 
regular account, perhaps with an overdraft that would neutralise the 5 day hold. 
Alternatively, the special accounts could require a mandatory savings plan, and upon 
“graduation” the account holder would be able to secure the overdraft with their own 
term deposit. The performance of the account holder during the 12 months they hold a 
“special account” would be forwarded to the credit file maintained by the non-profit.   
(see section 3.1). 
 
The special account strategy requires the financial institution to undertake additional 
internal administrative costs. These can be justified by three factors: 
 
 1. Providing enhanced access to low-income people is a demonstrable 
  indication of good corporate citizenship. 
 
2. This strategy will enlist new members/customers on an ongoing basis.   
 Two-thirds of the low-income population is dynamic, meaning they  
  will eventually move out of poverty and be people the institution  
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  wants to attract. 
 
 3. The capital costs of the ATM borne by the non-profit will ameliorate 
  some of the administrative costs created by the partnership. 
 
The overall strategy of the partnership with the financial institution (ATM, outreach, 
and special accounts) will address many of the needs currently being met by payday 
loans, and cheque-cashing operations. It provides physical or virtual proximity, it meets 
the basic service requirements, it moves the resident towards status as a “legitimate” 
account holder, and it builds the skills of the individual in an incremental way. 
 
3.4   Supplementary Services  
 
In addition to the micro-loan program and credit union/bank access strategy, the 
community financial services centre would be a delivery point for a range of 
supplementary services offered by additional community partners. These community 
partners are already delivering a range of financial skills programming, and have 
considerable experience and expertise that may shape overall program delivery. The 
importance of this existing network of community partners cannot be over-emphasised.   
 
 Additional, new supplementary services would have to be resourced independently 
through  grants or in-kind contributions. Some of the possibilities include: 
 
 Budgeting & Consumer Education: Workshops or small courses on a 
       range of topics related to personal  
       finances, including rent-to-own, 
       household budgets, planning for 
       retirement, etc. 
 
 Local Merchant Credit Service:  A service where, with the consent of  
       the consumer, local merchants who 
       wish to offer credit to residents 
       could receive a credit report from  
       the non-profit. 
 
 Household Financing:   In conjunction with the local merchants, 
       a loan program could be set up where 
       a financial institution finances purchases  
       of furniture and appliances by residents 
       who have performed well on micro- 
       loans and special accounts. Risk  
       could be shared by merchants and the 
       financial institution. 
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 Credit Counselling:    Residents could attain information and 
       counselling on handling creditors,    
       etc.   
 
 Existing Programs:    Existing programs such as IDAs,  
       learn$ave, or money management  
       courses  could be delivered on-site. 
 
 Tax Return Preparation:   The centre could offer free or low-cost 
       preparation of basic income tax returns. 
 
 
3.5   Ownership & Governance 
 
The ownership of the community financial services centre would likely best be served 
through the creation of a new non-profit corporation or community service co-
operative. Appropriate representation of community representation and organisational 
stakeholders is easily accommodated in either model. Consideration may also be given 
to an unincorporated coalition operating through an administrative host agency. This 
latter approach is not recommended, as the liability/exposure related to various loans 
should be legally distinct from any existing non-profit organisation. 
 
It would be most desirable to have established financial institutions such as credit 
unions or banks remain at arms-length from ownership and governance as such, and to 
define the partnerships through a series or protocols or contracts for service. Such 
clarity of separation would be necessary to avoid placing the proposed centre within 
the regulatory framework of banks and credit unions. It would also provide a clearer 
definition of risk and responsibility for the financial institution, which is necessary to 
satisfy credit union and bank examiners.   
 
 
3.6  Future Expansion 
 
The model of a community financial services centre is adaptable to different 
circumstances. For instance, the infrastructure and administrative systems from an 
initial centre could be used to establish a satellite centre in a different neighbourhood, 
with only incremental costs. Another possibility is that if the micro-loan capital were 
under-used in one location, the service could be expanded to other neighbourhoods 
without increasing the basic funding footprint.   
 
Such flexibility must be viewed with caution however. The true strength of this model 
is the ready access to the full range of services as the participant moves through the 
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various steps. Without access to an ATM and the special accounts, the long-term benefit 
of micro-loans is likely marginal. Expansion into other neighbourhoods should be 
thoughtfully planned, and only undertaken once sufficient experience has been gained 
with the model. 
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4.0  Feasibility & Financial Projections 
 
This section of the document outlines, in narrative fashion, a series of feasibility tests 
and financial projections. Most of the subsections have affiliated appendices, with more 
descriptive detail. All of these calculations have been made in broad strokes and based 
on a series of assumptions. The intent is to test the baseline feasibility of a concept, and 
whether the idea is worthy of further examination. Readers of this document should 
critically examine the validity of the assumptions in these calculations, and should 
remember that these calculations in no way diminish the need for a fuller business 
planning process prior to implementation. 
 
The provision of the core services as summarised in section 3.1 will require a certain 
physical and human resource infrastructure. This array of services can be provided 
within an overall operating budget of $198,000. Section 4.5 and the notes to Appendix A 
detail a pro forma operating budget. 
 
4.1  General Features 
 
The service model has been established around a physical centre of some 1,200 square 
feet, employing three core staff. If we assume co-location with an existing organisation 
that can provide access to a training room, the space utilisation is anticipated as: 
 
    Space Use   sq. ft. 
  
    3 workstations  300 
    Internet station    50 
    Telephone station    50 
    ATM      50 
    2 interview rooms  150 
    Washrooms   200 
    Reception area  100 
    Storage & misc.  300 
  
    Total:    1200 
 
The staff positions include an overall Program Co-ordinator, a Loans Co-ordinator, and 
an Administrative Assistant. Additional project staff, students, and collaborating staff 
from other organisations would complement the core staff. Cost estimates associated 
with the physical and staff infrastructure are included in Appendix A. Costs specific to 
a service (such as loan fees or interest) have been internalised to the feasibility 
calculations for that service, and in the case of micro-loans, the Loan Co-ordinator 
position has been allocated to that program area. 
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4.2 “Micro” Loans 
 
A feasibility calculation was conducted on a possible micro-loan program. The detailed 
calculation can be found in Appendix E. The calculations were made assuming $10,000 
in loan capital could be located at a cost of 2.5 percent per year. Loans would be offered 
for $40, $60, or $100. The first level loan is repaid entirely within 30 days. Borrowers 
could opt to repay the two larger loans over 30, 60 or 90 day terms. It is assumed that 
loan demand will be fairly evenly distributed among the loan levels, and that about 
two-thirds of borrowers will choose 30 day terms. 
 
All loans would be charged an administrative fee of $3.25, and a monthly interest rate of 
3 percent (equivalent to 36 percent annual interest). This rate is approximately twice 
that of a credit card, and about half of the legal maximum of 60 percent per annum. It is 
about one-tenth of the cost of pawning. This is a compromise between maintaining 
affordability and reflecting transaction costs. The cost to borrow $40 for 30 days would 
be $44.45.   
 
Based on the loan mix described above, the loan capital could comfortably make 1,000 
loans per year, and the total value of these loans would be $65,280. It is assumed that 
with proper screening and character referencing, loan losses would be 10 percent of the 
total value of loans, resulting in a loan loss cost of $6,528.   
 
If all these assumptions hold true, the income of the fund from interest and 
administrative fees will cover the cost of capital and projected loan loss. The staff time, 
office supplies and other incidental costs would be subsidised from the core budget of 
the non-profit entity. While the micro-loan program would not be truly self-sustaining, 
it does seem reasonable to conclude that the loan capital can be preserved and earn a 
modest return for social investors.   
 
 
4.3   Credit Union/Bank Access Costs 
 
The delivery strategy for credit union/bank access is centred upon the provision of an 
ATM machine at the community site. A “white label” ATM can be purchased (used) for 
as little as $7,000 or as much as $33,000. They can also be placed on a consignment basis. 
Although these machines generally have surcharges, the purchase of a machine would 
allow a non-profit community group to lower or eliminate the surcharges. These 
machines, however, are not deposit-taking machines, and would not meet the needs of 
residents who still have a physical cheque to deposit (it could, however, be useful to 
residents on direct deposit).   
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A deposit-taking machine is more expensive, typically around $43,000. The operational 
costs for a deposit-taking ATM are substantially higher, as the ATM needs to be 
serviced daily in order to process deposits. The operational costs and revenues affiliated 
with ATMs can be quite complex, but the Assiniboine Credit Union has provided some 
data that suggest a typical deposit-taking machine (depending on a number of 
variables) would need to generate 8,500 transactions per month to break even. (see 
Appendix D for detailed calculations). By way of comparison, the ATM in the West 
Broadway branch of ACU has recently done 4,700 transactions per month.   
 
If a community financial services centre was able to achieve levels of use similar to the 
West Broadway ATM, the owner of the machine could expect to lose over $1,100 per 
month. If however, a community financial services centre was able to purchase the 
ATM outright and contract with a financial institution to operate the ATM, the number 
of transactions required to break even would be about 5,600. Such a purchase, including 
installation and security hardware would cost about $53,000. 
 
The project research team has examined ATM locations in the North End. The ATMs 
operated by financial institutions are located on McPhillips Street, Main Street, and 
Arlington Street. The “white label” ATMs occur at an equal rate (13 versus 12) to those 
operated by financial institutions. While these more expensive ATMs are located in a 
similar pattern, there is a significant difference. Along Selkirk Avenue, between Salter 
Street and Arlington, there are four “white label” ATMs and no bank or credit union 
machines. Selkirk Avenue acts as a central commercial artery for the poorest part of the 
North End. Placement of a financial institution’s ATM in this location would provide 
the ATM with a competitive advantage of $1.50 to $1.75 per transaction relative to the 
four existing ATMs. In this context, the target of 5,600 seems achievable.   
 
There will be additional costs to the bank/credit union access strategy. The model calls 
for the partner institution to provide staff resources on-site for one-half day per week. 
As well, the institution will require staff time to administer the 100 special accounts 
called for in the strategy. In order to place a value on this staff time, we can assume that 
a staff person of the financial institution might be assigned to spend 20 percent of their 
time on these tasks. At an annual salary of $30,000 plus 15 percent benefits, we can 
assign a nominal value of $6,900 to the staff time.   It must be acknowledged that this 
costing of staff time contributed by the financial institution does not reflect the costs 
related to designing and setting up the special account functions in collaboration with 
the non-profit partner. The true value of the in-kind contribution is significantly higher.    
 
The model calls for the financial institution to internalise this cost, viewing it as an 
investment to recruit long term members/customers. The special accounts’ loan loss 
provision is projected at $4,000 (see section 3.3) and this cost is expensed.   
 
The additional technology recommended to provide wider credit union/bank access 
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will incur both start-up and operating costs. An internet workstation will cost about 
$2,500 to set up, and about $100 per month to operate (phone line and internet account). 
An additional phone line will be required for a telephone banking station, at an 
approximate cost of $50 per month.   
 
 
4.4   Supplementary Service Costs 
 
The supplementary services described in section 3.4 would only be offered if 
independent revenue or resource streams could be identified on a project by project 
basis. Much of this may be available through the allocation of in-kind services from 
existing service providers. The cost to the community financial services centre would be 
in providing physical space for the programming to be provided. 
 
 
4.5   Operating Budget and Sources of Funds 
 
A pro forma budget has been developed for an hypothetical community financial 
services centre as described in this document. See Appendix A for the full budget and 
explanatory notes. It is estimated that such a centre would require an annual operating 
budget of $198,000 based on a core staff of three. A feasible funding mix might be: 
 
 
 
   Revenue Source     Amount % 
 
   Manitoba Family Services    $60,000 30.3% 
   United Way of Winnipeg    $33,000 16.7% 
   Corporate & Individual donations  $20,000 10.1% 
   Fundraising events         $6,000   3.0% 
   In-kind Staff allocations    $42,740 21.6% 
   User fees and interest     $36,433 18.4% 
          $198,173 
 
This operating budget would include the provision of in-kind services from other 
community groups and the internalisation of credit union/bank staff costs related to the 
outreach and special account functions. In addition to operating costs, the proposed 
centre would require $90,000 in start-up capital, to be allocated as follows: 
 
Capital Required 
 
   Micro-loan Capital  $10,000 
      Special Account Security $20,000 
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      ATM purchase  $53,000 
  Digital camera system   $3,000 
  Office Furniture    $4,000 
      $90,000 
 
The start-up capital would be raised through a variety of sources. The micro-loan 
capital and the capital to secure the special accounts could be raised through social 
investors of an individual, corporate, or institutional nature. This would require 15 
investors willing to place $2,000 each. The community organisations who are the 
referral sources for the micro-loans would be logical investors in this capacity. 
 
The capital required for the digital camera system (to produce local identification 
cards), and the initial office furniture could likely be obtained from a combination of 
service clubs and smaller local foundations (such as the W.E. & Shirley Loewen 
Foundation).   
 
The larger challenge will be to raise the capital required for the purchase and 
installation of the ATM machine. This capital may be available from a combination of 
the Winnipeg Foundation and the Thomas Sill Foundation. Alternatively, an appeal 
could be made to Manitoba Family Services based on the rationale that area families on 
income support are spending disproportionate amounts of that support on high-cost 
financial services. 
 
5.0  Concluding Comments 
 
Attempts to provide affordable financial services to low-income people can take many 
different approaches. The model described in this document relies not only on 
observations regarding the economic nature of transactions, but on what people have 
said about their experiences, aspirations, and frustrations. Implicit in the model is a 
recognition that people engage in economic behaviour that, at first glance, appears 
irrational. Changing that behaviour is not simply a matter of providing lower cost. In 
this instance, the model has tried to incorporate room for learning new skills, and to 
create an opportunity for low-income people to interact with financial institutions in a 
community setting.   
 
Provision of the services described in this document on the scope and scale intended, 
can be seen as a cost-effective investment. The micro-loans and special accounts will 
create an annual savings (relative to using pawnshops and cheque-cashing services) of 
$57,000 to program participants. The total subsidisation of the services from private and 
public sources is $161,740 per year. This means the “payback” period is three years. 
Stated another way, if each program participant retains the financial skills learned in 
the program for three years, the subsidy for that participant will be more than offset by 
savings. In fact, the benefits of better financial skills and access to regular banking 
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services are likely to accrue to the individual for many years to come.  
 
The model of a community financial services centre is meant to be both sustainable and  
replicable. In the context of alternative financial services, sustainability does not mean 
self-supporting. It is known that market forces alone will not provide the alternative. 
Pawnshops, cheque-cashing outlets, and rent-to-own firms are the current market 
response. Proposed solutions can and should generate revenue from user fees, but 
subsidisation must also occur, particularly if there is a skill-building component. Section 
4.5 shows that user fees can comprise 18 percent of the costs associated with providing 
the core services. 
 
The political realities are such that we are not likely to see a universally applied 
subsidy, where each low-income person has guaranteed access to affordable financial 
services. Instead, the model proposes that a partnership between community 
organisations, financial institutions, philanthropic foundations, and government can 
offer an opportunity for a limited number of individuals to build their skills and 
develop a conventional relationship with a financial institution.   
 
While this model has been developed with North End Winnipeg in mind, the actual 
implementation is likely to look somewhat different. The model is merely a starting 
point for negotiations between funders, community partners and financial institutions 
that will change and shape the actual structure of services. Of course, the consumer will 
act as the ultimate judge as to whether the model meets community needs. The services 
offered, as well as their method of delivery, will be revised, amended and reshaped, 
based on actual experience, and on the extent to which people choose to use the 
services. Should the model prove successful, replication in other jurisdictions can be 
expected. In each instance, the specific configuration of a community financial services 
centre will vary according to the needs of the community and the aims of the local 
partners.         
 
Appendix G (A) - Operating Budget            
EXPENSES    note  REVENUES     note   +/(-)  
General Operations    General Operations       Space   
rent  1 9600 Manitoba Family Services   22 60000    program room  0  
utilities  2 6000 United Way of Winnipeg   23 33000    3 workstns  300  
phone & internet  3 8400  Donations & grants  24 20000    internet stn  50  
office supplies  4 4000  Fundraising   25 6000    telephone stn  50  
office equip. lease 5 7200  ID card cost recovery  26 3000    ATM   100  
promotion  6 3000           2 interview rms  100  
staff training  7 2000           washrooms  200  
Prog. Coordinator 8 35000           reception area  150  
Admin Asst.  9 28000           storage & misc.  250  
staff benefits  10 7560          
supplies for ID cards 11 2500             1200 sq. ft. 
legal & consulting 12 3000         
audit  13 1500          
miscellaneous  14 5000           Capital Required  
Sub-Total   $117,760      $122,000 $4,240     Microloan capital  $10,000 
                   Special Accts      $20,000 
Bank Access Program    Bank Access Program           ATM purchase  $53,000 
spec. acct loan losses 15 4000               digital camera  $3,000 
ATM operating costs 16 28467  ATM revenues   27 28469    office furniture  $4,000 
Outreach staff  17 6900  In-kind staff cont.   28 6900      
sub-total   $39,367       $35,369  -$3,997    
            
Micro-Loan Program    Micro-Loan Program        
Loan Coordinator 18 32000  In-kind staff cont.   29 35840      
     benefits  19 3840  Fee & interest income  30 6696      
     loan loss costs  20 6528          
cost of capital  21 250          
sub-total:   $42,618       $42,536     -$82    
TOTAL BUDGET              $199,745              TOTAL REVENUES               $199,905                $161 
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Appendix G (A (continued) - Notes to the Pro Forma Operating Budget 
note 
1. rent is based on approximately 1200 square feet at $8.00 per square foot.  This assumes the non -profit will be able to co-locate with existing programs  
 and have access to a shared program/meeting room. 
 
2. Allowance for $500 per month for hydro and other utilities not included in base rent. 
 
3. Assumes 8 phone lines @ $75 per month  (3 staff, one client, one fax, one internet, and 2 lines for alarm systems) plus 2 internet accounts @ $50/month. 
 
4. General office supplies. 
 
5. allowance of $600 per month for lease of 4 computers, photocopier, and other office machines. 
 
6. Promotional budget for local advertising and signage. 
 
7. Staff training allowance. 
 
8. Program Coordinator salary at approximate  non-profit standard. 
 
9. Administrative Assistant salary. 
 
10. Staff benefits for lines 8 & 9 at 12%. 
 
11. Supplies for making photo i.d. cards at about $5 per card.  (500 cards)  
 
12. Allowance for legal and consulting related to promissory notes, loan documents, etc. 
 
13. Budget for audit.  If the program is administered by an existing  non-profit, $1500 would be an incremental cost to include in a larger audit.  A  
 stand-alone audit would likely cost twice as much. 
 
14. Miscellaneous allowance for expenses not otherwise categorized. 
 
15. Assumes that the special accounts will incur losses of 10% (see section 3.3 of report). 
 
16. ATM revenues & operating costs will be internalized to the operation of the partner financial institution, but are shown here to give a sense of the  
 overall scale.  (see also line 27). 
17. Outreach staff will be provided by the partner financial institution, but approximate value is shown here to indicate extent of the partnership 
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Appendix G (A (continued) -  Notes to the Pro Forma Operating Budget  
 
note 
18. Loan Coordinator salary at approximate non-profit rate. 
 
19. Staff benefits at 12% of line 18. 
 
20. Loan loss costs of the micro-loan portfolio, estimated at 10.0%. 
 
21. Cost of loan capital of $10,000 sourced from social investors at 2.5%. 
 
22. Possible grant from Manitoba Family Services based on a dual rationale.  First, the service is achieving  reductions in the costs of financial services  
to 
 income assistance recipients.   For instance, users of micro-loans will save about $14,000 by having an alternative to pawnshops.  Secondly, the  
 graduated steps of the service will build skills and credit ratings that allow many low income people to maintain these reduced costs years into 
the  
 future. 
 
23. Possible contribution from United Way of Winnipeg.   This is scaled to the overall budget,  and is meant to define a sustainable funding role for 
the  
 United Way in such a service. 
 
24. A budgeted amount to be raised through a combination of small foundation grants, and donations from individuals and corporations. 
 
25. Fundraising target to be met through activities carried out by the staff and clients of the financial services center. 
 
26. ID cards are to be issued for a $6 fee that is essentially cost recovery (see note 11). 
  
27. see note 16. 
 
28. see note 17. 
 
29. Assumes that the micro-loan coordinator could be  a staff person seconded from an existing non -profit organization at no cost.  There is historical  
 precedent for this in the CED sector.  SEED Winnipeg was launched with staff ‘borrowed’ from C.E.D.A. and M.C.C. 
 
30. Fee and interest income from the micro-loans, see Appendix  E. 
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Appendix G (B)-  Feasibility Calculation- Hypothetical Community Pawnshop 
      
# loans/month avg loan size loan capital  # loans/year $ loaned/year monthly rate annual rate  
300  70  $21,000   3600  $252,000 30%  360%   
      
Expenses   note   
cost of capital   a 1680  
loss on sold items  b 2520  
staff (2 f.t.e. @ $24,000)  c 55200  
rent (1000 sq. ft @ $8)  d 8000  
utilities    e 1000  
miscellaneous   f 2400  
security    g 2400  
advertising   h 2400  
 
total expenses   i $75,600  
 
total revenue    j $75,600  
 
Profit/Loss         $0  
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Appendix G (B (continued) -  Notes to the Feasibility Calculation- Hypothetical Community Pawnshop 
 
a. Cost of the loan capital of $21,000 assuming that it will require an annual return of 8%. It is assumed that this loan capital can be fully lent out  
 through pawns every 30 days. Extensions of pawns are assumed to be under conditions identical to the original pawn. 
 
b. Assumes a loan loss provision of 1% of all dollars loaned during the year.   This implies that  the staff are 99% accurate in estimating the re-sale value  
 of collateral items. 
 
c. Assumes 2 full-time staff, which would allow for longer hours of operation.  The staff are projected to perform similarly to pawn shop employees from  
 other  jurisdiction in terms of  both number of pawns and amount lent per employee.  
 
d. Rent is based on a small pawn shop of 1,000 square feet that would specialize in smaller  high value items such as jewelry.    Taking electronics, tools,  
 appliances, etc. would likely require more room. 
 
e. Assumes heat, water and property taxes are included in  the rent, leaving $83 per month for hydro and phone. 
 
f. An allowance of $200 per month for  miscellaneous expenses such as insurance, cost of documenting transactions, etc. 
 
g. An allowance of $200 per month for a monitored security system to protect against break-ins and to provide video security  to deter robberies. 
 
h. An allowance of $200 per month for advertising, which would allow a Yellow Pages listing and perhaps some signage. 
 
i. Total of lines a through h.  This is likely a serious under-estimation of the true costs. 
 
j. Assumes that the loan capital is fully lent out each and every month for a monthly rate of 30%, which is about the effective rate currently used in the  
 sector.  The effective rate incorporates the various surcharges.  No income has been estimated from the sale of  forfeited collateral other than simply  
 recovering the loan principal and interest.  This implies that the hypothetical shop would return surplus from such sales to the borrower,  the only 
 social dimension to this hypothetical case. 
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Appendix G (C) - Feasibility Calculation - Community Payday Loan Service 
 
    Loan size # loans  amount loaned Loan Fee Interest  Earned Income Rate/2 weeks Annual 
rate  
   Note                 
   a $100  45  4500      $5  $4.50 427.5        4.5%      247%   
   b $200  80  16000    $10  $9.00 1520        4.5%      247%   
   c $300  65  19500     $15  $13.50 1852.5        4.5%      247%   
      190  $40,000     $3,800       
          
Annual Revenue  d $98,800    
        
Annual Expenses       
Advertising  e 6000    
Cost of Loan Capital f 2400  6%  
Loan Loss/Bad Debt g 31200  3%  
Staffing   h 27993.33   
Staff benefits  i 3359.2    
Phone/Fax  j 2400    
Rent    k 12000    
Security   l 2400    
Bank Chgs & Accting m 6000    
Miscellaneous  n 5000    
Total   o $987,52.53   
        
Net Income  p $47.47    
 
 7 
Appendix G (C (continued) -  Notes to the Feasibility Calculation - Community Payday Loan Service  
 
a - c. Shows presumed loan mix in $100 increments.  Loan fees are $5 per $100 borrowed, and the interest rate is 4.5% for every 2 week period.  The effective  
 annual rate is calculated by adding the loan fee and interest, dividing by principal, and multiplying by 26 periods per year.  This effective rate is a  
 substantial saving over existing payday loan rates. 
 
d. Annual revenue is the total from the biweekly earned income column multiplied by 26 periods per year. 
 
e. A nominal allowance for advertising in the Yellow Pages and perhaps in local newsletters.  This may be under-reported. 
 
f. Assumes loan capital of $40,000 requires a 6% return. 
 
g. Loan losses are projected at 3% of all loans. 
 
h. Staffing represents a single person operation that assumes 3 loans can be written per hour of paid staff time, at $17 per hour. 
 
i. Mandatory employment related costs at 12%  
 
j. allowance for phone and fax costs of $200 per month. 
 
k. Assumes rent of $1,000 per month.  this implies an internet or fax service only, where no storefront is required. All cash disbursed through electronic  
 debits. 
 
l. Security costs assume a modest allowance for an alarm system, based on the electronic debit form of disbursal.  Storefront delivery  would require more  
 cash and more sophisticated security. 
 
m. allowance for book-keeping assistance and various bank charges. 
 
n. allowance for expenses not otherwise categorized.      
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Appendix G (D)  - Feasibility Calculation - Conventional vs. Community  ATMs 
           
Normal ATM Operating Costs (monthly)  "Community ATM" Operating Costs (monthly)  ATM Capital Costs  
   note         note   
security system  a   100.00  security system    100.00   o ATM (deposit-taking) 43000 
phones $ modems b   100.00  phones $ modems   100.00   p installation    5000 
servicing  c 1500.00  servicing  1500.00   q security hardware   5000 
switch fees  d   672.24  switch fees    672.24     
interest costs  e   141.30  interest costs        0    r total   $53,000 
depreciation  f   716.67  depreciation        0      
           
total costs  g $3,230.21    $2,372.24     
           
           
Normal ATM Revenue    "Community ATM" Revenue  
      
# transactions  h 5602  # transactions  5602     
Interac fee  i 1.25  Interac fee  1.25     
% home transactions j 35%  % home transactions 35%     
fee revenue  k 3058.69  fee revenue  3058.69     
less proprietary chgs l 686.25  less proprietary chgs 686.25     
net revenue  m $2,372.45 net revenue  $2,372.45     
           
           
Profit/Loss  n -$857.76 Profit/Loss  $0.21     
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Appendix G (D (continued) -  Notes to the Feasibility Calculation - Conventional vs. Community  ATMs 
 
note 
 
a. Reflects monthly cost for a monitored alarm that is sensitive to shaking or  hammering.  Common cost to both scenarios. 
 
 
b. Reflects monthly costs for 2 phone lines for ATM data transmission and alarm hook-up.  Common cost to both scenarios. 
 
c. Approximate cost to service an ATM on a daily basis, which is required for deposit-taking  machines.  (replenishing cash, picking up deposits).   
 Includes an  allowance for repairs.  Common cost to both scenarios. 
 
d. Switch fees are estimated at $0.12 per transaction, and are fees charged by Interac to be part of the network. Common cost to both scenarios. 
 
e. Crude interest based on the financing of an ATM purchase over 60 months at 5% interest.  Financial Institutions can finance their ATM purchases  
 internally at prime + 1%.  In the community scenario, it is assumed the purchase of the ATM will be made with grants, and that there will be no  
 financing cost necessary. 
 
f. Monthly cost of straight-line depreciation over 5 years on the cost of the ATM at $43,000.  The community non-profit will not have to depreciate the  
 ATM for tax purposes.   It is assumed that at the end of the machines useful life, the customer base will be established enough to make the 
  business  case for the financial institution to replace the machine.   
 
g. Total monthly operating costs of the ATM based on the volume of transactions from line h. 
 
 
h. Transactions of 5,600 will be the break even point for the community ATM, all other assumptions holding true.  The regular ATM is projected at a  
 similar level for comparison  purposes.  Under normal circumstances, 8,000 transactions are required for an ATM to breakeven. 
 
i. Interac Fee charged for each transaction conducted at another insti tution's ATM.   
 
j. It is assumed that 35% of the transactions will be on accounts held in the host financial institution, with 65% of transactions on accounts from other  
 banks and credit unions. 
 
k. This is the revenue generated by the 3,641  non-host transactions (5602 x 65%) at $0.84 per transaction.  This is the portion of the $1.25 that is credited  
 to the host financial institution. 
 
l. Interac will charge a fee of about $0.35 per transaction  on accounts in the host institution.  Using Assiniboine Credit Union as an example,  an account  
 holder at ACU is not charged an  Interac fee for using a credit union ATM .  ACU absorbs this cost as part of the cost of servicing  members. 
 10
 
m. Net revenue is the total of lines h through l, and is the same in both scenarios. 
 
n. Example shows that at 5,602 monthly transactions the conventional ATM would operate at a loss of $857.76 per month, while the community ATM  
 would break even.  This is achieved by taking the interest and depreciation costs out of the community ATM scenario. 
 Appendix ÒDÓ (continued) - Notes to Feasibility Calculation - Conventional vs. Community  ATMs  
 
o. A deposit-taking ATM that meets applicable standards will cost about $43,000.  If the  machine is operated by a recognized financial institution, it  
 needs to meet standards set by the Underwriters Laboratory in order to be insured.  A cash-dispensing  ATM (no deposits) that meets the same standard  
 would be about $33,000.   Used 'white label' cash dispensers can be had for as little as $7,000 - $15,000,  but do not meet the UL standard. 
 
p. Installation costs vary by site, and this assumes an ATM can be placed in a building without major renovations. 
 
q. Security hardware would generally include a digital camera linked to a PC, which stores digital video on a hard drive.  The camera records only when  
 it detects motion near the ATM,  and up to one week of video footage can be stored on the hard drive.  The PC comes with a CD burner, so video that is 
 of interest to the authorities can be fixed in a permanent record.  Hardware costs are about $3,500 with an additional $1,500 allowance for installation. 
 
r. Total capital costs for the ATM and security hardware, installed.  (total of lines o through q). 
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Appendix G (E) - Feasibility Calculation - Micro Loan Fund 
            
 Admin fee= $3.25  Rate/month 3.00%  Total Loan Volume=  $65,280  Projected loss rate=  10%     
                    
note  month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 TOTALS 
      loan size term              
a $40 30 days 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 360 
                
b 60 30 days 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 120 
  60 days 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 144 
  90 days   7   7   7   7   7   7   7   7   7   7   7   7 84 
               348 
c 100 30 days 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 120 
  60 days   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   5   60 
  90 days 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 120 
               300 
                
d Cash Outflow 5440 5440 5440 5440 5440 5440 5440 5440 5440 5440 5440 5440 $65,280 
                
e fees 30 days 0 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 1788 
  60 days 0   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55 608 
  90 days 0   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55 608 
               $3,003 
                
f   P & I paid 30 days 0 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 31724 
  60 days 0 628 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 13194 
  90 days 0 488 975 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 14626 
               $59,544 
g   Cash Inflow  0 4273 5389 5876 5876 5876 5876 5876 5876 5876 5876 5876 $62,547 
 
     start              
h   Balance $10,000 4560 3393 3342 3778 4214 4650 5086 5522  5959 6395 6831 7267  
 12
                    
 Average Monthly Revenue  Average Annual Revenue  Average Annual Expenses       
 Fees $273   Fees $3,276   loan loss  $6,528      
 Interest $285   Interest $3,420   cost of capital (2.5%)    $250      
 TOTAL: $558   TOTAL: $6,696   TOTAL:   $6,778  
                
         Annual Profit/(Loss): -$82.00        
 
 
Appendix G (E (continued) -  Notes to the Feasibility Calculation- Micro Loan Fund 
 
note 
a. Assumes 30 loans made each month for $40 each.  All $40 loans are on 30 day terms.  This constitutes 37.5% of all loans. 
 
b. Assumes 29 loans for $60 each, split among 30, 60, and 90 day terms.   
 
c. Assumes 25 loans for $100 each, split among 30, 60, and 90 day terms.  Shows a shift towards longer terms for larger amount. 
 
d. Shows total value of loans disbursed for the month, totaling $65,280 in loans for the year.  This means the loan capital of $10,000 is turning over 6.5  
 times. 
 
e. Shows fee income broken down by loan term.  Fees are charged at $3.25 per loan, regardless of  term or loan size, and are added to the first payment 30  
 days after the loan is disbursed. 
 
f. Shows the Principal & Interest payments made on loans, broken down by loan term.   Interest is calculated by multiplying the rate by the number of  
 months defined by the term.  This simple interest calculation is added to the principal and divided by the number of payments.  One, two, or three  
 equal payments are made depending on the term. 
 
g. Cash inflow if cash from the P & I payments and fees is collected. 
 
h. Balance line shows how much cash is available for lending in any given month.  The capital of  $10,000 could likely support a higher volume of loans  
 and/or a limited seasonal fluctuation in demand. 
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Operating Assumptions: 
 
Average Monthly  
Revenue:  Looks at the average monthly fees and the interest accrued on the  typical loan mix from the pro-forma cashflow. 
 
Average Annual  
Revenue:  This figure does not match exactly with the cashflow, as some of the loans still have outstanding balances at year end.  For 
simplicity,  
   we are taking the fees and interes t into income in the month in which the loan is disbursed.   Therefore  the annual revenues are simply  
   twelve  times the average monthly revenues. 
 
Average Annual  
Expenses:  No staff cost is shown, on the assumption this will be a form of social subsidy.   Loan losses are calculated by multiplying the loan loss  
   rate by the total volume of loans in the year.  This is expensed against earned revenue.  It is assumed that a source of social capital 
can  
   be identified which will make $10,000 available for a return of 2.5%. 
 
Profit/Loss:  Revenue less Expenses, excluding staff costs.  The test for viability is if the fund can cover loan losses and give a modest return on 
capital 
   from earned revenues. 
 
The remaining assumptions on the administrative fee, rate, total loan volume and projected loss rate are self-explanatory. 
 
 

 
	




 !" #
$%
	
	


	
	





  !
"
#"$	%&'(
	)	
%&%
	"	%
	*	%		)&	
'"	

 
%&'
(
	+
	,

	-

.
	



-	*	
/**0		

	
	

*	

/*01
,+	
	
	
)2	%
3
		
2	41(	$**	
	
*
)


++++
	
		$

-	

1(	
	
-
+
			

		

5.*
	
	/501
5
		
-		
	
		
	

$

.

15	

+

+
	
	6	

	*
+*			/6*0	
*			)		6
*	
/*)6*01		+(*		

	
+5%	3

	-+&

%-	
	,1
$ 
        
(# %
 
	
		)		7
				

				 
			!	"#		
!$%
+	8.
	
+

&	!
	'(!)	
	!*#	*+
)
,&#			-$
 
)$*
 	




	




	

		

 


	








	


 





 













!
!
 





"
 
+
9 " *:;-



	
-		

81
9 , (	" !-


*<-

+
	
%

%+

	$%++

	%	
		$
	


	1
 
+./0
9 !)"
'#"+

+
	
	
-	
++

		$

+			15	
-			
		
	+-.

%	+
1=			
-	
	$-
	8.	
+
1
9 
"1"-"(-+

-
	$>-
+
	$
	-
$.

+	1
9 
$ %+
	+	-	
+	


	?	

+

	.+	

+		

	-
	
		
+
+
	
	
1
 



	
	

@-
3-'3-.

5
*

(	"$'



2
5'

'58	

)
	
'
	

*

'
	*

3-+	
	
'
(		

)	$	
>

	
	
&	
'-
(

"
=

&

&

/A0'"	$
"	*
5+	%5	
'B	

 
	
	
	
		



	
	




 !""#$
!%&$	'	&	!
 
(

)*+
&	$
),

	-
.&
	
/0
'

	!


.
1
!	$

)


 
*+
&	$
) 
	+

!	$2
. -3	!		+
	1	

	
		+		+	41
	5	$/6  78
. -			/-5""8
	""/"""	
	+9::"/"""41	

	1	

9	61607



!	$
	#	0
 
;!41	

		1	,


/
6 <71""#







 
 
  


 
 
               

	








 
 
  


























	






















	




















	

	





 

 
!

	
	
	=	
	
&	$>
3
&	


/6 <"1""#
   


 



 

   
   
 
  



 



 

   
 
 
 




 



 

   


 

	




 
   


	 	 	 	
 




	































	






















	




















	

	













   !  "#$%$
 
,

	-
) ?			!

	
!	$

	2
. &
	
/
	
	
'

	!


. 
1
!	$

 
&
	

) 


	
	
	



	!
	
!
	
2
. @

'A	

	/
. 	
	'	


	
0
 

'?	

) !	

	
!	$2
. 	
			!
	
	!	$
2	
$/	
	10
. 

	
!	$
			!
	
	!	$
2


	
	
	
/	!+

	+
1
0
 

'?	
508
) ?		
	

		

	2
) ;	+	
		!B"
/

		
/
+
	!
500/				6"""C8
) 			11+			




	!		9		
		
		
0
 
D		+	-	

 
& 
 	
,		+2E:"1E6""	+
D		+ E6"" E:" E6"" E:"1E6""

56=8 E6: EB: E6"
=-	 :C #"C "C :C
	
-	 #""C #B"C 7"C #""C
		+2E6"1E#"	+
D		+ E6" E#" E6" E6"1E#"

56=8 E670:" E# E6
=-	 7:C #"C "C #<C
	
-	 :7"C #B"C 7"C 7:"C
2(-	-
+

'?	
508
 
41	
4
	
41
	



	
-

	

5-F8
4
 
;	
E6""4
	

-	
	
&

F	,	
 E6"E#"" E#0## 6G#C
& -F EE6""9E6!0E6"" E0"" 6"7C
 -F HE6""IE60  J0  C E70 < : C
F K+	
	K
E60  J0  C4 E70 < : C
 6J
6-F
E60  J0 "C E70< :7C
	 E70"7 6"C
2(-	-
+	?+1

'?	
508
 

'?	
508
	1	,	4
/		
-	

 4


!

	 
	

-
	
 -F/#	/
	!/!	$	/


!
	1	4
E6""E6#<
+$  <<C
& -F/	!/!	$	/


!
/1	4
E6""E6#:06
+$
E#""E#G:0G"
+$
 6#C
B:BC
F #	/
$
		1	
4
E""E7G
+$ B66C
 -F/	!/	/
!	$		1	
4
E6""E66<
+$
E""E"
+$
E#""E##"
+$
7B<C
B"C
B"C
	566	1	8
E6"" EB BG:C
E"" E## ::6C
E#"" EB# :7BC
2(-	-
+	?+1
 
11?+A		/		
-	

 
& 	
	

- EG## EB7 EB 6
=?+ 6<  "
;			 E6/7BG E<B: E6/6BB
-
-	58 76C 6"C :C
-
	
-	 7< C 6"C #":C
2(-	-
+	?+1

'?	
508
 
;	A	

	&
;	A	 6:C
E#""/:C
	

	
A
	;
	 6"+$
	
E:""LL E::
	
M-	 <BC
2(-	-
+	?+1
LLA
	A		
	41	
0

'?	
508
 
)


	N?	/

			


	
+


			
	!	$	


2
)	
4	+1
	

6"16		

),		+/				1
1+
		

		
B"C6"""C/		

	

						!	$


0

'?	
508
 

	=	
	&	$	
3

,+
= ;		


3
>&	$ 
!
;		

	

	
 

3



!

3
 E70"" 6: E"0:" E"0G:
FO	
	
	
 E0"" G
@


3
 E70 : 6: E"0:" E"0:"
	 E#0B: 60# E"0:" E"0B#
&	$
&	$=	 E#0:" 6" E"0:" E60""
-& E70"" 6 E"0B" E"0B"
,	
	&	$ E0 : <
	
	&	$ E#0:" 6
	&	$ E70"" 6: E"0:" E"0G:

	!	$ E#0 : 6 E"0:" E60""
;F			; E#0 : 67
	 E#0B 660 E"0:# E"0<7
2(-	-
+/	
	!	$+!
		

'?	
508
 
) ?	/	

	
$	
	+

0
+	!	


			




	
	
0
@++2
. +

		
+
	+!$	
		'
	

	1	
	
!





'
	!


 

'
	!

508
. 	
!

	
			
	/	+
'41	
	!

	9	1	
			

. 	
+
	

	
	
/

		1	
1	

			
+	
	$
. 
	/
!	$
		
	

		

 

'	

) ;			
	+1+
				
	
!
		!
		

	0
. 	+	
		
!+
	
	


	1		11+

. 	+	

+
11+	
	1	
	'	
!5

/
	'
		
M
		80-	
11+
+

	

!
	
	!
P	1
0Q
) @+	!!+	
		
	
2
. 
	'
	
!
. 
	
 
?&
	

) 			+!$+$+
0
?			
	$+
		


1
	9		

	

+		0
) 	
	
		
		

!	$/+

	/


11+
	!
		
0?
	
!

!O
	!	
			
0
 

Q
1
&	$
) 
	



	

!	$
0
!	$Q



+

	

Q

1
!	$

!	$0-2
. 
	+	41	

	

$	+1
!	$
. 
	1		
	
$	+

1
!	$0
 

 
 
& 
 	
,	
 <:C  :C  "C
1	
 6:C :C 6"C
	
 :"C :"C
!

	 :"C G"C :"C :GC
1!

	 :"C #"C :"C 7#C
	 B"C :"C #"C 7GC
=	 7"C :"C G"C :#C
2(-	-
+
	
	
		
 

Q		

 
 
& 	



 B"C 		
	!

!
 7C 		
	!
!

	 G:C <:C <"C
1!

	 :C 6:C "C
	 7"C <"C B"C
=	 B"C "C 7"C
-

 <"C  "C <:C
2(-	-
+
 
!"		
 
) 	


	
	



	
	

	
!

A2
. 
	
				58
	
!

		!
	
	
	

. ;



M

	
	/
	
	+	

	+
;


 
) 	
	
	
2
=	
!		



58	
. 	

!+

	
!

	

. 
	$1
			+	


	




!+

;


 
) 

	$1
	
	
2
. 

	
1!		


	

1	
0-	
	
		
+

+$+

	
!	$

!+

		
0
. 	
	

		
		

+


	
	
	
		


0
;


